2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Cheong-gu Office

The cash donation contract concluded on July 15, 201 between the defendant and the non-party B shall be revoked within the limit of OOO. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff OOO and its related amount at the rate of 5% per annum from the day after the date the judgment of this case became final and conclusive to the day of complete payment.

(a) Imposition of capital gains tax;

1) On May 13, 201, Non-party B, the Defendant’s fenced wood shed, concluded a sales contract with Non-party RedCC, under which Non-party B and Non-party B agreed to sell OO-dong O-dong 82-2, 270.7 square meters (hereinafter “the instant land”) and its ground buildings (hereinafter “the instant building”) to the O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O

2) On July 15, 201, 201, thisB received from HongCC a check equivalent to the amount of OOO won out of the purchase price, and completed the registration of ownership transfer with respect to the instant real estate to HongCC on the same day.

3) On November 30, 201, the director of the tax office affiliated with the Plaintiff notified this B of the capital gains tax of the instant real estate as the payment deadline on November 30, 201.

B. The defendant's purchase of land

On the other hand, on May 19, 201, the Defendant entered into a sales contract with Nonparty DD Corporation to purchase OO-Gu O-dong 252-1 daily 660 square meters (hereinafter “instant site”) from O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O

(c) the insolvency of the BB;

This BB is in excess of its obligation from July 15, 201 to the date of the closing of the instant argument.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, entry of Gap evidence 1 to 11, purport of the whole pleadings

2. Summary of the parties’ assertion

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The Plaintiff is a tax creditor against BB, and this BB has deepened the shortage of joint security by donating cash OOOO won to the Defendant in the manner of paying the purchase price of the instant land purchased by the Defendant with the disposal price of the instant real estate in insolvent. As such, the said cash donation contract constitutes fraudulent act and constitutes a fraudulent act, and thus the said cash donation contract should be revoked within the limit of the principal amount of the preserved claim amount (i.e., additional OOOwon + additional OOOOwon). The Defendant, the beneficiary, should pay the said money to the Plaintiff as restitution.

B. Defendant’s assertion

1) The instant real estate is jointly owned by the members of the Defendant and was entrusted with the title of ownership on the registry to BB. Thus, the imposition of capital gains tax on BB by the title trustee under the principle of substantial taxation under Article 14(1) of the Framework Act on National Taxes has no effect, and there is no Plaintiff’s preserved claim.

2) This B is not a donation to the Defendant without compensation, but a return of the property to be reverted to the original Defendant. Therefore, there is no fraudulent act itself, and there is no intention between B and the Defendant to understand.

3. Determination

A. Formation of preserved claims

1) In principle, it is required that a claim protected by the obligee’s right of revocation has arisen prior to the commission of an act that can be viewed as a fraudulent act. However, there is a high probability that at the time of the fraudulent act, there has already been legal relations that form the basis of the establishment of the claim, and that the claim is established in the near future by such legal relations, and in a case where a claim has been established due to its de facto realization in the near future, the claim may also be the preserved claim

In light of the above facts, (1) at the time when this BB paid the disposal price of the instant real estate to DD Corporation as the payment for the purchase price of the instant land by the Defendant, even though the Plaintiff did not actually incur transfer income tax claims against B, the instant real estate sales contract, which is the basis for the establishment of the said claim, was already concluded, and there was a high probability that the Plaintiff would acquire transfer income tax claims against BB in the near future, and (2) the Plaintiff acquired transfer income tax claims against HongCC by imposition of transfer income tax, and (3) the Plaintiff acquired transfer income tax claims by imposition of transfer income tax, and such taxation claims are regarded as preserved claims that can be protected by obligee’s right of revocation.

2) As to this, the Defendant asserts that the instant real estate belongs to the Defendant and the instant real estate is merely a title trustee, and that there is no Plaintiff’s claim for capital gains tax on BB pursuant to the substance over form principle. However, as alleged by the Defendant, the actual owner of the instant real estate is the Defendant, even if the title trustee was merely the title trustee, and as long as the title trust relationship between the Defendant and the BB was not registered in the name of the title trustee at the time of the transfer, the Plaintiff merely a third party is bound to believe that the ownership transfer registration under the name of BB concerning the instant real estate was made and accordingly, the said taxation cannot be deemed null and void (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 97Nu13627, Nov. 28, 1997). Thus, if the Plaintiff’s claim for taxation on the instant real estate was not legitimate until the revocation of the pertinent taxation in the process of civil litigation, the Plaintiff’s claim cannot be deemed null and void.

(b) Fraudulent act;

1) With respect to the assertion that the creditor seeking the revocation of a fraudulent act is a donation to the beneficiary of the debtor, where the beneficiary contests that it was received as a repayment for the existing debt, this constitutes a denial of the creditor's assertion, and as seen in the above legal principle, it may significantly change the contents of the creditor's assertion and proof depending on whether the debtor's act of paying the money is a donation or a repayment. Thus, in order to recognize it as a fraudulent act, it shall be proved that the above act of paying the money constitutes a donation, or that there are special circumstances as mentioned above, such as the creditor's intent to harm the creditor, and the burden of proof is on the part of the creditor's assertion of a fraudulent act (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Da28686, May 31, 2007).

2) In full view of the health stand, Eul evidence Nos. 1 to 19, and the testimony and the whole purport of the pleading of the witness E, the following facts can be acknowledged.

① Around 1976, this BB entered into a contract to purchase OO-Gu O-dong 182 land (the land of this case was changed by a disposition of replotting issued by the head of Gangdong-gu Office around February 1987) from OF, and completed the registration of ownership transfer in the name of this BB on July 22, 1977. At the time, the purchase fund of the above land was appropriated by the members of the Defendant, and the FF was confirmed to acquire OO-dong as a church site on June 16, 197.

② The Defendant newly built the instant building upon obtaining a building permit on the instant land. On August 30, 198, the Defendant completed the registration of initial ownership in the name of thisB with respect to the first and second floors of the instant building, and the registration of initial ownership in the name of the Defendant with respect to the underground floors and third floors.

③ Upon the imposition of the property tax on the instant land under the name of BB, the Defendant passed a resolution on July 5, 2009 to pay the tax to the Defendant until the said land is transferred in the name of the Defendant at the Council and the Joint Council.

④ The Defendant Joint Council passed a resolution on April 24, 201 and July 24 of the same year on the purchase of the instant site and the sale of the instant real estate.

⑤ The members belonging to the Defendant recognize that the instant real estate is not the private property of the BB, but the Defendant’s property, and that it was a title trust to the BB.

3) According to the above facts, it is reasonable to view that, while purchasing the instant land with the Defendant’s funds, this B was a party to the instant land, and concluded a sales contract with FF by the so-called contract title trust, and completed the registration of ownership transfer, and the first and second parts of the instant building newly constructed with the Defendant’s funds were owned by the Defendant under title trust by means of registration of ownership preservation in the name of BB.

However, in a case where a title truster and a title trustee entered into a so-called contract title trust agreement prior to the enforcement of the Act on the Registration of Real Estate under Actual Titleholder’s Name (hereinafter “Real Estate Real Name Act”), and the title trustee entered into a real estate sales agreement with the owner as the party concerned, and fully paid the purchase price under the said sales agreement, and the grace period under Article 11 of the Real Estate Real Name Act has expired after the registration of ownership transfer under the name of the title trustee, notwithstanding the invalidity of the said title trust agreement, the sales agreement itself between the title trustee and the owner is deemed valid. If the former owner did not know of the title trust agreement, the title trustee acquires the ownership of the relevant real estate under the proviso of Article 4(2) of the Real Estate Real Name Act, and if the former owner was aware of the title trust agreement, the title truster would have acquired the status of purchaser who purchased the relevant real estate by paying the purchase price to the owner according to the title trust agreement, and thus, the title truster would be in a position to return the relevant real estate or purchase fund to the title truster (see, etc.

In light of the above legal principles, the disposal price of the real estate in this case has the nature of the real estate in this case or the object of the purchase fund in this case, which is the title trustee, to return the real estate in unjust enrichment to the defendant who is the title truster, and it is reasonable to deem that the BB paid the disposal price of the real estate in this case to the defendant is the performance according to the intent of the obligation to return unjust enrichment, and there is no other evidence to

C. Sub-committee

Therefore, the plaintiff's assertion based on the premise that the payment of the price for the disposal of the real estate in this case against the defendant by the BB constitutes a donation is without merit without any further review as to the remaining points.

4. Conclusion

Thus, the claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit.