1. As to the Defendant’s ground of appeal

(a) point of interfering with business through community credit cooperatives;

The threat of force, which is a means of the crime of interference with business, refers to any means of suppression or confusion of a person’s free will, and it may include indirect exercise of authority through a third party. However, even if the other party’s business was hindered as a result of any act, if it can be deemed that the other party’s legitimate exercise of authority, barring special circumstances, such as the content or means of such act cannot be permitted by social norms, it cannot be deemed the exercise of force that constitutes the crime of interference with business. Therefore, even if a third party caused difficulty in business or causes such danger by having the other party take a certain measure, the crime of interference with business shall not be established unless there are special circumstances.

The lower court, on the grounds stated in its reasoning, determined that the act of the Defendant, who is in the position of president of the association, sent official documents to the community credit cooperatives under the name of president of the association and suspended the advertisement on the ○○○ Private taxi newspaper (hereinafter “the taxi newspaper”), constitutes crime of interference with business by force, by taking advantage of the fact that ○○ Metropolitan City Private Passenger Transport Business Association (hereinafter “Association”) is qualified as a member of the community credit cooperatives (hereinafter “the community credit cooperatives”) in order to become an executive of ○○ Metropolitan City Private Passenger Transport Business Association (hereinafter “the community credit cooperatives”).

However, according to the reasoning of the judgment below and evidence duly adopted by the court below, the defendant's working union aims to cooperate with the government's policies on private taxi transport business and promote the rationalization of taxi transport business, enhancement of public interest, and the promotion of common interests among the members of the association. Of the projects to achieve this objective, community credit cooperatives' principal office is established within the association and its business area is the same as the association. The officers of community credit cooperatives are members of the association. The organization of community credit cooperatives is the members of the association, employees of the association and employees of the association. The organization of the union members of the union is the head of the association under the presence of the president of the union, the head of the office, and full-time directors and standing auditors of the community credit cooperatives and the union members of the association are present at the meeting of the head of the division, and this is the fact that the defendant's working union is used as time for reporting the overall affairs of the association and the community credit cooperatives, and that the defendant's working union's working group's opinion to publish new information advertisements in the association's newspaper or resolution.

Examining these facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, even if an actor, who is directly or indirectly authorized to participate in the decision-making of a third party, used excessive expressions emphasizing sanctions in cases where he/she fails to follow instructions, etc. in order to ensure the execution thereof within the scope of his/her authority, such expressions do not deviate from the scope of exercising his/her own authority, barring special circumstances. Considering the articles of association of the instant association, the developments leading up to the establishment of community credit cooperatives, the organization of officers and members of community credit cooperatives, and the process of reporting duties and decision-making, etc. conducted periodically between unions and community credit cooperatives, it is reasonable to deem that both the unions and community credit cooperatives are closely related to each other and that the unions have the authority to directly or indirectly participate in the affairs of community credit cooperatives [see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 217Du13, 14, 567, supra].

Therefore, the court below should have deliberated closely on whether the board of directors of the cooperative has the authority to discuss and decide matters concerning the general management and operation of community credit cooperatives, whether the board of directors of the cooperative falls under the scope of business authority to decide to suspend publication in a specific medium of community credit cooperatives, whether the representative of community credit cooperatives, etc. at the time of the resolution of the above board of directors participate in the process of discussion, whether the representative of community credit cooperatives, etc. participate in the process of discussion, and whether there are special circumstances, such as where the exercise of legitimate authority was iced or exceeded the permissible scope under the social norms, and then should have determined whether the defendant'

Nevertheless, solely on the grounds stated in its reasoning, the lower court concluded that the act of the Defendant demanding a community credit cooperative president to suspend advertising constitutes the crime of interference with business under the premise that the act constitutes the exercise of force that constitutes the crime of interference with business. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on force in the crime of interference with business, thereby failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations. The Defendant’

B. Defamation

As long as the recognition of facts and the selection and evaluation of evidence conducted on such premise do not go beyond the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, it belongs to the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court. Even if examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the records, there is no ground to deem that the lower court’s fact-finding exceeded the above limit. Therefore, this part of the ground of appeal merely criticizes matters falling under the exclusive

2. As to the Prosecutor’s Grounds of Appeal

The “competence” in the crime of interference with business is any means of suppression and confusion of a person’s free will. As such, violence, intimidation, as well as social, economic, political status and pressure by right, etc. are included therein, and even if it is committed through a third party other than the victim, there is no superior even if it is not required to control the victim’s free will, but at least it is considerably difficult to make a free decision or act. The determination of whether it constitutes force should be made objectively by taking into account all the circumstances, such as the date and time, place, motive and purpose of the crime, number of persons and the form of conduct, type of duty, type of duty, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Do5732, Sept. 10, 2009, etc.).

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court determined that the Defendant’s demanding Nonindicted 2 to suspend advertising in the taxi newspaper does not constitute force on the crime of interference with business, but also did not pose a risk of interfering with business, even if the act constitutes force. Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, the lower court is just and acceptable, and there is no error of misapprehending the legal principles as to the force of interference with business.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, among the guilty parts of the judgment below, the part concerning interference with business through community credit cooperatives should be reversed, and defamation parts should be reversed as long as one punishment is imposed on the substantive concurrent relationship under the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act. Accordingly, the entire conviction part of the judgment below is reversed and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices

Justices Kim Chang-suk (Presiding Justice)