[2] The starting date and ending date of the implementation of the collaborative act in order to determine the period of violation, which is the standard element to impose penalty surcharges on the unfair collaborative act under Article 19 (5) of the former Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act

1. Plaintiff’s ground of appeal

A. As to grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2

(1) According to Article 19(5) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (amended by Act No. 7315, Dec. 31, 2004; hereinafter “the Act”), if the Fair Trade Commission proves two indirect facts of “an act falling under any of the subparagraphs of Article 19(1) of the Act by two or more enterprisers” (hereinafter “an act corresponding to the appearance of an act”) and of “an act practically restricting competition in a particular business area” (hereinafter “competitive act”), the enterpriser is presumed to have agreed to engage in such collaborative act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2002Du4433, May 30, 2003; 2004Du9371, Oct. 12, 2006).

(2) As to whether the act corresponds to the external form of action

The lower court determined that seven companies (other than the Plaintiff, cement industry Co.,, Ltd., 200; hereinafter referred to as “the instant seven companies”) which are the constituent members of the Korea Chamber Industry Association including the Plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as the “Mayang Industry Association”), including the Plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as the “the instant companies”), limited the Plaintiff’s business to use it as common cement materials at the time of manufacturing; and that all the acts of the instant cement industry Co., Ltd., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “the instant cement companies”) were to interfere with the instant cement industry’s activities, such as the instant cement industry, and the instant cement industry, and the instant cement industry, which are their joint venture business, were to interfere with the instant cement industry’s activities, such as the instant cement industry (hereinafter referred to as “this case’s companies”) or the instant cement industry, which are their joint venture business, were to interfere with the instant cement industry’s activities, such as the instant cement industry, and to the instant cement industry sector’s combination or the instant joint venture.

In light of the records and the purport of the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below are justified, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence, violation of the rules of evidence, and incomplete hearing.

(3) As to whether competition-restricted measures are applied

According to the records, since slot powder is generally low compared to ordinary cement, as the number of business operators engaged in slot powder business increases or the number of business operators engaged in slot powder business increases or the number of business operators engaged in slot powder products manufactured and used by them only at the time of manufacture of ready-mixed which they produced increases the external sales, demand for slot powder is expected to increase and the demand for normal cement powder is expected to decrease, and accordingly, it is highly likely that the competition in cement manufacturing will be promoted in cement markets. Therefore, the act of the company in this case that the company in this case restricts the amount of ordinary cement supply of cement products or orders or pressures the company in this case to waive or restrict slot powder powder business with the main industry and the basic materials to waive or reduce slot powder powder business is an act that practically restricts fair and free competition between the company in this case and the company in this case, since it prevents entry of the above company and maintains the market power of the company in this case.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence, violation of the rules of evidence and incomplete hearing.

B. Ground of appeal No. 3

In light of the relevant statutes and the records, the lower court determined that Article 19(5) of the Act is not Article 23 of the Act, but Article 23 of the Act, on the ground that the instant company’s act of restricting the supply of cement products to the Ariju industry and the U.S.-S.-U.S.-U.S.-U.S.-U.S.-U.S.-U.S.-U.-U.S.-U.S.-U.-U.S.-U.

2. As to the Defendant’s ground of appeal

Article 61(1) [Attachment 2] 6 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act provides that "the period of violation x sales of related goods and services x 5/100 x 5/100 x the period of violation ; in relation to the period of violation, public notice on detailed guidelines for imposition of penalty surcharges Ⅱ. The period of violation 5. 6 and 10 b. c. Article 19(5) of the Act provides that the starting date of implementation shall be deemed the date of the violation in the case of Article 19(5) of the Act and the closing date shall be deemed the date of completion if the collaborative act is terminated by not later than the date the corrective order is notified. In addition, Article 19(5) of the Act provides that "the period of imposition of penalty surcharges for unfair collaborative acts is presumed to have been agreed upon only when the act is subject to restriction on competition; therefore, the starting date of implementation of the collaborative act shall be one of the two indirect facts that correspond to the external limit of the above act.

The court below held that on May 28, 2003, when the basic materials were in the above supply restriction period, each written statement containing the contents such as the waiver of the development plan for the Incheon Northern Port, and the “to limit the scope of supply of the slurg products to self-consumption,” and that after the completion of the above renunciation notice, Lee Il-gu, the vice-chairperson of the two associations, notified the company of this case of this fact, "after consultation with the company of this case, the problem has been resolved smoothly, so that the other companies except the slurg cement Co., Ltd. have increased the cement supply volume on a daily basis from May 29, 2003, and around that time, the defendant could recognize the fact that the company commenced an investigation into the collaborative act of the company of this case, and therefore, the non-company of this case was released from the supply volume and the agreement on the collaborative act of this case was reversed on May 29, 2003.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding legal principles as to the termination period of unfair collaborative acts.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against each party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Young-ran (Presiding Justice)