2020Na22644, Confirmation of the existence of an obligation

2020Na22651 Guarantee obligations

1. A;

Daegu Jung-gu

2. B

Jeju

3. C

Daegu Dong-gu

Plaintiffs (Law Firm 00)

[Defendant-Appellant]

D Corporation

Seoul Jongno-gu

Representative Director 00

Law Firm (LLC) 00

○○, ○, and ○

Daegu District Court Decision 2019Da205132 decided May 28, 2020 (main office), 2020 Gaz.

20164 Judgment (Counterclaim)

December 9, 2020

January 20, 2021

1. The judgment of the court of first instance is modified as follows.

A. It is confirmed that there is no obligation based on the construction contract concluded on September 26, 2006 by the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) against the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff).

B. It is confirmed that there is no debt based on the monetary loan agreement of October 28, 2008 against the plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant) A and C (Counterclaim plaintiff).

C. It is confirmed that there is no obligation based on the monetary loan agreement in 2009 against the Defendant (Counterclaim Defendant) of the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Plaintiff).

D. All of the counterclaim claims filed by the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) against the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) are dismissed.

2. The total costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) in total, including the principal lawsuit and the counterclaim.

1. Purport of claim

Main Office: It is as set forth in Section 1-A, (b), and (c) above.

Counterclaim: The plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant; hereinafter referred to as "the plaintiff") shall pay to the defendant (Counterclaim plaintiff; hereinafter referred to as "the defendant") 262,885,650 won and 12% interest per annum from November 12, 2016 to the service date of a duplicate of the counterclaim of this case and 2% interest per annum from the next day to the day of complete payment. Preliminaryly, the defendant shall pay to the defendant, the plaintiff A shall be 262,885,650 won, and the plaintiff C shall be jointly and severally with the plaintiff 202,85,650 won and each of the above amounts shall be jointly and severally paid 6% interest per annum from November 2, 2016 to the service date of a duplicate of the counterclaim of this case, and 12% interest per annum from the next day to the day of full payment.

2. Purport of appeal

The principal lawsuit: To amend the judgment of the first instance as follows. To seek a judgment such as the entries in the purport of the claim in the principal lawsuit.

Counterclaim: The part against the plaintiffs in the judgment of the court of first instance shall be revoked, and the defendant's counterclaim against the plaintiffs falling under the revoked part shall be dismissed.

A principal lawsuit and a counterclaim shall be deemed simultaneously.

1. Basic facts

The reasoning for this Court’s explanation is as follows, since the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance is the same as that of the corresponding part of the judgment of the court of first instance except for dismissal or addition as follows. Thus, it is cited by the main sentence of Article 420

Jin part

The promotion committee of this case, on October 28, 2008, signed and sealed the above contract as a joint surety for the above 202,885,650 won (hereinafter referred to as the "first loan contract of this case"), which was borrowed from the defendant from July 28, 2007 to October 2008. The promotion committee of this case signed and sealed the above contract as a joint surety for the above 202,885,650 won (hereinafter referred to as the "first loan contract of this case"). The promotion committee of this case signed and sealed the above contract of this case between the defendant and the defendant around November 2008 to December 2009, as a joint surety for the above 202,8,885,650 won (hereinafter referred to as "the above contract of this case" of this case, and as a joint surety for the above 1,600,000 won loan contract of this case, each of the above contract of this case was signed and sealed.

No. 7 of the judgment of the first instance, No. 13, "4," and No. 18, "5," respectively.

4. The addition

The following shall be added to the 7th sentence of the first instance judgment:

"Related Acts and subordinate statutes, etc."

The Act on the Maintenance and Improvement of Urban Areas and Dwelling Conditions for Residents (amended by Act No. 9444 of Feb. 6, 2009) and the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Maintenance and Improvement of Urban Areas and Dwelling Conditions for Residents (amended by Presidential Decree No. 21171 of Dec. 17, 2008) are as follows: “The Act on the Maintenance and Improvement of Urban Areas and Dwelling Conditions for Residents (amended by Presidential Decree No. 21171 of Dec. 17, 2008) and the contents of the operating regulations of the Promotion Committee are as follows:

2. Determination on the main claim

A. The parties' assertion

1) The plaintiffs' assertion

A) According to Article 11 of the former Act on the Maintenance and Improvement of Urban Areas, the selection of a construction project is inherent authority of the general meeting of the association, and thus, the instant contract agreement entered into between the Defendant and the instant committee on September 26, 2006 is null and void. As long as the said contract agreement becomes null and void, the instant loan agreement and each of the instant loan loan agreements (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the instant loan agreement, etc.”) in an indivisible relationship are null and void. Therefore, since the principal obligation of the instant committee against the Defendant does not exist, there is no joint and several liability obligations of the Plaintiffs against the Defendant depending on the subsidiary nature of the guaranteed obligation.

B) The instant lease agreement, etc. constitutes “the accompanying cost bearing by the owner of the land, etc.” under Article 14(3) of the former Act, and thus, the written consent of the owner of the land, etc. should be obtained in accordance with Articles 23(1) and 28(4) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Urban Improvement Act.

According to Article 37 (1) of the Operational Rules of the Promotion Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Operation Rules of this case"), the Promotion Committee of this case has the nature of the non-corporate association, and the provisions concerning incorporated associations in the Civil Act shall apply mutatis mutandis except as otherwise provided for in the Act. Thus, the Promotion Committee of this case shall supplement the provisions concerning collective ownership of the Civil Act. According to Article 276 (1) of the Civil Act, the management and disposition of the general meeting shall be made by a resolution of the general meeting of members. The loan agreement of this case, etc. is for raising the operating expenses of the Promotion Committee of this case, and constitutes the management and disposition of the collective ownership, and thus the lending agreement of this case shall be subject to a resolution of the residents' general meeting. Furthermore, according to Articles 21 and 32 of the Operation Rules of this case, it is necessary to pass a resolution of the residents' general meeting to valid the loan agreement of this case.

However, the instant promotion committee did not obtain written consent from the owners of the land, etc. regarding the instant rental agreement and did not go through the resolution of the residents’ general meeting, and thus the instant rental agreement, etc. is entirely null and void. Therefore, the instant promotion committee’s principal obligation against the Defendant does not exist, and there is no joint and several surety obligation against the Defendant depending on the subsidiary nature of the guaranteed obligation.

C) Even if the instant loan agreement, etc. is valid, since the loan obligation of this case constitutes a debt with no fixed time limit, that is, the date of establishment of the relevant debt, namely, the date of conclusion of the instant loan agreement, or the date of conclusion of each of the instant loan for consumption (202,885,650 won out of the instant loan, August 10, 2008, and the remaining 60 million won, December 31, 2009), the extinctive prescription period was expired from August 10, 2008, and the instant loan obligation of this case was extinguished for five years, which is the commercial extinctive prescription period. Accordingly, according to the subsidiary nature of the guaranteed debt, the Plaintiffs’ joint and several surety obligation of the Defendant was extinguished.

D) The Defendant exempted the Plaintiffs from each of the joint and several liability obligations of this case via the head of ○○ Business Headquarters.

2) The defendant's assertion

A) Even if the instant contract agreement is null and void in violation of Article 11 of the former Act, the instant promotion committee and the Defendant separately from the validity of the instant contract, and as such, as the assumptive intent is recognized to create the instant loan obligation through the instant loan agreement, etc., the instant contract agreement, etc. is valid pursuant to the proviso to Article 137 of the Civil Act, and accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ joint and several liability owed to the Defendant remains valid

B) The obligor of the instant loan agreement, etc. is only the instant promotion committee, and the owner of the land, etc. did not bear the instant loan obligation against the Defendant and cannot be said to have borne additional expenses due to the instant loan agreement, etc. Therefore, the instant loan agreement, etc. does not constitute “the accompanying the bearing of expenses by the owner of the land, etc., such as the land” under Article 14(3) of the former Urban Improvement Act. Therefore, the written consent of the owner of the land, etc. is not necessary

Even if the instant loan agreement, etc. constitutes an accompanying share of expenses by the owners of land, etc. under Article 14(3) of the former Act, the relevant statutes and the instant operating regulations do not stipulate that the act of borrowing money shall be subject to the consent of the owners of land, etc.

However, according to Article 21 subparagraph 8 of the Operational Rule of this case, the act of borrowing funds is subject to the resolution of the residents' general meeting as a financing source. Thus, the lending agreement of this case, etc. of this case is effective only if it is subject to the resolution of the

On August 22, 2006, the promotion committee of this case held a general meeting of resident on August 22, 2006 and decided to delegate the authority to conclude contracts with the defendant to the promotion committee of this case. The defendant's business proposal including the contents of lending operating expenses to the promotion committee of this case was distributed to the residents, and the above proposal contains the limit of lending funds, interest rate, etc. Thus, the promotion committee of this case is deemed to have concluded the loan agreement of this case through the resolution of the legitimate general meeting of resident, so the loan agreement of this case, etc. of this case is valid, and therefore, the plaintiffs' joint and several liability obligations against the defendant shall continue to exist effectively.

C) The instant loan obligation is an indefinite term due to which the “the expiration date of the occupancy designation period” was determined as the due date. As such, when the Defendant expressed to the Promotion Committee on November 1, 2016 that the instant loan would be repaid at the time of rescinding the instant contract agreement, the due date for the instant loan obligation becomes impossible due to the impossibility of the occurrence of an uncertain one-year period. Since it is apparent that the five-year commercial extinctive prescription period was not exceeded, the instant loan obligation does not extinguish, and accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ joint and several debt obligation against the Defendant remains valid.

D) The Defendant did not state to the Plaintiffs the intent of exemption.

B. Validity of the instant lending agreement, etc. (Invalidity)

1) Whether the contract agreement of this case is null and void in an indivisible relationship (unlawful)

Since it is reasonable to deem that the selection of a construction project for a housing redevelopment project under the former Act is not a matter belonging to the scope of the authority held by the promotion committee or the general meeting of residents held by the promotion committee, it is null and void a resolution to select a construction project at the general meeting of residents held at the stage of the promotion committee (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2008Da6298, Jun. 12, 2008; 2009Da22419, Apr. 12, 2012). Therefore, even if a resolution was adopted by the general meeting of residents selected the defendant as a construction project on August 22, 2006, it is null and void, and the instant contract agreement concluded thereafter is also null and void.

However, comprehensively taking account of the following facts and circumstances acknowledged by the evidence as seen earlier and the purport of the entire pleadings, the promotion committee of this case and the Defendant appears to have concluded the instant lending agreement, etc. separately from the fact that the instant lending agreement was null and void, so it is difficult to deem that the instant lending agreement, etc. was in an indivisible relationship with the instant lending agreement null and void. Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ allegation in this part is

① In cases where a part of a juristic act becomes null and void as it violates the validity provision, which is a mandatory law, the entire juristic act shall be null and void as prescribed in the main sentence of Article 137 of the Civil Act. However, under the proviso to the same Article, where deemed that a juristic act had not been null and void if the parties had known of such invalidation, the remaining part excluding the invalidation portion is still effective. In such a case, the intent of the parties refers to the intention of assumptive effect if a part of the juristic act was known at the time of the juristic act, and barring any special circumstances, it should be recognized that the juristic act had been conducted even without the invalidation portion (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Da9068, Apr. 26, 2013)

② On May 24, 2006, Article 11(1) of the former Act on the Improvement of Urban Areas and Dwelling Conditions for Urban Areas (hereinafter “former Act”) revised that “after obtaining authorization to establish a housing redevelopment project partnership, a housing reconstruction project partnership shall select a constructor or a registered business entity as a contractor after obtaining authorization to implement the project.” Since August 25, 2006, the said amended provision was enforced since August 25, 2006. Despite controversy over the validity of the selection of construction works at the promotion committee’s stage, the instant promotion committee entered into the instant contract with the content of the instant contract agreement and rental agreement on September 26, 2006.

③ Under Article 2(2) of the Addenda to the former Urban Improvement Act (amended by May 24, 2006), the promotion committee of this case seems to have been able to select the defendant as a contractor by means other than competitive bidding after obtaining authorization to establish the association. Thus, even if there was no contract on the contract of this case, the promotion committee of this case seems to have concluded the loan agreement of this case in order to maintain a favorable and favorable relationship by continuously lending funds to the promotion committee of this case and to maintain the favorable status that can be selected as a contractor when a future partnership is established.

④ Although the instant contract agreement and the instant loan agreement are included in the content of the instant provisional contract, it is reasonable to view the instant contract agreement and the instant loan agreement as separate agreement, in full view of the following: (a) construction work on apartment buildings and ancillary welfare facilities, etc.; (b) the instant loan agreement concerns operating expenses of the promotion committee and the loan of business funds; and (c) the instant promotion committee and the Defendant separately prepared each loan agreement of this case on October 28, 2008 and around 2009 with respect to the instant loan.

2) Whether the written consent of landowners, such as land, and whether it is invalid without obtaining a resolution of the residents' general meeting (esteem)

A) Relevant legal principles

(1) According to Articles 14(3) and 17 of the former Act, where the contents of duties performed by a promotion committee consisting of the cost-bearing of the owners of land, etc., or cause changes in rights and obligations, the consent of the owners of land, etc., such as land, etc. shall be obtained prior to the performance of such duties, and matters necessary for the method and procedure for calculating the consent of owners of land, etc. shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree. According to Articles 23 and 28(4) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act, matters other than those prescribed by the consent ratio under each subparagraph of Article 23 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Maintenance and Improvement of Urban Areas, other than those prescribed by the operational regulations of the promotion committee, shall obtain the consent of owners of

(2) Meanwhile, according to Articles 5(1)9 and 32 subparag. 2 of the Operational Rule of this case, borrowing operating expenses and business funds of the Promotion Committee constitutes the business of the Promotion Committee of this case. According to Articles 21 subparag. 8 and 32 subparag. 2 of the Operation Rules, the method of financing is determined as a method of financing, and the borrowing of operating expenses and business funds is a resolution of the Residents’ General Meeting. According to Article 22 of the Operation Rules, the residents’ General Meeting holds a meeting with attendance of the majority of the owners of the land, etc. who agreed to the composition of the Promotion Committee, and makes a resolution with the consent of the majority of the owners of the land, etc. (including the owners of the land, etc. who

(3) Such a resolution by the residents’ general meeting is separate from the consent of the owners of land, etc. under Article 14(3) of the former Act, and thus, even if the loan agenda is resolved at the residents’ general meeting, the obligation to obtain separate written consent from the owners of land, etc. is not exempted, and such subsequent performance, such as entering into a loan agreement for consumption, may not be conducted without such written consent (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2010Da55705, Sept. 13, 2012; 2019Da259272, Dec. 27, 2019). Therefore, a loan agreement entered into by the promotion committee to borrow funds for operation and implementation of the project without such written consent and resolution by the general meeting, is ineffective as it fails to meet the requirements for the written consent of the owners of land, etc. and the requirements for the resolution by the general meeting (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2019Da259272, Dec. 27, 2012>

B) According to the reasoning of Gap evidence No. 7 and the purport of the whole pleadings, the instant operating rules do not stipulate the ratio of written consent to the act of borrowing funds. It is recognized that the instant operating rules did not obtain the written consent of the owner, such as land, etc. regarding the conclusion of the instant lending agreement, etc. by the instant promotion committee.

The plaintiff's assertion is that the promotion committee of this case violated Article 14 (3) of the former Urban Improvement Act and Article 23 (1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Urban Improvement Act and entered into the loan agreement of this case without the written consent of the land owner. Thus, the loan agreement of this case, etc. is invalid.

The defendant's assertion is that there is no provision regarding the method of written consent to the act of borrowing funds, the ratio of consent, etc. under the operating regulations of this case. Thus, the promotion committee of this case does not have the duty to obtain written consent from the landowner and others.

In full view of the facts of paragraphs (1) and (2) above, the promotion committee of this case's agreement of this case without the written consent of the owner of the land and others violates Article 14 (3) of the former Act and Article 23 (1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act, and thus, the agreement of this case's lease is invalid.

(1) In full view of the following (1) through (5), even if the operating rules of the promotion committee do not include the cost-bearing of the owner of the land, etc., or the ratio of written consent of the owner of the land, etc., which resulted in changes in rights and obligations, the promotion committee is obligated to obtain the written consent of the owner of the land, etc. pursuant to Article 14(3) of the former Act and Article 23(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act, where the contents of the business performed are “the cost-bearing of the owner of the land, etc., such as the land, etc., or the change in rights and obligations,” but the contents of the business performed are “the cost-bearing of the owner of the land, etc., or the change in rights

(1) Where a statute delegates a certain matter to a subordinate statute, determination as to whether the subordinate statute complies with the limits of delegation ought to be made by comprehensively examining the legislative purpose and contents of the relevant provision, structure of the provision, and relationship with other provisions. If, even though the statutory delegation itself explicitly provides for the limits of delegation by using terms with which the meaning can be accurately known, the subordinate statute goes beyond the limits of its literal meaning, or it is deemed that the subordinate statute has made a new legislation beyond the bounds of its literal meaning by expanding or reducing the scope of the terms used in the delegation provision beyond the meaning of the terms used in the delegation provision, it is not permitted as it deviates from the limits of delegation (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2011Du30878, Dec. 20, 2012).

② Article 14(3) of the former Act delegated the Presidential Decree to the proportion of consent of owners of land, etc., which entails expenses to be borne by the owners of land, etc. or causes changes in rights and duties among the duties of the promotion committee. Article 23(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act delegated matters other than those prescribed in each subparagraph to the operation regulations of the promotion committee. In addition to the said delegation regulations, it is difficult to view that the said delegation provisions are limited to the scope of the subject matters subject to written consent, among those accompanied by the bearing of expenses by the owners of land, etc., or causing changes in rights and duties, or delegated matters that may exclude the said written consent.

③ Article 17 of the former Act delegated the method and procedure for calculating the consent of the owners of land, etc. to the Presidential Decree. Article 28 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Maintenance and Improvement of Urban Areas and Dwelling Conditions for Residents prescribed the method of calculating the owner of land, etc., the number of consenters, the method of collecting consent in writing, and the method of collecting consent in accordance with the above delegation. There is no provision on the objects subject to the consent of the owners of land, etc. or any other matter that may be excluded from the procedure of consent. Therefore, the committee of promoters is obligated to provide for the specific ratio of consent to

(4) If a promotion committee does not stipulate specific consent ratio on "the cost of the owner of the land, etc. is accompanied by the cost of the owner of the land or the change in rights and obligations" in its operating regulations, it is valid even if the cost of the owner of the land, etc. is accompanied by the cost of the owner of the land, etc. or changes in rights and obligations occur without the consent of the owner of the land, etc., or if the promotion committee does not stipulate specific consent ratio on "the cost of the owner of the land, etc. is accompanied by the cost of the land, etc. or changes in rights and obligations are caused" in order to avoid the provisions of Article 14

(5) Therefore, in cases where the promotion committee did not provide for the specific consent ratio with respect to “the cost bearing by the owner of the land, etc., or the change in rights and duties,” in violation of its duties, the promotion committee should interpret that the act is invalid if it entails the cost bearing by the owner of the land, etc., or causes any change in rights and duties without the consent of the owner of the land, etc.

(2) In full view of the above facts and the following (1) through (3), it is reasonable to view that the instant loan agreement, etc. constitutes “the accompanying cost bearing by the owner of the land, etc.” under Article 14(3) of the former Act.

① According to Article 15(3) of the former Urban Improvement Act and Article 13(1)4 of the instant operational regulations, an owner of land, etc. who has agreed to the composition of a promotion committee bears the responsibility to pay operating expenses of the promotion committee, and according to Article 12(2) of the said operational regulations, in order to enter the owner of land, etc. who has not consented to the composition of the promotion committee in the list of consenters, the same amount as the operating expenses paid by

(2) According to Article 15(4) of the former Act, since the rights and obligations relating to the duties performed by the promotion committee are comprehensively taken over, members of the association to be established in the future will be obliged to return the borrowed amount from the loan borrowed by the promotion committee.

③ The purport of the former Act and subordinate statutes to provide for the aforementioned relevant provisions to obtain written consent from owners of land, etc. in relation to the business involving the bearing of expenses is to ensure procedures to reflect their intent in relation to matters that directly affect the rights and duties of owners of land, etc.

C) Even if there is no demand for written consent from owners of land, etc. under Article 14(3) of the former Act on the Maintenance of Urban Areas and Dwelling Conditions, etc., whether the agreement of this case is null and void without a resolution of the residents' general meeting, according to the relevant legal principles, the agreement of this case, etc. should undergo a resolution of the residents' general meeting pursuant to Article 21 subparag. 8 and Article 32 subparag. 2 of the Operational Rules, and the following facts or circumstances acknowledged by the aforementioned evidence, Gap’s evidence, evidence No. 7, 11, and Eul’s evidence No. 11 and No. 12, and the purport of all pleadings are as follows, the promotion committee of this case cannot be deemed to have undergone a legitimate resolution of the

① The agenda of the residents’ general meeting held on August 22, 2006 by the instant promotion committee is limited to the ratification of the amendment of the promotion committee, the authorization of the service company, the provisional selection of the participatory contractor, the conclusion of the contract, the delegation of the promotion committee’s executive officers’ wages, the office rules, and the borrowing of operating expenses and business funds from the Defendant (Evidence A 11). Of the above agenda, the delegation of the contract among the above agenda is merely about the delegation of the contract to the participatory contractor and the service company (Evidence A2).

② At the above residents’ general meeting, there was a resolution to select the Defendant as the contractor, and the Defendant stated in the “Defendant’s business proposal distributed to the residents in relation to the agenda for the selection of the contractor,” that the Defendant lent the project promotion expense to the instant promotion committee under the condition of project participation. However, there was no specific explanation about the amount of loan, repayment period, etc. (No. 8-9 of the evidence No. 11). However, there was no specific discussion about the total amount, interest rate, repayment period, repayment method, etc. of the loan in the process of the above resolution. At the time, the Plaintiff A, the president of the resident’s general meeting, was merely the selection of the contractor, not the principal selection, but the principal selection of the contractor, and explained to the effect that it is necessary after the establishment of the partnership (No. 24 of evidence No.

C. Sub-decision

Since the instant rental agreement, etc. is null and void because it is in violation of the procedures for written consent of the owners of land, etc. and the requirements for resolution by the residents’ general meeting, there is no principal obligation under the instant rental agreement, etc. against the Defendant of the instant promotion committee. Therefore, there is no joint and several liability obligations of the Plaintiffs against the Defendant. Furthermore, as long as the Defendant is disputing the existence of the said joint and several liability, the Plaintiffs have a benefit to seek confirmation thereof. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ claim on the principal claim is justifiable without any need to further examine the

3. Judgment on the counterclaim

A. The defendant's assertion

1) At the time when the Defendant entered into the instant provisional contract with the instant promotion committee on September 26, 2006, the Plaintiffs jointly and severally guaranteed the Defendant’s loan obligation to the Defendant under the instant provisional contract, and the Defendant thereafter lent total of KRW 262,885,650 to the said promotion committee. On November 1, 2016, the Defendant expressed his intent to rescind the instant contract with the promotion committee on the grounds that the instant promotion committee did not establish an association for several years after the instant provisional contract was concluded and the purpose of the contract could not be achieved. Accordingly, the Defendant is jointly and severally liable to pay the Defendant delayed payment from November 12, 2016 to the date of full payment.

2) At the time of concluding the instant loan loan agreement with the instant promotion committee, Plaintiff A and C jointly and severally guaranteed the above loan debt amounting to KRW 202,885,650 with the Defendant, and thereafter, Plaintiff A and the Defendant jointly and severally guaranteed the above loan debt amounting to KRW 60,000,000 when the instant loan loan agreement was concluded with the instant promotion committee. The Defendant rescinded the instant contract agreement on November 1, 2016, thereby causing loss of interest under Article 6(2) of each of the instant loan loan agreement. Accordingly, the conjunctively, the Defendant, the Plaintiff A, the Plaintiff A, and the Plaintiff C, jointly and severally and severally with the Plaintiff, have a duty to pay damages for delay from the date of repayment to November 2, 2016.

B. Determination

Since the loan agreement of this case, etc. of this case is both null and void, the defendant's above assertion, which is premised on the validity of the loan agreement of this case, is without merit without further review.

4. Conclusion

All claims filed by the plaintiffs against the plaintiffs shall be accepted with merit, and all counterclaim claims by the defendant against the plaintiffs shall be dismissed without merit. Since the judgment of the court of first instance is partially unfair with different conclusions, the judgment of the court of first instance accepted the plaintiffs' appeal and modified as above.

The presiding judge, judge and judicial police officer

Judges Hong Sung-sung

Judge Goh Sung

1) Although the instant loan for consumption is indicated as KRW 84 million in the instant loan for consumption, the instant promotion committee does not dispute the amount actually borrowed from the Defendant as KRW 60 million between the parties.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.