2. Determination

A. The lower court determined that there was a special circumstance in which the Defendant may not disclose or notify personal information to the public, in full view of the Defendant’s likelihood of recidivism, anticipated side effects and anticipated side effects on the Defendant’s disadvantage due to the Defendant’s order of disclosure or notification, the prevention effect of sexual crimes subject to registration, and the effect of protecting the victims of sexual crimes subject to registration, as stated in its reasoning.

The judgment below

Examining the reasoning in comparison with the record, the above judgment of the court below is just and it is difficult to see that there was an error in the judgment on the requirements for exemption from disclosure and notification order.

The prosecutor's assertion is without merit.

B. The first sentence on the assertion of unfair sentencing is, based on the statutory penalty, discretionary judgment that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope, by taking into account the factors on the sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act, on the basis of the statutory penalty.

However, considering the unique area of sentencing of the first instance court that is respected under the principle of trial priority and the principle of directness taken by our Criminal Procedure Act and the nature of the ex post facto review of the appellate court, it is reasonable to reverse the judgment of the first instance court that the sentencing of the first instance is judged to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion when comprehensively considering the conditions of sentencing specified in the process of the first instance sentencing review and the sentencing criteria, or that it is unreasonable to maintain the sentencing of the first instance court as it is in full view of the materials newly discovered in the course of the appellate court’s sentencing review.