A. The sentence imposed by the prosecutor by the court below (one year and four months of imprisonment) is too unhued and unfair.

B. The above sentence imposed by the court below on the defendant is too unreasonable.

2. The determination of sentencing on each of the grounds of unfair sentencing by the Defendant and the prosecutor is based on the statutory penalty, and a discretionary determination is made within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act.

However, considering the unique area of sentencing of the first instance court that is respected under the principle of trial priority and the principle of directness taken by our Criminal Procedure Act and the nature of the ex post facto review of the appellate court, it is reasonable to reverse the unfair judgment of the first instance court only in cases where it is deemed that the judgment of the first instance court exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion when comprehensively considering the conditions of sentencing in the course of the first instance sentencing review and the sentencing criteria, etc., or where it is deemed unfair to maintain the first instance sentencing as it is in full view of the materials newly discovered in the course of the appellate court’s sentencing review.

In the absence of such exceptional circumstances, it is desirable to respect the sentencing of the first instance court in the absence of such exceptional circumstances.

(see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). Circumstances asserted by the Defendant and the Prosecutor as an element of sentencing in the trial of the lower court were already revealed during the oral proceedings of the lower court, and no changes in circumstances favorable to the sentencing guidelines are found after the sentence of the lower court.

In light of the various conditions of sentencing as shown in the records and arguments of this case and the reasons for sentencing of the lower judgment, even if considering all the circumstances asserted by the Defendant and the prosecutor as the grounds for appeal, it cannot be recognized that the Defendant’s sentence, which the lower court sentenced, is too heavy or is so unfluent that it exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion.