The reasoning for this part of this Court is as stated in Paragraph (1) of the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance, and thus, this part is cited by the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. The plaintiffs' assertion1

A. The comparison group of the plaintiffs, which are job counselors (general), is a public official of class 8 and class 9 counseling service (hereinafter referred to as "public official of this case").

B. Although the plaintiffs perform the same and similar duties as the public officials of this case, the defendant is obligated to pay the plaintiffs a fixed meal allowance, holiday allowance, and civil petition allowance to the public officials of this case by treating the plaintiffs unfavorably on the ground of the social status that they are vocational counselors (general). This is a tort that constitutes discriminatory treatment based on social status prohibited under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, and thus, the defendant is obligated to pay the plaintiffs each money as stated in the "amount claimed by the plaintiff" in attached Form 2 as compensation for damages or wages, and damages for delay.

3. Determination

A. Whether the job counselor (general) is "social status"

(1) As a matter of principle, the law is a norm which has the same binding force against many and unspecified persons, so it should be interpreted that objective validity should be clarified, and that legal stability should not be undermined by maintaining consistency with all the people as much as possible. In addition, since positive law is established in consideration of universal and typical matters, it is necessary to interpret that the law can be the most reasonable solution for specific matters in applying the law in various cases that occur in society reality. In short, the goal of legal interpretation must be to find concrete feasibility within the extent that does not undermine legal stability. In addition, the legislative intent and purpose of the law should be faithfully interpreted in light of the ordinary meaning of the language used in the law. Furthermore, the legislative intent and purpose of the law, its amendment history, harmony with the entire legal order, and the relationship with other Acts and subordinate statutes, and thus, the systematic and logical interpretation of the law should not be in line with the request of the above interpretation by additionally mobilization. In addition, there is no need to construe the meaning and purpose of the law as a matter of principle, and there is no further need to interpret the meaning and purpose of the law in question.

(2) Article 6 (Equal Treatment) of the Labor Standards Act, which is the basis of the plaintiffs' claim in this case, provides that "an employer shall not discriminate against workers on the basis of gender, and shall not discriminate against workers on the ground of nationality, religion, or social status, and a person who violates the above provision shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five million won from Article 114 (Penal Provisions) of the Labor Standards Act. Meanwhile, the term "social status" used in the above provision is used in both the latter part of Article 11 (1) of the Constitution and Article 2 (3) 4 of the National Human Rights Commission of Korea.

The interpretation of Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, which can be seen as the basis of Article 11 (1) of the Constitution, seems to be the same as the Constitution of the Republic of Korea. However, unlike Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, the concept of ‘social status', which is different from the phrase itself, which is a relatively clear concept, ‘gender, nationality, and religion', is divided in academic circles about the scope in which the concept is included. Therefore, the violation of Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act shall be interpreted so as to have the possibility of prediction as much as there is a penal provision that is premised on criminal punishment.In this regard, if it is viewed as ‘social status' under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, it should be presumed that the characteristics of the same provision that can be equal to those of other items cited as the basis of discrimination, i.e., the fixedness in the sense that it can not be easily changed.

The general definition of "social status" issued by the Constitutional Court is a position that takes place for a long time in society and entails a certain social evaluation (see Constitutional Court Order 93Hun-Ba43, Feb. 23, 1995). We examine the plaintiffs' arguments based on the above definition and the above interpretation method.

(3) In full view of the following circumstances acknowledged earlier, the Plaintiffs’ status of “vocational counselor (general)” cannot be deemed as a fixed position that cannot be easily changed in society, or as a mark related to a specific character of workers, which entails a certain social evaluation, and thus cannot be deemed as a social status. In full view of the following circumstances, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiffs’ status of “vocational counselor (general)” is a fixed position that cannot be easily changed in society, or that it entails a certain social evaluation as a mark related to a specific character of workers.

① The Plaintiffs reported in advance the Defendant’s employment announcement stating the working conditions as non-public officials, and, based on their voluntary intent, formed and worked labor relations with the Defendant, such as the Defendant, and changed the type of occupation into “vocational counselor (general)” in accordance with the Defendant’s employment center occupational integration prepared as follows.

The Ministry of Employment and Labor under the defendant has established a new "general class" in the occupational category of an employment center for the efficient management of human resources of the employment center on the grounds that there is a conflict or discrimination between the occupational categories of "office members, etc. within the employment center" and the need for improvement of treatment arises, and has newly incorporated the human resources in the occupational category of an employment counselor and abolished all the occupational categories of an existing "office members," thereby incorporating them into a general counselor (hereinafter referred to as "vocational counselor") among the employment counselors. Therefore, the types of work such as the "office members, etc. to which the plaintiffs belong," and the "vocational counselor" was integrated into a single job category (the single job classification system of a single job category of an employment counselor has been revised to five stages including a general counselor at the existing fourth stage). (iii) Those who acquired a specific qualification or qualification qualification of an employment center as a "office member, etc." under Article 3 of the National Technical Qualifications Act or a person who has acquired a specific qualification or qualification of at least Grade 2, a person who has not obtained a qualification of at least Grade 2 national technical qualifications or higher than Grade 2 (2).

④ The Plaintiffs’ status of “vocational counselor (general)” as one of non-public official in indefinite contract workers falls under the category of “vocational counselor (general)” within the occupation of “vocational counselor (general)” among the types of employment as inorganic contract workers. Upon the lapse of a certain promotion requirement period, the status of “vocational counselor (general)” is deemed as a fixed position in which the status of “vocational counselor (general)” is easily changed in society.

Even if the plaintiffs' claims are not limited to the status of "vocational counselor (general)", the status is not limited.

Even if the form of employment, which is an inorganic contract position, is considered to be a social status, it shall not be accepted for the following reasons.

The form of employment is not a legal concept, but it is an intermediate area where the Act on the Protection, etc. of Fixed-Term and Part-Time Workers (hereinafter referred to as the "fixed-term Act") and the Act on the Protection, etc. of Dispatched Workers (hereinafter referred to as the "Dispatch Act") have been implemented to protect fixed-term workers and dispatched workers, but it is not a regular position, but it can not be protected by the said Act. Accordingly, the essence of the contract is that there is no restriction on the contract period like regular workers can lead to a result that the wage system or the working conditions vary from regular workers by taking into account the contradictory situation of the contract positions. However, it does not necessarily mean that there is a certain social evaluation for the contract positions in our society or that it is a mark related to the specific character of the relevant worker.

Even if the content of the Plaintiffs’ assertion as a social status, which is the grounds for discrimination, has been changed from the time of filing the instant lawsuit to the appellate court, its evaluation may vary depending on what is included in social status. Moreover, if the meaning of “social status” is premised on not only the overall society of our society as seen above but also the small-scale society of the workplace to which the Plaintiffs belong, it may not be seen as a fixed position that can not be easily changed within that society in that the Plaintiffs cannot be seen as a public official because they are non-public officials (inorganic contractual service) in their workplace.

However, in addition to the characteristics of a fixed position, there is no material to see that there is a certain evaluation of an inorganic contract worker within the society or that the inorganic contract worker itself is revealed a certain mark related to the worker's personality.

B. Even in a case where a job counselor (general) and the pertinent public official are deemed to constitute a same comparative group, if the Plaintiffs’ assertion is based on reasonable grounds, the subject to which the Plaintiffs were treated as a person subject to comparison should essentially belong to the same comparative group (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da1051, Oct. 29, 2015).

The term "discriminatory treatment" under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act refers to a case where a norm such as a law determines whether or not such norm violates constitutional equality rights, and a discrimination itself cannot be deemed to exist in cases where the norm is different from that of the same in its essential nature. However, in order to determine whether a person subject to comparison belongs to "the same comparable group in essence" in order to determine whether the right to equality is infringed under the Constitution, the relevant comparative group shall not consider physical characteristics or actual aspects, such as the intrinsic characteristics of the compared group itself or the characteristics of duties, and a normative interpretation of the meaning and purpose of the relevant provision related to comparison should also be taken into account (see, e.g., Constitutional Court Order 2009HunMa538, Mar. 25, 2010; Constitutional Court Order 9HunMa494, Nov. 29, 2001).

(2) In full view of the following circumstances acknowledged earlier and the aforementioned evidence, Gap evidence Nos. 5, 30 through 32, Gap evidence Nos. 21-1 through 9, Gap evidence Nos. 23, 25-1, 24-2, Eul evidence Nos. 1, 10, 13-18, and Eul evidence Nos. 4-1 through 3, it cannot be deemed that the job counselor (general) to which the plaintiffs belong belongs is essentially the same compared group as the public official of this case who is compared.

① The purpose of employment of private vocational counselors seems to have been to have been to perform the overall duties of the Employment Center on behalf of the public officials who are difficult to increase in the employment. As seen earlier, when the Plaintiffs were to be employed as a "vocational counselor (general)" before they were converted to a "vocational counselor, etc., only documents and interview were available. On the other hand, the public officials of this case need to be qualified as a job counselor (in order to become a job counselor, a person who has obtained a four-year university or higher under the National Technical Qualifications Act or a four-year university or higher under the Higher Education Act, a person who has obtained a four-year university or higher under the Higher Education Act, a high school graduate or higher, and a person who has worked for a local labor office as a "daily employment center of local labor office" for three or more years, and in the employment procedure, the public officials of this case and the public officials of this case (general) are subject to document screening, written examination, and interview, and the purpose and procedure of employment.

On the other hand, since preparing detailed guidelines for the promotion of the integration of human resources of the employment center, the "Clerical Staff, etc." had them conduct specialized education so that they can perform all duties of the employment center as soon as possible. At the beginning of the integration of jobs, they maintained the current duties as possible, placed them on the main duties, such as simple support and counseling rather than supporting, and have decided to re-grant their duties within the center after completing the specialized education course. On January 20, 2010, Article 4 of the amended Employment Advisor Regulations states that the scope of duties of the employment counselors, such as the plaintiffs, are stated in the job placement counseling and job placement of job seeking, vocational ability development, job guidance and job guidance, employment insurance, job related affairs related to employment permission, government agencies, local governments, public institutions and private institutions related to each of the above duties, and the job consultation or guidance affairs of the employment center is somewhat different from the job counselors of the employment center of this case without any specific nature of the job counselors of the employment center of this case.

However, even if we examine whether the compared group has the same or similar kind of work as the plaintiffs' assertion, it should not be evaluated with only the division of work inside each employment center, but the external responsibility relationship should also be considered to have a considerable weight in the determination of the same or similar kind of work. Unlike vocational counselors, the public officials in this case are in charge of the management, reporting, performance management, etc. of various kinds of administrative affairs inside and outside the country, or are in charge of the overall affairs of the relevant department. Accordingly, the public officials in this case are in the position to become the person in charge inside and outside the country, so their authority and responsibilities should not be considered to be greater. Accordingly, the public officials in this case and the "vocational counselor (general)" in this case are different from their contents and scope.

If so, it is without any need to further examine whether there is a reasonable ground for discrimination on different premises.

4. Conclusion

Ultimately, the judgment of the court of first instance is just in its conclusion, and the plaintiffs' appeal is dismissed in its entirety as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Cho Young-young

Judges Juk-man

2) The Plaintiffs asserted that they were discriminated against in the first instance court by the "social status of the job offering counselor, etc." (the fifth page of the complaint), and on February 2, 2017.

I arranged that “the person was discriminated against in accordance with the same status as the General Vocation Professor(3-4)” in the preparatory documents. In the appellate trial, “inorganic contract position” has been in force.

It is argued that the employment type of private vocational counselor (general counselor) is a social status (six pages of preparatory documents dated February 9, 2018).

3) Article 11(1) of the Constitution: All citizens shall be equal in front of the law. Any person shall be political, economic or social literature on the basis of gender, religion or social status.

There shall be no discrimination in all areas of chemical life.

4) The main sentence of Article 2 subparag. 3 of the National Human Rights Commission Act: "discriminatory act against infringement of the right of equality" means gender, religion, disability, age, social status without reasonable grounds;

Area of origin (referring to the place of birth, place of registration, principal place of residence before adult age, etc.), country of origin, nation of origin, nation of origin, physical conditions such as features, and marriage

· whether he/she is married, such as unmarried, unmarried, separate, divorce, death, re-litigation, de facto marriage, etc., pregnancy or childbirth, family form or family status, race, skin color, thought or thought; or

Political opinions, previous crimes whose effect of punishment has been invalidated, sexual orientation, educational background, medical history, etc., and which fall under any of the following items:

(1) means an act under this subsection.

5) In order to have the predictability required in the statutory interpretation premised on the above 3-A(1) and (2), it is too small-scale society, or the plaintiffs are not required.

Whether a social status may vary depending on a comparative group, as alleged in the first instance court in the primary and conjunctive division.

It is not appropriate, but it will be judged with the highest preference to the plaintiffs' claims.

6) Within that limit, whether it is general or former, or not, its class.

7) Under Article 8(1) of the Fixed-term Act and Article 21(1) of the Dispatch Act, discriminatory treatment, apart from Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, which forms the basis for the instant claim.

Any employee or employee who has no fixed period of time to carry on the same or similar kind of business as the basis of a comparative group

The Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act is different from the Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.