Defendant

In addition, all appeals filed by the person who requested the attachment order and the prosecutor are dismissed.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. The Defendant and the person who requested the attachment order (hereinafter “Defendant”) on the part of the case asserted that the Defendant and the person who requested the attachment order (hereinafter “Defendant”) were too unjustifiable because they were sentenced to the punishment of the lower court (three-year suspension of execution of imprisonment with prison labor for a period of four years), while the prosecutor asserts that the sentence of the lower court is too unf

B. 1) The lower court’s dismissal of the Defendant’s request for an attachment order, despite the risk of recommitting a sexual crime, is unreasonable.

2) The lower court sentenced the Defendant to a suspended sentence and ordered the Defendant to attach a location tracking device to verify whether he/she complies with the requirements during the period of protection observation pursuant to Article 28(1) of the Act on the Protection of Specific Criminal Offenders and the Electronic Monitoring, Etc. (hereinafter “Electronic Devices Installation Act”). The lower court’s order is unreasonable on the grounds that there is no need to attach an electronic device during the period of protection observation to the Defendant.

2. In light of the fact that the sentencing on the part of the defendant in the case is a discretionary judgment made within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on the statutory penalty, and the fact that the sentencing is conducted within the reasonable and appropriate scope, and the appellate court’s ex post facto nature, etc., it is reasonable to respect the sentencing in the event that there is no change in the conditions for sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion. Although the sentencing of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to reverse the judgment of the first instance on the sole ground that the sentence of the first instance falls within the scope of discretion, but is somewhat different from the appellate court’s view, to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court’s judgment (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). There is no special change in the sentencing conditions compared with the first instance court’s case.