2. In our Criminal Procedure Act, which takes the principle of court-oriented trials and the principle of direct determination, there are unique areas of the first instance court concerning sentencing, and in addition, considering the ex post facto and in-depth nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the first instance court’s sentencing in cases where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court, and the first instance court’s sentencing does not deviate from the reasonable scope of the discretion. Although the first instance court’s sentencing falls within the reasonable scope of the discretion, it is desirable to reverse the first instance court’s judgment just because it is somewhat different from the appellate court’

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). In full view of the reasons for sentencing as stated by the lower court and all of the sentencing conditions indicated in the record and trial process of the instant case, the lower court’s sentencing is too excessive and thus, it is not recognized that the lower court exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion, on the ground that there was no change in the sentencing conditions compared with the lower court’s failure to submit new sentencing data in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine, and there was no change in the sentencing conditions, and that the Defendant’s blood alcohol level was 0.128% at the time of committing the crime.

3. In conclusion, the defendant's appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act since it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.