2015Da30886 Nullification, etc. of dismissal

2015Da30893 (Consolidation) Nullification of dismissal

1. A;

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

4. D.

E Company

Seoul High Court Decision 2013Na47578, 2013Na47585 decided April 8, 2015 (Joint)

Judgment

September 10, 2019

The part of the lower judgment against the Defendant’s payment points is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.

All of the appeals by plaintiffs A, B, and C and the remaining appeals by the defendant are dismissed.

The costs of appeal between the plaintiffs A, B, C, and the defendant are assessed against the above plaintiffs.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the grounds of appeal by Plaintiffs A, B, and C

A. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

Based on its stated reasoning, the lower court determined that even if there was any defect in violation of the disciplinary rules in the process of notifying the above plaintiffs to the disciplinary committee, the above plaintiffs A, B, and C had already been fully aware of the grounds for disciplinary action at the time when the defendant notified the meeting of the disciplinary committee, and the above plaintiffs selected the method of explanation in writing instead of attending the disciplinary committee, and sufficiently explained their own position through the disciplinary committee and the review procedure (excluding plaintiff B). Thus, even if there was a defect in violation of the disciplinary rules in the process of notifying the above plaintiffs to the disciplinary committee, such defect was cured unless

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the defect in disciplinary proceedings, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

B. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

Based on its stated reasoning, the lower court determined that: (a) monetary transactions with Plaintiff A, B, and C; (b) monetary transactions with an interested party; (c) stock investment; and (d) neglect of duties or inappropriate handling of such acts, etc., constitutes grounds for disciplinary action stipulated in the Defendant’s rules of employment, disciplinary rules, and ethical norms.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding grounds for disciplinary action, legitimate grounds upon dismissal, and principle of allocation of burden of proof.

C. Regarding ground of appeal No. 3

Based on its stated reasoning, the lower court determined that the Defendant’s disciplinary dismissal against Plaintiff A, B, and C was an exercise of the right to reasonable disciplinary discretion within the scope of the criteria for disciplinary deliberation prescribed by the Defendant’s disciplinary rules.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on disciplinary discretion, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

2. As to the Defendant’s ground of appeal

A. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

For reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court determined that the Defendant’s recommendation position against Plaintiff D was null and void as it abused the disciplinary discretion, on the ground that it is difficult to view that a monetary transaction with the employees other than Plaintiff D’s F constitutes a transaction with an interested party likely to undermine the fairness in performing his/her duties in light of the name, size, frequency of such monetary transaction, and the acquisition of profits. As such, the grounds for disciplinary action, which is a monetary transaction with F, cannot be deemed to constitute a transaction with an interested party.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on grounds for disciplinary action and discretionary power, as alleged in the grounds of appeal

B. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

Based on its stated reasoning, the lower court determined that the annual allowance was included in the wages that the Defendant would have been paid if it had worked normally from the disciplinary action against Plaintiff D’s unfair recommendation agency until the Defendant reinstated Plaintiff D.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal doctrine, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the scope of unpaid wages during unfair dismissal, as otherwise alleged in the grounds of appeal.

C. Regarding ground of appeal No. 3

The lower court determined that the instant welfare points are included in wages, and accordingly, calculated that the unpaid welfare points and the monthly welfare points until reinstatement are included respectively.

Even in cases where an employer implements a selective welfare program and allocated welfare points that can be used to purchase goods at an employee-only online shopping site as in the instant case to employees on a continuous and regular basis based on collective agreements, employment rules, etc., such welfare points do not constitute wages under the Labor Standards Act, and as a result, do not constitute ordinary wages (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2016Da48785, Aug. 22, 2019).

According to the records, for the welfare of employees, the Defendant Company paid all employees the welfare points equivalent to KRW 1,00,000 each year (as of July 1, 200, KRW 000 points a year, = 1,000 points). The employees used the welfare points received as such through the purchase of goods at the selective welfare Geter site, etc., which is an exclusive online shopping site for employees of the Defendant Company.

Examining this in light of the aforementioned legal principles, the instant welfare points based on the selective welfare program cannot be deemed as wages under the Labor Standards Act.

Nevertheless, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine as to the wage nature of welfare points. The ground of appeal assigning this error is with merit.

D. Regarding ground of appeal No. 4

In light of the relevant legal doctrine (see Supreme Court Decision 2014Da28305, Aug. 26, 2014) and the record, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the legal nature of the unpaid wages during the unfair dismissal, thereby adversely applying the interest rate for delay damages, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

3. Conclusion

The portion of the lower judgment against the Defendant is reversed, and that part of the unpaid welfare points and the monthly welfare points until reinstatement are remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. All of the appeals by Plaintiffs A, B, and C and the remaining appeals by the Defendant are dismissed, and the costs of the appeal by the said Plaintiffs are borne by the said Plaintiffs as the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jo Hee-de

Justices Kim Jae-in

Justices Min You-sook

Justices Lee Jae-hwan