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(영문) 대법원 1989. 10. 27. 선고 87다카425 판결
[소유권이전등기말소][공1989.12.15.(862),1770]
Main Issues

(a) Where the diversion of the registration of invalidation is permitted, the legal relationship with the interested person who has made the registration of ownership transfer prior to such diversion, where the utilization of the registration of invalidation is made by an agreement on the utilization of the registration of expired provisional registration

B. The legal relationship with the interested parties who completed the registration of ownership transfer prior to the diversion of the registration, where the utilization of the registration was made by agreement on the provisional registration whose cause has ceased to exist.

Summary of Judgment

(a) The usefulness of a registration invalidated due to the extinguishment of a real relationship is allowed only if there is no third party having an interest in the registration before an agreement to divert the registration has been reached;

B. Since the principal registration of transfer of ownership, which was completed under the name of the person holding a provisional registration under the agreement on the usefulness of the registration that was completed under the name of the former owner Gap after the ground for registration of invalidation has ceased to exist, is evaluated as a registration of invalidation lacking in substance relations with respect to the relation to Eul, who is an interested party in the registration that was already registered for ownership transfer before the agreement on the usefulness of the registration is reached, and thus, if the registration of transfer of ownership of Byung completed based on the above Gap’s title transfer registration or this registration is cancelled by the registration invalidation of cause, the registration officer should make ex officio the registration of transfer of ownership in the title, and even before the cancellation registration is made, Eul is presumed to be the owner because it holds the right as

[Reference Provisions]

(b)Article 186(b) of the Civil Code;

Reference Cases

A. Supreme Court Decision 70Da1630 delivered on December 24, 1970, Supreme Court Decision 74Da482 delivered on September 10, 1974, Supreme Court Decision 80Da2329 delivered on December 26, 1982, Supreme Court Decision 81Da870 delivered on December 28, 1982, Supreme Court Decision 82Da1168 delivered on March 8, 1983, Supreme Court Decision 87Da1232 delivered on October 25, 1988

Plaintiff-Appellee

Plaintiff 1 and 8 others, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant Kim Jong-young

Defendant-Appellant

Defendant 1 and one other Defendants (Attorney Na-ho, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul Civil District Court Decision 86Na397 delivered on December 12, 1986

Notes

1. All appeals are dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be assessed against the defendants.

3. Text 1.-2 of the judgment of the court of first instance shall be amended as "No. 882" in paragraph (b).

Due to this reason

1. The summary of the facts found by the court below is as follows.

(A) On December 19, 197, Nonparty 1, who was the owner of the instant land, concluded a sales contract with Defendant 1 to sell the said land at KRW 6,450,000, and received KRW 6,200,000 in total as part of the down payment, intermediate payment and remainder payment from January 5, 1978, and issued a provisional registration for the preservation of ownership transfer claim on February 20, 1978 under the name of the above Defendant on February 17, 1978.

(B) On September 13, 1978, the above defendant deposited 250,000 won to the above non-party and filed a lawsuit against the above non-party for the execution of the procedure for ownership transfer registration based on the above provisional registration with respect to the above land. However, the above defendant's dismissal of the above defendant's claim was sentenced on the grounds that the court below failed to satisfy the certification of the location agency under Article 19 of the Farmland Reform Act, and the judgment of the court of first instance became final and conclusive as it is on April 14, 1981, the above non-party declared that the above contract was revoked on July 14, 1981, and notified the above non-party of the non-party's refusal to receive the deposit of 6,200,000 won already received on the grounds that the above contract was terminated as the return of the provisional registration certificate in return for the cancellation of the above contract. The defendant asserted the validity of the cancellation of the contract, and notified the above non-party of the rejection of deposit.

(C) Meanwhile, on November 16, 1981, the above non-party thought that the sales contract was cancelled as above as the above defendant, and entered into a sales contract with the plaintiff 1 to sell the above land for KRW 110,000,000 as down payment, and received KRW 20,000 as down payment, and on April 23, 1982, the above plaintiff is responsible for and resolved all legal defects such as provisional registration of the above defendant's name concerning the above land between the above plaintiff and the above plaintiff. The above non-party 20,000,000 won reduced the sales price to KRW 95,00,000 and paid KRW 20,000 to the non-party 2 as 9,50,000 for the above land's debt 20,000,0000 won to the above non-party 1,50,0000 won to the above non-party 2,000,000 won.

(D) When both Defendant 2 and Defendant 2 concluded a sales contract to sell the said land at KRW 170,000,000 as the down payment, and the transfer registration procedure is not possible to transfer the said Defendant’s name from the said Nonparty’s name because it was completed once the principal registration based on the provisional registration under Defendant 1’s name was completed under the said Defendant’s name, and Defendant 2 pretended to directly purchase the said land from Defendant 1, thereby making it possible for Defendant 2 to use the priority preservation effect of the said provisional registration under Defendant 1’s name.

(E) Accordingly, on July 9, 1980, the above non-party informed Defendant 1 of such circumstances, and let the above non-party and Defendant 2 appropriate the above provisional registration by giving up his right to the above provisional registration. In response thereto, the above non-party shall pay 32,50,000 won to Defendant 1 up to November 5, 198. Of them, the above non-party shall pay 6,200,000 won deposited to the above defendant on July 14, 1981; the above non-party shall pay 6,200,000 won deposited to the above defendant on July 14, 1981; the above non-party shall return the certificate of provisional registration to the above non-party; and the above non-party shall receive 8.22,200,000,0000 won received from the above non-party; and the above non-party shall receive 20,000 won, 200,000 won, 2000 won paid directly from the above non-party.

(F) According to the above agreement with Defendant 1 on the usefulness of the invalidation registration, the above Nonparty completed the registration of ownership transfer based on the above provisional registration under the above Defendant’s name with respect to the above land on January 25, 1985. Based on this registration, the registration of ownership transfer was completed based on Defendant 2’s name on the same day.

(G) Each transfer of ownership in the name of the plaintiffs (Plaintiff 1 and the joint plaintiff 2 in the original judgment refers to the plaintiff 1 and the joint plaintiff 2 in the original judgment) that was completed after the provisional registration of Defendant 1 was made, still remains without cancelling ex officio.

2. We examine the defendants' ground of appeal No. 1 (the grounds of appeal No. 2000,000,000,000 won,000 won,00 won,00 won,00 won,00 won,00 won,00 won,00 won,00 won,000 won,000 won,

(A) After recognizing the facts as seen in paragraph (1), the lower court determined that Defendant 1 received KRW 32,500,000 from Nonparty 1 on July 29, 1983, and gave up the above provisional registration right. According to this agreement, the lower court returned the certificate of provisional registration to the Nonparty pursuant to this agreement, and received KRW 6,200,00,00, and paid KRW 32,50,000 as agreed upon in the above agreement. The lower court received the above provisional registration’s payment of KRW 32,50,00 as well as the above provisional registration’s payment of KRW 32,50,00 as well as the above Defendant and the above Nonparty’s promise to sell and purchase the above land as of February 17, 1977 or the above provisional registration as of February 17, 1978. Therefore, even if the above Nonparty’s ownership transfer registration was concluded based on the above provisional registration under the name of the above Defendant, and thus, it was presumed that each of the above Defendants’s ownership transfer registration and its ownership transfer registration was invalidated for the above Defendants’s invalidation.

On July 9, 1983, Defendant 1 agreed to waive the above provisional registration right (right to claim ownership transfer) by receiving KRW 32,00,000 from the above non-party and paid KRW 32,50,000 in full, the court below's determination that the above provisional registration was invalidated by examining the evidence admitted by the court below. It is reasonable that the court below's determination that the above provisional registration was invalidated by making payment of KRW 32,50,000,00 as the above provisional registration, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to wrongful recognition of facts in violation of the rules of evidence, cancellation of contract, effect of deposit receipt, or false declaration of intention in collusion with the court below's determination as to the above provisional registration, as the court below's determination as to the above provisional registration was erroneous by receiving KRW 6,20,000,000, as the above provisional registration was invalidated by the above non-party 1 and it did not affect the conclusion of the court below's judgment.

The Supreme Court Decision (Supreme Court Decision 64Da563 delivered on October 1, 1964; Supreme Court Decision 64Da255 delivered on March 21, 1967) that the theory of lawsuit is reasonable because it is merely the purport that the sales contract as a claim contract between the parties to the transaction of farmland can be effective, and that the provisional registration for preserving the claim for transfer of ownership can be made on the grounds of sale and purchase can be made. Thus, the court below cannot be deemed to have judged contrary to the Supreme Court Decision, such as the theory of lawsuit.

In addition, the extinction of the substance relationship is permissible only if there is no third party who has an interest in the registration before the agreement to use the invalidated registration is reached (see Supreme Court Decision 86Meu716, Dec. 9, 1986; Supreme Court Decision 74Da482, Sept. 10, 1974; Supreme Court Decision 70Da1630, Oct. 10, 1963; Supreme Court Decision 63Da583, Oct. 10, 1963; Supreme Court Decision 63Da583, Jul. 9, 1983; Supreme Court Decision 200Da825, Nov. 3, 1984; Supreme Court Decision 2005Da1583, Oct. 10, 1963; Supreme Court Decision 2009Da12788, Nov. 3, 208).

(B) If the relevant evidence is reviewed by comparison with the records, it shall be deemed that the court below erred in the violation of the rules of evidence, such as the theory of lawsuit, in the course of the court below's finding that there is no evidence to prove that there was no evidence to prove that the sales contract was not required to be terminated as a matter of course, and that there was no evidence to prove that the sales contract was terminated as a matter of course, in case where the plaintiff 1 entered into a sales contract with the non-party 1, and issued and delivered a promissory note with the maturity of 5,00,000 won with the maturity of 1 year after the completion of the registration of ownership transfer under the above plaintiff's name, and then the registration of ownership transfer was completed under the above non-party's name.

(C) Ultimately, we cannot accept the argument as it is without merit.

3. Determination on the ground of appeal No. 2

In a case where the principal registration of ownership transfer based on the provisional registration is completed after the provisional registration for preserving the right to claim ownership transfer of real estate has been completed, if the principal registration of ownership transfer based on the provisional registration has been completed thereafter, the registration officer may cancel ex officio the registration of ownership transfer in the name of a third party that was made after the provisional registration (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Order 4294Dogggghhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

However, as in the case of this case, since the principal registration of transfer of ownership in the above defendant's name was completed after the above provisional registration became void due to an agreement between the above defendant and the non-party 1 on the utilization of invalidation registration, inasmuch as an agreement on the utilization of invalidation registration had already been reached with respect to the relation against the plaintiffs, who are interested parties on the registration which was already registered for ownership transfer before the conclusion of the agreement on the utilization of invalidation registration, the above transfer of ownership in the above defendant's name or the above transfer of ownership based on this registration is cancelled as invalid registration, the above transfer registration in the above defendant's name should be cancelled ex officio (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 82Meu168, Mar. 8, 1983; Supreme Court Decision 80Meu2329, 230, Jan. 26, 1982; Supreme Court Decision 2008Da12879, Feb. 18, 1988).

4. Therefore, all appeals by the defendants are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the defendants who have lost. Since it is obvious that there is any error in the judgment of the court of first instance in writing, it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges who are to correct it in accordance with Paragraph 3

Justices Lee Jae-sung (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-서울민사지방법원 1986.12.12.선고 86나397
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