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(영문) 수원지방법원안산지원 2020.07.24 2019가단5765

근저당권설정등기말소

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Attached Form

As to the real estate recorded in the list, Defendant B, C, and D shall be 25/1125 shares, respectively, and Defendant E shall be 1125 percent.

Reasons

1. On January 30, 1989, the registration of the ownership transfer of the instant real estate on April 1, 1989 and the fact that the Defendants jointly inherited the net K’s property according to the percentage stated in paragraph (1) of the Disposition, as to the real estate listed in the separate sheet (hereinafter “the instant real estate”) as indicated in Gap evidence Nos. 1 to 4, and as to the registration of the establishment of a neighboring mortgage of the maximum debt amount of KRW 6 million (hereinafter “the registration of the establishment of a neighboring mortgage of this case”) with respect to the real estate listed in the separate sheet (hereinafter “the instant real estate”). < Amended by Presidential Decree No. 17843, Apr. 1, 1989>

As alleged by the Plaintiff, the ten-year extinctive prescription for the secured obligation of the establishment registration of the instant neighboring mortgage has expired. As such, the Defendants shall cancel the registration of establishment of the instant neighboring mortgage as to each share indicated in the Disposition against the Plaintiff.

2. As to this, Defendant D, J, C, B, and I asserted that the Plaintiff should first repay the secured obligation under the above registration, but this cannot be a valid legal defense against the completion of the extinctive prescription.

In addition, Defendant D asserts that the Plaintiff cannot invoke the completion of the extinctive prescription, but the Plaintiff, the owner of the instant real estate, has the legal interest to assert the completion of the extinctive prescription regarding the secured obligation under the registration of the establishment of the instant real estate.

In addition, Defendant D argues that it is an abuse of rights to claim the completion of extinctive prescription without paying the secured debt, but it is difficult to find out any grounds or circumstances to regard the abuse of rights as abuse of rights.

3. Accordingly, I accept the Plaintiff’s claim as ordered.