1. As to Defendant A and B’s grounds of appeal

A. As to the prior election campaign by December 12, 201, based on the evidence duly admitted by the lower court, comprehensively on the following circumstances as to the prior election campaign by December 12, 201, the Defendants conducted a survey by telephone campaign personnel, such as the statement in paragraph (a) of Article 1 of the Criminal Act, by December 12, 2011 (before December 13, 2011, on which Defendant A registered a preliminary candidate), by the date of the first instance judgment, with respect to the prior election campaign by December 12, 201 (hereinafter “instant public opinion poll”).

(2) We affirm the judgment that the purpose of Defendant A’s personal guidance and improvement of support by means of enhancing his career or promotion of relations with the National Assembly members prior to the election campaign period, rather than just preparing for a candidate and election campaign, constitutes an “pre-election” as an objective planned act that is objectively recognized by the intention of promoting the election in the future, and Defendant A may have a criminal intent to such an act. There is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the pre-election campaign, or in violation of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the pre-election campaign, or in violation of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules. 2) As to the pre-election campaign from December 13, 2011, which is stipulated as an election campaign in which a preliminary candidate is allowed under Article 60-3(1) of the Public Official Election Act, and the act of appeal for support by means of direct conversations between a telephoner and a preliminary candidate.