(영문) 서울행정법원 2014.1.23.선고 2012구합10185 판결

1. On February 23, 2012, the National Labor Relations Commission rendered a revocation of the decision of review on the case of applying for reexamination of unfair dismissal and unfair labor practices between the plaintiffs and the defendant joining the defendant as to the central 201st century 104/buno238 combined dismissal and remedy for unfair labor practices.

2. Of the costs of lawsuit, the part arising between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant is assessed against the Defendant’s Intervenor, respectively.

Purport of claim

The same shall apply to the order.

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

A. The Intervenor joining the Defendant (hereinafter referred to as the “ Intervenor”) is a company whose business purpose is amusement park and theme park operation business, etc. using more than 4,400 full-time workers, and the Plaintiff A entered the Intervenor on December 2, 1996 and worked in the Ri management business division, and the Plaintiff B Trade Union (hereinafter referred to as the “Plaintiff Trade Union”) is a national trade union established on July 13, 201 for the organization of B Group and its affiliates employees.

B. On July 18, 2011, the Intervenor held a personnel committee for the Plaintiff A with respect to the grounds for disciplinary action as follows (hereinafter “instant grounds for disciplinary action”). On the same day, the Intervenor decided to dismiss the Plaintiff and notified the Plaintiff A of the dismissal (hereinafter “instant dismissal”).

Around January 2008, Article 42(9) and Article 42(2) of the Rules of Employment (hereinafter referred to as “Disciplinary Reason 1”) stating false information and sending the company’s reputation to the National Election Commission on the following grounds: (a) around February 2, 2010, that the company’s legitimate objection to a full-time assignment is unfair; and (b) around January 2, 2008, the company’s files containing personal information of 4,300 executives and employees belonging to us are sent to the external e-mail account (hereinafter referred to as “Disciplinary Reason 3”); (c) Articles 130(23) and 131(6) of the Rules of Employment (hereinafter referred to as “Information Security Rules”); and (d) Articles 2, 3, and 6 of the said Rules (hereinafter referred to as “Information 3”) stating the details of purchase of electronic trade books on July 4, 2011.

Articles 130(23), 131(6), 131(2), 131(6), 2, 3, and 6 of the Rules of Employment (hereinafter referred to as the "Disciplinary Reason 4") of the intra-company e-mail account after being downloaded (hereinafter referred to as the "Disciplinary Reason 5"), and 42(14), 57, 15, and 17 of the Rules of Employment (hereinafter referred to as the "Disciplinary Reason 5") of the Rules of Employment without permission of the company for a long time on several occasions, such as where the attendance at the company's workplace is electronically entered at the company's workplace on several occasions on July 2011, and the employee's dignity is damaged (hereinafter referred to as the "Disciplinary Reason 6") by being connected to the police at the workplace on June 2011, and submission of insulting letters to the superior on July 7, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as the "Disciplinary Reason 71(7) of the company's disciplinary Rules").

C. On August 30, 201, the Plaintiffs asserted that the instant dismissal constituted unfair dismissal and unfair labor practices, and filed an application for remedy against unfair dismissal and unfair labor practices with the Gyeonggi Regional Labor Relations Commission (hereinafter referred to as the “Game Labor Relations Commission”). However, on October 31, 201, the Gyeonggi Labor Relations Commission made a decision to dismiss all of the above applications for remedy (hereinafter referred to as the “decision on dismissal of this case”).

D. On December 12, 2011, the Plaintiffs filed an application for reexamination of the instant decision of dismissal with the National Labor Relations Commission (hereinafter referred to as the “China Labor Relations Commission”). On February 23, 2012, the Central Labor Relations Commission (hereinafter referred to as the “Central Labor Relations Commission”); the Central Labor Relations Commission (hereinafter referred to as the “instant decision of reexamination”) rendered a ruling dismissing all the above applications for reexamination on the grounds that the grounds that “the grounds for disciplinary action against the instant disciplinary action are recognized and the grounds for disciplinary action against the instant disciplinary action are not recognized (the grounds for disciplinary action were omitted)” (hereinafter referred to as the “instant decision of reexamination”).

【Fact- without dispute over the grounds for recognition, Gap evidence 1 and 2, Gap evidence 3-1 and 2-2, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the decision on the retrial of this case is legitimate

A. The plaintiffs' assertion

(1) As to the dismissal

(A) As to disciplinary proceedings

1) On July 11, 201, a notice of the attendance of the personnel committee issued by the Intervenor to Plaintiff A on July 11, 201 includes only the provisions of the rules of employment and does not specify the grounds for the disciplinary action. The notice of the attendance of the personnel committee issued to Plaintiff A on July 14, 201 includes the grounds for the disciplinary action, but the contents are not clear

2) On July 14, 2011, the intervenor notified the Plaintiff A of the attendance at the personnel committee held on July 18, 201. The chairperson of the Plaintiff’s labor union sent a certificate of content that the intervenor requested the extension of the date and time of the personnel committee to the intervenor on July 15, 2011, but the intervenor was compelled to hold the personnel committee on July 18, 201, and thus, the intervenor did not grant a reasonable period of explanation to the Plaintiff A.

(B) As to the grounds for disciplinary action

1) As to the grounds for disciplinary action No. 1, this does not fall under Article 42(9) of the rules of employment of the Intervenor.

2) As to the disciplinary cause No. 2, Plaintiff A’s counterparty to Plaintiff A at the time made a campaign speech prior to and after Group B’s meeting, such as “necessary time, Docra,” etc., the contents of the note sent by Plaintiff A are true, and even if Plaintiff A’s assertion is false, it cannot be deemed unlawful to raise an objection against the alleged violation of the Election Act by Plaintiff A, who was candidate for the election, as a candidate for the second disciplinary cause.

3) With respect to the disciplinary reasons for the third disciplinary measure, since executives and employees’ cell phone numbers, etc. can be freely searched and confirmed through F, which is an internal computer network, it does not constitute information maintained as confidential between employees, but does not constitute information useful for business activities. Accordingly, this does not constitute a major trade secret of a company. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s act of sending the said personal information to the e-mail by himself/herself, a workplace employee, and G is merely a sharing of information freely shared by employees, and thus does not constitute disclosure or leakage. The act of inputting the said personal information to the H for sending text messages to employees does not constitute disclosure or disclosure, since it does not allow the other party without authority to

4) As to the grounds for disciplinary action No. 4, the head of the electronic transaction headquarters does not have independent economic value due to the details of issuance of electronic tax invoices, nor does it constitute production methods, sales methods, and other technical or managerial information useful for business activities, which are kept confidential by considerable effort. The Plaintiff’s main purpose is to store the head of the electronic transaction headquarters for purchase and sale on his/her own computer and send him/her to his/her e-mail account is that it does not constitute disclosure or divulgence of trade secrets, and thus, does not constitute Article 131(6) of the Rules

5) As to the grounds of disciplinary action No. 5

F&B of the Plaintiff et al.; a person engaged in remuneration business in group logistics derivatives has been aware of the fact that he/she freely used the rest time of one hour a day given to him/her, and his/her superior did not raise any problem, which does not constitute a disciplinary cause.

6) As to the grounds for disciplinary action No. 6

The plaintiff A only operated a vehicle parked in the apartment parking lot in which the plaintiff A resides, since there is no parking place around 2010, on several occasions, and did not mention the name of the intervenor and the fact that the plaintiff A is affiliated with the intervenor at the time of the report. Therefore, there was no fact that the plaintiff injured the intervenor's honor.

7) With respect to the 7th Disciplinary Reason, the Vice Minister of Support and Assistance did not go through 30 minutes after the Plaintiff’s article on the operation of the two balls of the Plaintiff A, leaving the relevant article on his own computer monitors for his own business purpose, and let the Plaintiff confirm the number of workers in the office, and sent F&B to the head of the group and the vice-head of the group using F. The Plaintiff sent the article on how the article was posted by phone to J, and the reason why the Plaintiff informed the article that he was aware of the fact while disregarding the security regulations that prevent the non-business Internet during the working hours, but the J avoided the answer, and the Plaintiff A sent a text message.

Plaintiff A came to know the fact that K became the representative of a company-level labor union established in the Intervenor, and sought to listen to K's call, but K did not respond to any response, thereby sending letters to K.

8) With respect to the grounds for disciplinary action No. 8, the Intervenor’s leave and leave under the rules of employment are distinguished, and there is no provision that the Plaintiff applied for a change of the leave before two working days. The workplace where the Plaintiff A was working was unable to freely change the leave, and there was verbal decision and ex post facto decision-making practices, and thus, this does not constitute absence from office without permission.

In comparison with the misconduct of the plaintiff A, disciplinary action on dismissal is excessive, and important data related to the affairs, and data related to the affairs of the intervenor who leaked out his/her work files to the outside, and the worker J of the intervenor was involved in L fraud cases and entered the prosecution, and did not receive any disciplinary action even though the fact was reported to the press, the dismissal of the plaintiff Gap against the plaintiff is against the disciplinary balance.

(2) As to unfair labor practice

① The affiliates of the Group B, to which the intervenor belongs, have established specific and organized measures against the establishment of labor union; ② the intervenor continues to engage in, oversee, and threaten the union members of the Plaintiff’s union on the ground of the establishment of the Plaintiff’s labor union; ③ the intervenor interfered with union activities, including the distribution of printed materials from the Plaintiff’s labor union; ④ the intervenor was unfairly punished or accused under various circumstances; ⑤ the plaintiff’s chairperson D, vice-chairperson A, audit, audit, and secretariat M; ⑤ the plaintiff’s member’s National Assembly N was published, ⑤ the plaintiff was dismissed to interfere with the activities of the Plaintiff’s labor union, taking full account of the following documents: (a) the dismissal of the case constitutes unfair labor practices under subparagraphs 1 and 5 of Article 81 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (hereinafter “Labor Relations Adjustment Act”).

B. Relevant provisions

It is as shown in the attached Form.

(1) The duties of Plaintiff A, etc.

(A) The Intervenor is divided into Liart Business Division, FC Business Division, E&A; and E&A. (Engine & Assign) Business Division.

(B) On December 2, 1996, the Plaintiff A joined the Intervenor and continued to work in the Intervenor’s Ri project division F&B; (f&B) Group. The Group is responsible for the work of cleaning, cleaning, cleaning, and repairing of the main organ, installing and removing the equipment at the time of the group, and requesting the cleaning of the engine, with the 26 restaurants located within the Intervenor’s business place in the logistics warehouse. The Group is responsible for the work of carrying cash and various expendable items (cleaning, cleaning, taxation items, garrising, suspending, tamping, etc.) in the Intervenor’s business place.

(C) From December 2, 1996 to January 1, 1998, Plaintiff A took charge of parking management, operation of restaurants, such as P, Q, and C, from February 1, 1998 to October 2, 2006, and distribution of consumed goods from November 2, 2006 to February 2010.

(D) On December 24, 2008, Plaintiff A was subject to a disciplinary action of reduction of the level of "in-house employee intimidation by the Intervenor."

(E) From March 2010, Plaintiff A was in charge of repair and maintenance work of a restaurant, and the said work was requested to repair the relevant business entity if the main equipment, such as the cafeteria, electronic siren, and the establishment and maintenance of a foundation, etc., of the restaurant, and, upon completion of repair, Plaintiff A approved an electronic tax invoice on the Intervenor’s integrated work computer system (referring to software that process the Intervenor’s integrated work computer system in an efficient manner, such as inventory, accounting, purchase, transaction line management, electronic invoice issuance, cash payment, and cash asset management) through the confirmation of repair after the completion of repair. Accordingly, Plaintiff A used the Intervenor’s integrated work computer system.

(2) As to the ground of appeal No. 1

(A) On March 2002, Plaintiff A was elected as the Intervenor’s employee members of the labor-management council (two years of office) of the Intervenor, and Plaintiff A was employed as employee members until February 2, 2008 through two consecutive terms.

(B) On January 20, 2008, Plaintiff A sent to the division of the Intervenor’s division (F&B from September 20, 2006; referring to a person who was in charge of attitude and welfare work at the support department of the Group; referring to a person who was in charge of attitude and welfare work at the support department of the Group) a complaint concerning personnel movement conducted around that time. The main contents are as follows.

1. Whether it is a matter of consultation with the labor-management council: whether it is the right of the labor-management council.First of all, the assignment and selection of human resources are basically a matter of consultation with the labor-management council. The labor-management council has requested several times including the last nine months to comply with this part, but it has been notified to one of the members and the labor-management members, disregarding the procedures specified in this Act, and the personnel team has been compelled. The most significant reason why it may be unfolded to one side is that the majority of the labor-management members have implied and explicit agreements.2. The number of employees is 3.F&B; the business team is the only problem? It is necessary at the end of the other team.

(3) As to the ground of appeal No. 2

(A) The chief of J held a group conference on February 3, 2010, and the F&B was located in that place; 16 employees, who are group cooks and senior workers, and the head of E, who are the members of the labor-management council, participated in the conference. The above people moved to the Chinese restaurant called the "R in Permitted time after a group meeting was held more than one hour."

(B) On February 26, 2010, the Intervenor’s election of the labor-management council members was held, and E and Plaintiff A were elected. Plaintiff A raised an objection to the result of the above election to the National Election Commission of the Intervenor (hereinafter referred to as the “National Election Commission of the Intervenor”) (hereinafter referred to as the “Central Election Commission”) by stating that “A led by the chief of the J division to make a meal place on February 3, 2010, and is a cook and the present labor-management member, E is in the process of replacing cooking in preparation for the election, and there is a need for time to complete the election because of long term of office.”

(C) On February 26, 2010 and February 27, 2010, Plaintiff A, the Chairman of the Central Line S, the Representative Twit, and U, the Central Line C, who are the members of the Central Line C, are considered to be in common sense to limit the number of members on the day of the investigation. Although the prior election of a member of E is limited to six cooks, the investigation of a member of the Central Line C, who is alone, would be doubtful with the intention of the Central Line C. The written statement of a senior member without any core relation, is discarded. ② After Plaintiff A’s objection, the Central Line S, the Vice Director of the Central Line S, who is consistent with a high-tension attitude in several calls with Plaintiff A, was unilaterally carried out without silenting the opinions of the objectors, and without consultation, ③ the reason and method of the prior election of a member of the Central Line C, who was on February 3, 2010, appears to have been present, and the result of the prior election of a member of the Central Committee is obvious.

(4) As to grounds of appeal Nos. 3 and 4

(A) On March 20, 2007, April 30, 2010, and May 3, 201, Plaintiff A signed a trade secret security pledge (the grounds of the instant disciplinary action stated “information security pledge”; hereinafter referred to as “trade secret security pledge”) as required by the Intervenor on three occasions on May 3, 201, and the key contents are as follows:

I shall be in respect of the protection of trade secrets and electronic mail screening while serving in the intervenor (hereinafter referred to as the "company").

I take the following oath.1. I will thoroughly observe the various regulations of the company relating to the protection of the production method, sale method, and other technical or managerial information useful for business activities (hereinafter referred to as "trade secret"), which is not known to the company while in office, and has independent economic value, which is maintained in secret by considerable effort.2. I will not divulge or disclose to any third party inside or outside the company, except in the case of using the following information which is acquired while performing their duties or without connection with their duties or other business activities as designated for the designated business. (1) I will not use any information on research and development (R&D) plans, work reports and sites related to products or construction-related research and development, details of experimental data, analysis data, etc. (2) information on key service systems (3) such as operation machinery, golf courses, construction design methods, computer program, etc. (4), organization, financial management methods, personal information related to the company, etc., and other information related to the company's business, such as personal information and management guidelines, etc. (5) I will not use the information or other information.

(B) From March 1, 2010 to March 31, 2010, the Intervenor provided online security education to all employees, and the Plaintiff A completed the above education. On May 14, 2010, the Intervenor sent to the employees a letter of official title stating “matters to comply with the regulations on external identification of e-mail,” and on October 20, 2010, the Intervenor conducted a campaign for basic security surveillance against employees, and each of the main contents are as follows.

Matters to comply with the regulations on external release of electronic mail;

In the case of sending out of the outside e-mail system all of the e-mail e-mails (NAV, e.g., the following) - When transmitting out of the outside e-mail business e-mail to the outside e-mail: F using e-mail e-mail - business e-mail : in the case of sending out of the outside e-mail or attachment the business e-mail e-mail to the outside e-mail or attachment, where the business e-mail includes the details of the company's business e-mail e-mail, the head of the department must include the prior approval of the head of the department in the reception of the e-mail e-mail e-mail e-mail see the head of the department, and take measures by which the head of the department to know the fact of transmitting the e-mail e-mail e-mail 10 boxes production and security - 10 boxes production of e-mail e-mail 10 meters security officers.

(C) Every officer or employee of the Intervenor may enter F, which is an internal computer network of the Intervenor (hereinafter referred to as “F”), search the personal information of the officer or employee. The above personal information contains name, ID, company, department, class/title, name, number, Nickname, E-mail, company address, company telephone, company facsimile, mobile phone number, and mobile phone number. From May 2010 to F, Plaintiff A drafted three X-cell files (hereinafter referred to as “the instant personal information files”) for each business division of the Intervenor in the manner of inserting each item after copying the Intervenor’s names, 4,335 name, class, e-mail address, and cell phone number.

(D) On November 4, 2010, Plaintiff A sent a file of the instant personal information to D (the chairperson of Plaintiff’s union)’s internal mail account (W) and G (X)’s internal mail account (the member of Plaintiff’s union). On November 18, 2010, Plaintiff A sent the file of the instant personal information from the above internal mail account to his external mail account (Y). On November 18, 2010, Plaintiff A sent the file of the instant personal information to H using the Intervenor’s electronic mail account (Y)’s electronic mail account. On January 201, the Plaintiff sent the file of the instant personal information to H via the Intervenor’s electronic mail delivery site.

(E) From Sep. 2010 to Oct. 2010, Plaintiff A visited the Intervenor’s Liart Business Department’s office with the ID granted by the Intervenor from the Intervenor’s computerized accounting support book (in part of the integrated business computer system), and attempted to download the Intervenor’s purchase sales data (such as tax invoice receipt and disbursement details, sales place, e-mail list, date of preparation, amount, value-added tax, value-added tax amount, employee in charge, item, management number, reasons for correction, etc.) on his/her own computer. However, Plaintiff A attempted to download the Intervenor’s purchase sales data on the Plaintiff’s own computer.

(F) On July 4, 2011, Plaintiff A sent each of the 11.XS and daxs. XS files (hereinafter “the instant data files”) containing the data on purchase and sale in his/her own computer, using the 'x files’ function of the said system, on December 12, 2010, and on June 3, 2011. (g) Plaintiff A sent each of the 11.XS and daxs. XS files (hereinafter “the instant data files”).

(h) From May 1, 201 to July 22, 2011, the Intervenor conducted an “information asset security inspection” and the Plaintiff came to know that the Intervenor sent the Intervenor’s 4,335 personal information and the purchase and sale data via external e-mail. The Intervenor filed a complaint with the District Prosecutors’ Office regarding the Plaintiff’s act of transmitting the Intervenor’s 4,335 personal information via intra-company e-mail on November 18, 201; the Intervenor sent the Intervenor’s 4,335 personal information to an individual e-mail; the Plaintiff’s act of storing the said personal information by accessing the group e-mail website; the act of accessing the group e-mail website on January 201; the act of transmitting the purchase and sale data downloaded from the electronic accounting supporting book system to an individual e-mail; and around July 4, 2011, by using the internal e-mail to the Defendant’s private e-mail.

(i) On April 6, 2012, a public prosecutor belonging to the Suwon District Public Prosecutor's Office requested a summary order of KRW 3 million only for the charges of occupational breach of trust due to the act of transmitting personal information of KRW 4,335 of the above intervenor's employees by personal e-mail, the act of transmitting the above personal information to a group sending Internet website, the act of storing the above personal information in the personal address register, the crime of occupational breach of trust due to the act of violating the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act (Leakage of business secrets, etc.), and the crime of violating the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act (Leakage of business secrets, etc.) due to the act of transmitting the above purchased and sold data by personal e-mail. On the same day, a judge belonging to the Suwon District Public Prosecutor's Office notified the plaintiff A of the summary order of KRW 3 million (2012Da6192) and the plaintiff A claimed formal trial.

(j) On February 21, 2013, the Suwon District Court rendered a judgment of innocence (2012 high court 1678) on the grounds that “the foregoing data on purchase and sale do not constitute trade secrets, and does not constitute a major business asset, and the Plaintiff or a third party cannot be deemed to have obtained property benefits through the transmission of the above data on purchase and sale.” Although the prosecutor appealed on October 10, 2013, the Suwon District Court rendered a judgment of acquittal (2012 high court 1678). However, “the above data on purchase and sale does not constitute trade secrets, but falls under a major business asset.” However, the above data on purchase and sale cannot be deemed as having acquired property benefits and losses to the intervenors by transmission of the above data on the ground that it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff or the third party acquired property benefits and suffered losses to the intervenors, and the Prosecutor appealed filed a final appeal and the Prosecutor is pending in the lawsuit with Supreme Court Decision 2013Do13819.

(5) As to grounds of appeal No. 5

From April 13, 2011 to July 14, 2011, Plaintiff A used 16 to 27 minutes each time between 8:00 am and 9:0 am in the workplace of the Intervenor between 16:0 am and 27 minutes. The Plaintiff A’s working hours are from 8:0 am to 5:0 am, and the point time is not fixed.

(6) As to grounds of appeal Nos. 6 and 7

(A) On October 29, 2006, AA used the instant car for the purpose of delivery and commuting from the time to December 2006 upon the request of the victim AB to use the instant car for the purpose of the use of the AA car. On December 29, 2006, AD (referring to a person who has worked as an employee at the restaurant in the trade name of the "AF" operated by the wife AE for one year from January 2006) used the instant car to leave the restaurant. AD opened the instant car to leave the restaurant on December 29, 2006 upon the request of the plaintiff A to request for the custody of the instant car from the wife, and opened the instant car to the above restaurant while leaving the restaurant for the employee of the above AF restaurant, and the plaintiff-friendly and the plaintiff-child of AG used the instant car to use the Plaintiff.

(B) The Plaintiff was operating a car for the AJ (number plate on green basis) in the name of AI from the father AH, which was transferred to one of the AJ car in the name of AI. However, on December 2006, the Plaintiff 1 issued the above AJ car in front of the white background by forging and using the documents related to the police officer, and then issued the next number plate, and then removed the number plate before and after the instant car, attached the AJ car to the instant car.

(C) Plaintiff A knew that this document was forged and issued in front of the AJ white background, followed number plates are attached to the instant passenger vehicle and without authority for the purpose of exercising AJ number plates based on the above white background: (i) around 19:06 on September 5, 2010, Plaintiff A knew of the fact that: (ii) around 08:03 on April 22, 201, in the vicinity of the Pung Industrial Complex located in the front of the wife population, ③ on May 15:06 on May 18, 201, in the vicinity of the Stung Industrial Complex, and (iii) on May 19:48, 201 on May 27, 201, the 200 U.S. 1:5 on May 27, 2011, and (iv) on May 19:48, 201 on the roads of the 13:0 U.S. 18, 2017.

(D) On June 26, 2011, Plaintiff A was arrested on police due to the instant criminal facts at the Intervenor’s workplace, and was released on June 27, 2011.

(E) AK Internet news media companies, including the Yonhap News and MBN, reported the facts of Plaintiff A’s entry, but did not state the name of Plaintiff A or the fact that Plaintiff A belongs to the Intervenor. After the Plaintiff’s personnel team was published, the Plaintiff A’s senior vice-president notified the Intervenor of the publication of the publication of the said article, and discovered the said article through Internet search, and the Intervenor’s staff AL and AM were considered to have been seen. The J reported the said article to the head of the Group and sent the said article to the head of each Pte by using the Fmer.

(F) On July 8, 2011, Plaintiff A sent to J text messages stating that “I will pay off this benefit through a life-long text message. I will do so.”

(G) On December 14, 2011, Plaintiff A was indicted as a crime of unlawful exercise of air defense for the instant criminal facts, and was sentenced to a judgment of suspended sentence (201No4802) at the Suwon District Court. The prosecutor appealed against the above judgment. The Plaintiff A was sentenced to imprisonment with prison labor for four months and suspended sentence for two years (201213, March 21, 201), and the said judgment became final and conclusive around that time.

(h) On June 6, 2011, K (the Intervenor’s person in charge of customer management duties at the FC Business Team of the FC Business Division) made a report on the establishment of a trade union by making himself/herself the chairman, the number of union members, and the name of the trade union “CEU” as the FC Business Team of the Intervenor. On June 23, 2011, K was issued a certificate of report on establishment of the trade union on June 29, 201. CEU concluded a collective agreement with the Intervenor on June 29, 201 with the term of validity as a witness by the end of June 2013. K testified that “As soon as the Intervenor agreed on the part required by the trade union, it became final and conclusive”, and the said collective agreement does not include any basic provision regarding the terms and conditions of employment, such as wages, and no basic provision regarding the terms and conditions of employment.

(i) On July 17, 201 and around 18:00, Plaintiff A made a phone call to K two times, but K did not receive the phone, Plaintiff A finished negotiations without public notice. The Plaintiff sent a text message, “A. The chairperson of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Commission,” “I have made a phone call,” and “I have finished negotiations without public notice. I have to prepare for response to the request for the extension of public notice to the court. I have to prepare for the request to the court. I have to do so. The Plaintiff sent a text message, “I have to do so.” However, K sent a text message, “I have to give no answer.”

(7) As to the grounds for disciplinary action No. 8

(A) On July 11, 201, the Intervenor notified the Plaintiff A of the attendance at the first personnel committee held on July 14, 2011, and stated “Article 42 subparags. 9, 14, 57 (Outgoing), 130 (Disciplinary Grounds), 14, 15, 23, 131 (Criteria for Dismissal of Disciplinary Action) 2, 6, 20, etc.” as grounds for disciplinary action.

(B) On July 11, 2011, Plaintiff A asked Plaintiff A to post a telephone on the phone (the Intervenor’s Lit Project Division F&B; the subsidiary affiliated with Group Logistics Exchange; Plaintiff A’s commercial company) on July 23, 2011 and July 24, 2011, which was scheduled to be changed to July 12, 201 and July 13, 201, and Plaintiff A’s non-working period was called “N was known only once.”

(C) At around 07:00 on July 12, 201, NN made a call to the Plaintiff, and “A shall submit a written request for approval to the company with difficulty in entering, and obtain approval.” On July 12, 2011, the Plaintiff A appeared at the Intervenor’s workplace, and made a request for change of the term of absence through the internal computer network (as of July 23, 2011 and July 24, 201, the approval of the change of the term of absence was made on July 12, 2011 and July 13, 2011). (d) The head of the Intervenor’s division made a request for change of the term of absence to the Plaintiff 10:0 on July 12, 2011, the direction was changed to the Plaintiff’s 10:00 leave of absence and the direction was changed to the Plaintiff’s 1. The change of the Plaintiff’s term “A and 10:00 leave of absence was changed.”

(E) On July 12, 201, Plaintiff D, etc. held a general meeting for the establishment of Plaintiff’s Trade Union on July 7, 201.

(f) On July 13, 2011, NN rejected the Plaintiff’s request for its approval on the ground that “the applicant should consult with the supportJ responsibility for the relationship on the full-day holiday.”

(G) On July 13, 2011, Plaintiff Labor Union submitted a trade union establishment report to Plaintiff A with its name “B labour union”, “Seoul Yeongdeungpo-gu AO building 213, the seat of its main office “Seoul Yeongdeungpo-gu AO building 213, the number of union members, four representative D, and vice-chairperson.”

(h) On July 14, 201, Plaintiff A attended the first personnel committee on July 14, 201, and requested the postponement of the personnel committee on the grounds that it is impossible to vindicate the grounds for disciplinary action in the notice of attendance, etc.

(B) On July 14, 2011, the Intervenor sent to the Plaintiff a notice of the second personnel committee attendance, which was held on July 18, 2011, stating the grounds for the instant disciplinary action, to the Plaintiff A. The Plaintiff was served on July 15, 201.

(j) On July 18, 201, Plaintiff A requested postponement of the personnel committee for the preparation of substantive vindication on the grounds that the grounds for disciplinary action are unclear at the second personnel committee. However, the Intervenor continued to proceed with the second personnel committee and decided to dismiss the instant case.

(k) On July 18, 201, Plaintiff Labor Union was issued a certificate of union establishment report by the Seoul Southern District Office of the Seoul Regional Employment and Labor Agency.

(l) On July 20, 201, the Intervenor filed an application for review of the instant dismissal with the Intervenor. On July 20, 201, the Intervenor’s letter of notice of attendance at the personnel committee meeting held on July 14:00 on July 25, 201 by stating the instant disciplinary cause to the Plaintiff A. While the Plaintiff appeared and explained in the said personnel committee, the Plaintiff’s application for review was dismissed on July 26, 201. (m) On July 21, 2011, the Intervenor’s non-name employees in charge of the Intervenor’s product team of the L/A project made a statement that “on the part of the Intervenor’s telephone conversation with the Intervenor, our team will not make approval for a change of holidays without filing a written approval for a change of holidays.”

(n) On August 26, 201 and September 16, 2011, the Plaintiff and Labor Union attempted to distribute printed materials to employees to promote a trade union. However, the Intervenor was removed from the Intervenor, and the Intervenor was forced to take away from the distribution place, or forced to take away from the distribution place on August 26, 2011, and on September 16, 201, the first instance court (Seoul Administrative Court Decision 2012Guhap20755 Decided May 14, 201) took part in the Plaintiff’s act of expulsion on September 27, 201, and on September 16, 201, the lower court took part in the Plaintiff’s act of expulsion from Seoul High Court (Seoul Administrative Court Decision 2013, 2012Guhap20755 Decided May 14, 2013).

section 22).

(o) With respect to the distribution of printed materials as of September 16, 201, the intervenor filed a complaint against the chairman of the Plaintiff’s union, the vice-chairman of the Plaintiff’s union, the Plaintiff’s members G, M, and AP as a residential intrusion crime. Although the Intervenor was indicted for violating the Punishment of Violence, etc. Act (joint residence intrusion), the judgment of innocence was rendered in the first instance court (Supreme Court Decision 2012DaDa1511 Decided February 18, 2013). The prosecutor filed an appeal against the above judgment and filed an application for the revision of the indictment under the ancillary name, such as addition of a crime of joint departure, and the court permitted the indictment and changed the indictment, but all the primary and preliminary charges were pronounced not guilty (Seoul District Court Decision 2013No127 Decided July 18, 2013). The prosecutor also filed a final appeal with the Supreme Court Decision 2013Da1313030 Decided July 18, 2013).

(p) On November 4, 2011, the Intervenor took a disciplinary measure for two months of suspension from office against the grounds of disciplinary action, such as “the collection, storage, and compilation of 59 personal information of 1,836 personal information and 59 personal information of the partner employees without permission.” G made a request for remedy against the above disciplinary measure to the Regional Labor Relations Commission for unfair suspension from office and unfair labor practices, but it was dismissed. G filed a lawsuit for cancellation of the above disciplinary measure with the Seoul Administrative Court on September 27, 2013, and the above court rendered a judgment revoking the above review decision on September 27, 2013 on the ground that the above disciplinary measure constituted unfair disciplinary action and unfair labor practices (Seoul High Court Decision 2012Guhap2827). At present, G continues to exist in the appellate court (Seoul High Court Decision 2013Du29546, May 6, 2015).

(q) Group B, a business group to which the Intervenor belongs, drafted the documents referred to in the title “O” on January 2012, and the main contents are as follows:

Chter 1 201 evaluation and reflect 1C issues are linked with external labor organizations by four persons, namely, the so-called “B labor union” established on July 13, 201, A (Chairperson), A (Vice/Dong) and MG (members)-P-P (members), while taking measures to suspend one member from office - filing a complaint or complaint 13 cases (including labor union 7 and 6) / [2] followed, “B labor union” / “B labor union” / The first-company labor union / [3] the preparation for the completion of the case / the establishment phase / the establishment phase / the establishment phase / the establishment phase / the establishment phase / the establishment phase 200 works of Q Q, the chairperson of the first-company labor union / the establishment phase / the establishment phase / the establishment phase / the establishment phase - the establishment process of labor union - the establishment process - the establishment process of labor union - the establishment process - the establishment outline 20% of labor union - the establishment phase 210.7.

At the time of the establishment of a small number of labor unions, the role of the labor-management council is required to be thoroughly prepared and trained up to 0 months for the purpose of immediately avoiding unfair dismissal labor practices. The dismissal ○○-B labor union immediately before the establishment of the labor-management council to immediately avoid the act of unfair dismissal of workers. The measures to prevent the spread of 0 labor union such as anti-mination and accusation (6 cases)- such as insult, insult, housing intrusion, etc. / [4] The current situation / [4] the importance of the management of 000 points personnel in question, the need to thoroughly prepare and train the preparation of preparation and training of preparation workers so that it is possible for the first on-site employees to take measures to respond to the problem in advance (the effect of early management of labor-management and on-site organizations) and to make a report by the first on-site employees to be more 2012. If it is found that there is no negative understanding that it will be more than 200 labor-management and 2010 old-old groups after the establishment of labor-management groups 2.

1. Promotion Terms and Conditions 1. Operation of labor-management-related cooperative 3. Operation of labor-management-related cooperative 4. Operation of labor-management-related cooperative 3. Operation of labor-management-related cooperative 1. Operation of labor-management-related cooperative 3. Operation of labor-management-related cooperative 4. Operation of labor-management-related labor-management-related labor-related cooperative 4. It is highly likely to establish labor-management-related personnel by continuously reducing the source of the problem (1.2. to 4.2. 2012) re-classification and measures (2) the core problem personnel such as de-classification and measures (2. 3. 201. 1. 36. 201. 36. 36. 1. 201. 36. 1. 201. 36. 36. 1. 201. 36. 1. 201. 36. 36. 2013 of labor-management-related collective bargaining-based labor-based labor-based labor-based labor-based labor-based labor-based labor-management of new labor-based workers.

After closely analyzing the possibility of early settlement of the old union, the new employer: (2) new employer shall be isolated from dismissal, suspension from office, etc. after proving the fact of illegality; and (4) simple employer shall be placed on the ground of a violation of the current regulations with respect to installation of the old union gate, union activities during working hours, installation of the old union, etc.; (3) existing employer shall be prepared to use the old union gate so that it can be utilized as necessary; (4) existing employer-management will not be able to early dilution; and (4) existing employer-management will not be able to provide new employer-management cooperation system for early dilution; and (5) existing employer-management will not be able to provide new employer-management cooperation system for early dilution; and (4) previous employer-management will not be able to provide new employer-management cooperation system for early dilution; and (4) previous employer-management will not be able to provide new employer-employee-management cooperation system for early dilution; and (5) new employer-management will be able to prevent and increase the new employer-management-management-management.

[Ground of recognition] A, Gap evidence Nos. 4 through 45, and Gap evidence No. 49 (the intervenor asserts that this document cannot be used as evidence since it is impossible to confirm the author of the document.

Even if the parties did not prove the establishment of Eul evidence as the site, the court may recognize the establishment of Eul evidence by free evaluation (Supreme Court Decision 90Nu3904 delivered on September 25, 1990) by taking into account the preceding purpose of the pleading (Supreme Court Decision 90Nu3904 delivered on September 25, 199). In full view of the overall purport of the pleading No. 50-1 and No. 50, National Assembly member N disclosure of documents such as Gap evidence No. 49 on October 14, 2013 to the press; Group B's materials that were reported by the media on the same day through a group No. 1, No. 5, which were written by the above 1, No.2011, No. 97, No. 2013, No.

D. Determination

(1) As to the dismissal

(a) Concerning disciplinary proceedings

1) Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act provides that, with respect to the physical nature of the grounds for disciplinary action, an employer shall be notified in writing of the grounds for and timing of dismissal in order to dismiss a worker. This is to ensure that the employer is careful in dismissing the worker through written notification, such as the grounds for dismissal, and that the dispute surrounding the dismissal can be settled appropriately and easily after clarifying the existence, time and reason of dismissal, and that the worker can respond appropriately to dismissal. Therefore, when the employer gives written notice of the grounds for dismissal, it should be able to specifically identify the grounds for the dismissal in the location of the worker. In particular, in the case of disciplinary dismissal, it is sufficient that the employer must state the specific facts or misconduct that serves as the substantial grounds for the dismissal, and that only the provisions of the collective agreement or rules of employment in violation of the rules of employment should be put into force (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Da42324, Oct. 27, 201).

The fact that only the provisions of the rules of employment in violation of the plaintiff A are set up, and the specific grounds for disciplinary action are not specified are as seen earlier.

However, according to the above notice of attendance, Plaintiff A attended the first personnel committee held on July 14, 201 in accordance with the notice of attendance and retired from the personnel committee on the ground that it is impossible to vindicate the grounds for disciplinary action not specified in the notice of attendance. On July 14, 2011, Plaintiff A sent the second written notice of attendance of the personnel committee held on July 16:00, 201, stating the grounds for the instant disciplinary action, to Plaintiff A sent the second written notice of attendance of the personnel committee held on July 15, 201. Plaintiff A was served on July 15, 201. Plaintiff A held the personnel committee on July 18, 201 and decided to dismiss the instant case. Accordingly, Plaintiff A could have specifically known the grounds for dismissal through the second personnel committee.

Therefore, the plaintiffs' assertion that the disciplinary procedure is unlawful because the grounds for disciplinary action are not specific is without merit.

2) Where a collective agreement, rules of employment or disciplinary regulations provide a person subject to disciplinary action with an opportunity to attend the disciplinary committee and submit a vindication and explanatory materials, even if there is no particular provision regarding the timing and method of notification, the date and time and place of notification shall be notified within a considerable period to prepare the vindication and explanatory materials. The notification made in brutly without sufficient time to prepare such vindication and explanatory materials shall be deemed unlawful because it does not deprive the person subject to disciplinary action of the opportunity to submit the vindication and explanatory materials. Even if the person subject to disciplinary action appeared and makes statements before the disciplinary committee and made statements, the disciplinary action based on the resolution of the disciplinary committee shall be deemed to be unlawful and unfair exercise of disciplinary right in violation of the disciplinary procedure (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Du15317, Jun. 25, 2004).

However, on July 14, 2011, the intervenor sent a notice of attendance at the second personnel committee meeting held on July 18, 201, which was held on July 16, 201, to the Plaintiff A, stating the grounds for the instant disciplinary action, and the Plaintiff A served on July 15, 201. The intervenor held the second personnel committee on July 18, 201 and resolved the dismissal of the instant case as seen above. Thus, the time interval from the notice of the above attendance to the second personnel committee meeting cannot be deemed to have led to the deprivation of the Plaintiff’s opportunity to submit explanatory materials and the second personnel committee meeting. Thus, the Plaintiffs’ assertion on this part is without merit.

(B) As to the grounds for disciplinary action

1) As to the first ground for disciplinary action

On January 208, 2008, the mail sent by the plaintiff A to the chief of the J of the division at that time does not constitute "a speech or behavior that damages the company's credit or defames the reputation" under Article 42 (9) of the Rules of Employment of the intervenor, taking into account the following: (a) the contents and expressions of the plaintiff's unilaterally raised an objection against the intervenor's forced behavior without consultation with the labor-management council; and (b) at that time, the plaintiff A was a worker member of the

Therefore, this part of the grounds for disciplinary action is not recognized.

2) As to the ground of appeal No. 2

On February 26, 2010, Plaintiff A, a candidate for an election of a labor-management council member of the Intervenor, who was disqualified, filed a suspicion of prior election campaign by Plaintiff E, and the intervenor’s objection to the result of the election is within the scope of the exercise of rights as a candidate to express his/her opinion or dissatisfaction on the method of investigating the above objection to the Central Election Management Council Chairperson and the members. Thus, Plaintiff A’s act cannot be deemed as constituting a speech or behavior that damages the company’s credit or defames the reputation under Article 42(9) of the Rules of Employment of the Intervenor.

Although the intervenor asserts that the above act of the plaintiff Gap constitutes a disciplinary action under Article 130 subparagraph 14 of the rules of employment of the intervenor, Article 130 subparagraph 14 of the rules of employment of the intervenor provides that "the plaintiff Gap's act is a ground for disciplinary action where the plaintiff Gap's act treats another member in a will secret within the company or causes damage to another member within the company." The plaintiff Gap's above act is a candidate's exercise

Therefore, this part of the grounds for disciplinary action is not recognized.

3) As to grounds of appeal Nos. 3 and 4

A) Whether the Intervenor’s rules of employment fall under Article 131(6) of the Rules of Employment

Article 131(6) of the Rules of Employment of the Intervenor provides that "any person who discloses or divulges major trade secrets of the company without permission" shall be subject to disciplinary action against "any person who discloses or divulges them without permission." The "trade secret" means any production method, sale method, and other technical or managerial information useful for business activities, which have been maintained in secret by considerable effort (see Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act and Article 1 of the Trade Secret Security Pledge).

In this context, “not known” means that the information is not ordinarily available to an unspecified person because it is not known to the general public, such as a publication, because it is not known to the general public (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2002Da60610, Sept. 23, 2004). “An owner of the information has an independent economic value” means that the holder of the information can benefit from competition to the competitor through the use of the information, or that a considerable cost or effort is needed for the acquisition or development of the information (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Do9022, Apr. 9, 2009), and “the information is kept confidential by considerable effort” refers to an indication or notification that can be perceived as a secret, and that the information is objectively maintained and managed as confidential information, such as restricting access to the information or imposing access to the information, or imposing a duty to comply with the information, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2008Do453708).

The Intervenor’s 4,335 names, classes, e-mail addresses, and mobile phone numbers cannot be deemed to have independent economic value in the above sense, and cannot be deemed to constitute technical or managerial information useful for the Intervenor’s business activities. Therefore, the Intervenor’s 4,335 names, class, e-mail addresses, and mobile phone numbers do not constitute the Intervenor’s major trade secrets. As such, the Plaintiff’s sending of the files “Bokl.xls” to the Intervenor’s respective mail accounts on November 4, 2010, sending the instant personal information files to the Plaintiff’s external mail account on November 18, 201, and sending the instant personal information files to H on November 18, 2011 does not constitute Article 131(6) of the Rules of Employment of the Intervenor.

On July 4, 2011, Plaintiff A sent the data file of the instant case to his external domain account. ① The Intervenor’s information protection regulations and a trade secret security pledge are merely imposed on his employees a general and abstract duty to keep confidential information, and it appears that the Intervenor did not impose a specific duty to keep confidential information to his employees. ② The Intervenor did not separately indicate the purchase and sale data X-cell files, and did not indicate that the information constitutes a trade secret. ③ The Plaintiff did not notify the Plaintiff’s access to the said file that the information constitutes a trade secret; ③ there was no security device to prevent the Plaintiff from downloading the file to the PC in his company or transmitting it to the personal date; ③ the Plaintiff’s purchase and sale data does not constitute the Plaintiff’s purchase and sale data including the transaction terms and transaction information or the transaction profit ratio or the information sales ratio of the Intervenor to the Plaintiff’s employees.

B) Whether the Intervenor falls under Article 130(23) of the Rules of Employment of the Intervenor

Article 130 (23) of the Rules of Employment of the Intervenor provides that "the time when the intervenor uses the internal computer communications network for non-business purposes or violates the company's rules in relation thereto."

Even if Plaintiff A prepared the instant file to publicize Plaintiff’s Trade Union, it cannot be deemed as the Plaintiff’s business to publicize Plaintiff’s Trade Union. As such, Plaintiff and A’s act of sending the files of “Libokl.xls” to the respective mail account of Plaintiff D and G on November 4, 2010, sending the instant personal information files to his/her external mail account on November 18, 2010, and sending the instant personal information files to H on January 201, 201, constitutes grounds for disciplinary action against Plaintiff and A on January 23, 2011, since Plaintiff and A’s act constitutes “the case of using the instant private telecommunication network for non-business purposes” under Article 130(23) of the Intervenor’s Rules of Employment.

On July 4, 2011, Plaintiff A sent a file for data on purchase and sales to his/her external mail account, and also constitutes grounds for disciplinary action on the grounds that “in-house computer network is used for non-business use” under Article 130(23) of the Rules of Employment of Intervenor.

4) According to Article 47 of the rules of employment of the Intervenor with respect to the grounds for disciplinary action No. 5, if working hours are eight hours, the rest hours are one hour, and the rest hours are part of the working hours and the members may freely use them.

Since the working hours of Plaintiff A are nine hours from 8:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., one of them constitutes recess hours, and the fact that Plaintiff A’s occupation time has not been fixed is the same as above, the above Plaintiff is entitled to freely use one-time occupation time during his working hours. Since the above Plaintiff’s working hours are between 16:27 and 27 minutes, it does not deviate from the scope of the above rest hours.

Therefore, this part of the Plaintiff A’s act does not constitute grounds for disciplinary action because it constitutes a use of recess hours.

5) The grounds for the employer’s exercise of the right to discipline against workers with respect to the grounds for the 6 grounds for disciplinary action are to maintain discipline and order within the extent necessary for smooth performance of business activities. Thus, workers’ private flight may be deemed legitimate grounds for disciplinary action only when it is directly related to business activities or is likely to damage the company’s social evaluation.

In order to say that corporate social assessment is likely to be damaged, it is not necessarily necessary to cause any disadvantage in the transaction or the result of the business damage, but the nature of the act in question.

In full view of all the circumstances, including the purpose and management policy of the company, the type and scale of the business, and the status of the worker in charge in the company, the misconduct must be objectively assessed to have a significant adverse impact on the company’s social evaluation (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Du3689, Dec. 14, 200).

The Plaintiff’s act of operating the instant car, even though being aware of the circumstances attached by A without authority for the purpose of exercising the AJ number plate on the given white background, in front of the AJ on which the Plaintiff forged and issued this document, constitutes a flight in the worker’s private life. In full view of the fact that the Plaintiff’s act was not directly related to the Intervenor’s business activities, the status of the Intervenor, the nature of the above criminal act, and the name of the media article reported on the above criminal act, it cannot be deemed that the above criminal act of Plaintiff A is objectively and objectively assessed that the adverse impact on the Intervenor’s social evaluation is significant.

Therefore, this part of the grounds for disciplinary action is not recognized.

6) As to the grounds for disciplinary action No. 7

On July 8, 2011, Plaintiff A sent a text message to J, who is the superior, “I will pay this beneficiary a lifelong completion,” and sending a text message to K, who is the superior, on July 9, 2011, “Cwins swins” to all interfered with internal order by engaging in an act of unafford personality, and constitutes grounds for disciplinary action under Articles 42(7) and 130(3) of the Intervenor’s Rules of Employment.

7) According to Article 62 of the Rules of Employment of the Intervenor with respect to the Disciplinary Reason 8, “days” refers to weekly holidays, contractual holidays due to the reduction of working hours, etc. However, according to Article 65 of the Rules of Employment of the Intervenor, “Holidays” refers to annual paid leave, ordinary paid leave, etc., and in this case, “temporary leave” refers to a Saturday in which workers should originally leave, and that the number of workers during weekly or weekly paid leave refer to a holiday in accordance with the characteristics of the Intervenor’s workplace where workers are working on a weekly or weekly basis, and therefore, the said rules of employment constitutes “days” under the Rules of Employment.

Meanwhile, according to Article 77 (1) of the Rules of Employment of the Intervenor, when a member intends to take a leave, he/she shall apply to the head of the department to which he/she belongs for the time and period specified, and obtain approval from the company at least two working days. However, according to Article 63 (1) and (2) of the Rules of Employment of the Intervenor, where it is deemed particularly necessary in light of the company’s work process, the company may change holidays to another day, and thereby, the holidays that have been changed shall be deemed as ordinary days, and the holidays shall be deemed as holidays, and there is no provision that the company shall obtain approval from the company for the change of holidays by two working days.

Therefore, Plaintiff A cannot be deemed to have obtained the Intervenor’s approval with respect to the change of the leave on the two working days, and Plaintiff A obtained the approval for the change of the leave on July 11, 201 with respect to the change of the leave. In full view of the fact that the Intervenor’s workplace at the time was considered to have been a general figure on the change of the leave, Plaintiff A’s oral approval for the change of the leave on July 11, 201 after obtaining the oral approval for the change of the leave from her superiorN on July 11, 201, cannot be deemed to constitute unauthorized absence.

Therefore, this part of the grounds for disciplinary action is not recognized.

(C) As seen earlier, the grounds for disciplinary action against the Plaintiff A are the pertinent provisions of Article 130(23) of the Intervenor’s Rules of Employment among the grounds for disciplinary action Nos. 3 and 4, and Article 130(23) and Article 7 of the Intervenor’s Rules of Employment. The grounds for disciplinary action No. 3 are the activities to promote the Plaintiff’s labor union. The grounds for disciplinary action No. 4 are that there were no damages to the Intervenor or that the purchase and sale materials were leaked to a third party. Of the grounds for No. 7, the dispatch of intimidation letters to J revealed that J shows the Plaintiff’s input materials to the employees and sent them to the staff. However, the sending of insulting letters to K constitutes grounds for disciplinary action No. 193 without any justifiable grounds for disciplinary action No. 92, the Plaintiff’s act constitutes grounds for disciplinary action No. 193.

Therefore, the intervenor asserts that the plaintiff A should take into account the intervenor's abusive behavior after the dismissal of this case. Thus, the facts of misconduct committed before and after the disciplinary action in addition to the deliberation, work performance, and records of disciplinary action of the person subject to disciplinary action can be considered materials for consideration of disciplinary action. However, in a case where the disciplinary action regulations such as collective agreement or the company's rules of employment stipulate that disciplinary action against workers shall be conducted through a resolution of the disciplinary committee, the legitimacy of the disciplinary action shall be determined by the disciplinary committee, and it shall include the reasons which are not discussed by the disciplinary committee, and the propriety of the disciplinary action shall not be determined (see Supreme Court Decision 20058047, Jun. 15, 2006). According to Article 137 (1) of the rules of employment of the intervenor, the disciplinary committee of the worker shall advise the intervenor and conduct it, and the grounds alleged by the intervenor shall not be included in the plaintiff A's dismissal after the dismissal of this case. Thus, the intervenor's assertion that the plaintiff's dismissal of this case is legitimate.

(D) Sub-committee

Therefore, the dismissal of this case constitutes an unfair dismissal, and unlike this, the part concerning the dismissal of this case’s dismissal is unlawful.

(2) With respect to unfair labor practices, dismissal shall be deemed unfair labor practices in cases where dismissal is deemed to have been made on the ground of a worker’s legitimate trade union activity, unlike the grounds for dismissal where the employer, in substance, as to the dismissal of the worker, is deemed to have been made on the ground of the worker’s lawful trade union activity. Whether the dismissal actually constitutes a ground for dismissal of the worker’s legitimate act for the worker’s trade union operation shall be determined by comparing and determining the grounds for dismissal with the employer’s reasonable act for the worker’s union operation, time when dismissal was made, relationship with the employer and the trade union, imbalance between sanctions against the union members and non-members in the same kind of case, imbalance between previous practice, employer’s speech and behavior or attitude toward the worker’s union members, and the existence of the employer’s intent to engage in unfair labor practices (see Supreme Court Decision 99Du2963, Apr. 11, 200). The dismissal in this case ought to be determined by considering that the worker’s intent to dismiss the worker’s employee’s unfair labor practice in light of Article 18(1).

Therefore, the part concerning unfair labor practices in the instant review decision is unlawful.

Conclusion

If so, the plaintiffs' claims are accepted on the grounds of the reasons.