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(영문) 서울고등법원 2015.08.19 2015누30311

요양불승인처분취소

Text

1. Revocation of a judgment of the first instance;

2. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

3. All costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Reasons

1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, which partially accepted the judgment, is the same as the corresponding part of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, from “the developments leading up to the disposition of first instance” to “the summary of the Plaintiff’s assertion.” As such, it shall be cited in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and Article

2. Whether the disposition is lawful;

(a) as shown in the Attachment of the relevant statutes;

B. Grounds for this Court’s explanation concerning this part of the facts of recognition are set forth in Section 3.B.

Since it is the same as the statement in the port, it is cited in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

C. Unless the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act has a special provision that recognizes an accident that occurred while commuting to and from work by ordinary means and route, it cannot be deemed that the worker’s commuting to and from work is under the control and management of an ordinary employer, and unless the worker has a special provision that recognizes the accident that occurred during his/her commuting to and from work by ordinary means and route, the accident that occurred during his/her commuting to and from work cannot be deemed as an occupational accident solely on the ground that the worker’s choice of the method and route is ordinary.

Therefore, in order for a disaster to be caused during his/her work to be caused by an occupational accident, if an employee uses the means of transportation provided by the employer, or the employer allows the employee to use a similar means of transportation, the method of commuting to and from work and the choice of the route seems to have been entrusted to the employee, but the employee was on duty while commuting to and from work.

It is judged that there is no room for choice of the method of commuting due to the urgent work related to the work before or after the ordinary time of commuting or due to the characteristics of the work or the characteristics of the work, etc., it cannot be deemed that it actually reserved to the worker, and that there is a close and poor relationship with the work in terms of social norms.