2. The Korean Criminal Procedure Act, which takes the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness, has a unique area for sentencing determination, and there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court, and the first instance court’s sentencing does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it.

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). In this case, there is no particular change in the sentencing conditions compared to the original judgment.

In addition, in full view of all the sentencing conditions as shown in the arguments and records of the instant case, including the details and contents of the instant crime, the motive, means and consequence of the instant crime, the amount of damage to the victims, and the amount of damage to the victims or presumed to have been returned or recovered, the criminal records of the Defendant (in particular, without the same kind of power), the circumstances after the instant crime, and other criminal defendant’s age, character and behavior, occupation, family relationship, economic form, health condition, etc., it is not recognized that the sentencing of the lower court, which sentenced the Defendant for three years (including probation, 120 hours of social service, etc.) in the suspension of execution in January and June, is too uncompared, and thus, exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion.

3. Accordingly, the prosecutor's appeal cannot be accepted, and it is dismissed under Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act.