A. As to the grounds of appeal as to the primary facts charged, it does not necessarily require the intention of murder or planned murder. It is sufficient to recognize or anticipate the possibility or risk of the death of another person due to one’s own act, and its recognition or prediction is not only conclusive but also it is so-called doluence. In a case where the defendant asserts that there was only no criminal intent of murder or assault at the time of committing the crime, the issue of whether the defendant was guilty of murder should be determined by considering the objective circumstances before and after committing the crime (see Supreme Court Decisions 2008Do9867, Feb. 26, 2009; 208Do9867, Nov. 1, 2010, etc.). In light of the aforementioned legal principles, the court below’s determination on whether the defendant was guilty of murder at the time of committing the crime, such as the background leading up to the crime, motive, type of the crime, the nature and repetition of the prepared deadly weapon, and the possibility of the death (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Do969).

For the reason that it is difficult to see that the judgment of the first instance court which acquitted the Defendant on the primary charge of murder is justifiable, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, the court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free conviction in violation of logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal principles on the intention of murder.

B. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment on the grounds of appeal as to the conjunctive facts charged, the lower court: (a) the Defendant first met with J and K, a criminal conciliation commissioner of the F District Prosecutors’ Office on the day of the instant case; and (b) there was no special motive or reason to inflict an injury upon the Defendant, who was the first Ma, E’s mother, to the Defendant.