[1] The meaning of "the principle of equality" under Article 229 of the Company Reorganization Act

[2] The case holding that reorganization programs which set forth the conditions of repayment more unfavorable than the general reorganization claims arising out of commercial transactions with respect to reorganization claims arising out of a financing bill do not violate the principle of equality

[1] Even if a general reorganization claim does not have priority, it cannot be deemed that the cause of the occurrence (e.g., purchase of goods, use of money, issuance of loan notes, etc.) differs from each other. Also, even if claims of the same nature are claims of the same nature, conditions may be determined differently when equality is not undermined even if they are differentiated under the proviso of Article 229 of the Company Reorganization Act, and the conditions are different depending on the cause and form of the occurrence of rights, the period of payment, the purpose of the claim, and the difference in the time of the occurrence, etc., unless the difference is unreasonable.

[2] The case holding that since the bill issued by the appellant is purely financed bills issued by the reorganization company without any consideration for the convenience of the customer's credit, which are different in nature from the advanced bill issued by the reorganization company for the convenience of the customer, the appellant's claim for the payment of the bill against the endorsers of each bill, there is a different way to recover the claim, the claim of the holder of the loan bill is not partially exempted, and the holder of the loan bill is all classified as other general reorganization claims, and the repayment plan of the same condition has been set forth in the same condition, and only the appellants are not treated disadvantageously, the above reorganization plan cannot be deemed as having set forth terms and conditions against the appellants without reasonable grounds.

[1] Article 229 of the Company Reorganization Act and Article 233 (1) 2 of the Company Reorganization Act / [2] Article 229 of the Company Reorganization Act and Article 233 (1) 2 of the Company Reorganization Act

[1]

Supreme Court Order 88Ma266 dated July 25, 1989 (Gong1997Sang, 285)

[Plaintiff, Appellant] 92G10 dated June 15, 1992 (Gong1992, 2219)

Seoul High Court Decision 2001Na14488 decided May 1, 201

The manager of the Redmon Industry Co., Ltd. and the Gangnam Group

Incheon District Court Order 95Ma618 dated March 22, 1997

The appeal of this case is dismissed.

Expenses for appeal shall be borne by the appellant.

1. Basic facts

According to the records of this case, the following facts are recognized.

A. On February 26, 1996, the court of the court below rendered a decision to authorize reorganization programs on March 22, 1997 to the reorganization company under the Montreal Manufacturing and Sales Chain Co., Ltd.

B. According to the above authorized reorganization programs, the appellant’s claims are to be paid in lump sum in the 10th year (2007), which is the last year of the implementation of the reorganization programs, on the ground that they are claims arising from an abnormal transaction. In contrast, the ordinary commercial transaction claims are to be paid in full in the year of preparation (1997) if they are not more than five million won, and if they are more than five million won, they are to be paid in installments for three to eight years from the third year (200) as follows:

2. Summary of grounds for appeal;

The appellant was aware of the fact that the bill was issued by the reorganization company with the knowledge of the fact-finding bill through ordinary commercial transactions, and even a financing bill was distributed to a third party, the appellant’s claims do not differ from the advanced bill due to commercial transactions. Therefore, the above reorganization program violates Article 229 of the Company Reorganization Act, which provides that “The conditions of the reorganization program shall be equal between the persons who have rights of the same nature and the same conditions shall be equal.” Thus, the order of the court below that approved the reorganization program is unjustifiable, despite the lack of fairness and fairness, which is the requirement for the approval decision, is against Article 229 of the Company Reorganization Act.

3. Determination

Even if a general reorganization claim does not have priority, it cannot be said that the cause of such claim (e.g., purchase of goods, use of money, issuance of accommodation bills) differs from each other. Even if claims of the same nature are claims, the conditions may be determined differently when equality is not undermined even if they are differentiated among them pursuant to the proviso of Article 229 of the Company Reorganization Act, and the conditions are different depending on the cause and form of the occurrence of the right, the period of payment, the purpose of the claim, and the difference in the time of the occurrence, etc., unless the difference is unreasonable.

However, in light of the fact that the bills issued by the appellant are purely financed bills issued by the reorganization company without any consideration relationship for the convenience of the customer’s credit, which are different in nature from the advanced bills issued by the reorganization company, and that there is a different way to recover the claims by claiming the payment of bills against the endorsers of each bill; the claims of the appellant are not partially exempted; the holders of the loan bills are classified as both other reorganization claims and the repayment plan under the same condition has been established as equal to the appellant. Therefore, the above reorganization programs are not subject to disadvantageous treatment to the appellant. In light of the fact that the parties to the appeal are not subject to disadvantageous treatment, it cannot be said that the above reorganization programs set forth extremely unfavorable conditions against the appellant without reasonable grounds.

4. Conclusion

Thus, the order of the court below that approved the above reorganization program did not err, and therefore, the appeal of this case is not justified, and it is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Lee Yong-soo (Presiding Judge)