(영문) 서울중앙지방법원 2015.4.22.선고 2014가합586479 판결

1. Defendant C shall pay to Plaintiff B the amount of KRW 7,00,000 as well as 5% per annum from October 20, 2014 to April 22, 2015, and 20% per annum from the next day to the day of full payment.

2. The plaintiff A Si's claim against the defendants, the plaintiff B's claim against the defendant channel, and the remaining claims against the defendant C are dismissed, respectively.

3. Of the costs of lawsuit, the part arising between Plaintiff A and the Defendants is borne by Plaintiff B, and the part arising between Plaintiff B and Defendant C is borne by Plaintiff B. Of the part arising between Plaintiff B and Defendant C, 3/4 is borne by Plaintiff B, and the remainder is borne by Defendant C, respectively.

4. Paragraph 1 can be provisionally executed.

Purport of claim

The Defendants jointly pay 10 million won to Plaintiff A, 30 million won to Plaintiff B, and 5% per annum from October 20, 2014 to the service date of a duplicate of the complaint of this case, and 20% per annum from the next day to the day of complete payment.

Reasons

1. Basic facts

A. Status of the parties

Plaintiff A is a local government subject to the Local Autonomy Act, Plaintiff B is a market in the city of Plaintiff A, and Defendant B is a broadcasting business operator operating cable TV broadcasting channel A in the Defendant channel (hereinafter “Defendant channel”). Defendant C is a member of the National Assembly.

B. The broadcast of this case

1) On October 20, 2014, the Defendant channel broadcasted the same content as the broadcast report of this case in the form of dividing whether the host of the event of A Si, the visitor, Defendant C, and F attorney-at-law on October 17, 2014 (hereinafter “instant event”), generated from G festivals (hereinafter “instant event”) on October 17, 2014, are the subject of an interview and interview (hereinafter “the broadcast report of this case”).

2) Of the instant broadcast reports, the part regarding the issue of the Plaintiffs is as follows.

A) Defendant C: (A) at this time, it appears that (the instant event was supported) KRW 5 million. In Si or this, there is a condition instead of supporting that KRW 5 million. In this context, the current market owner of the Republic of Korea has changed to catch this Section and the microphones. It is an implied agreement between the two parties. It is true that this case has been held. It is not known that the contract has been held legally. However, in view of the foregoing, it is a common master (hereinafter referred to as “Do”) that has already been supported by the master and supported by the master (hereinafter referred to as “IB”).

B) F attorney-at-law: why is why is why is why is and why is why is the public performance that is not used in G square? (hereinafter referred to as the “second report”) at this time.

C) Defendant C: (Plaintiff B) The market is going into the market and is too large to be less than one in the surrounding areas. Therefore, in the case of a project conducted in the city to a person who has self-contested, or a person who has a pro-North controversy, one unilaterally enters into a private contract or is employed or employed (hereinafter referred to as “third report”).

D) Defendant C: (Plaintiff B) may not know what the form, condition, etc. of the Plaintiff’s self-help test was. However, Defendant C: (E) was hospitalized at a mental hospital or one’s own and became safe (hereinafter referred to as “fourth report”); (b) the Plaintiff B was not in a financial difficult situation; (c) the Plaintiff was sold at A’s market; (d) the Plaintiff’s land located at H was sold at the press; and (d) the Plaintiff was made at a canter once the Plaintiff was dead, and the State was exposed to the press; and (d) the advertisement was made at a canter once before the inspection was made; and (e) the State was made at the time of the inspection, but there was no inspection by the State Council (hereinafter referred to as “5 Report”).

[Ground of recognition] The fact that there is no dispute, Eul's evidence 2, Eul's video or statement of Eul's evidence 1 (including numbers, if any; hereinafter the same shall apply), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The plaintiffs' assertion

Since the plaintiffs were false reports of Nos. 1 through 5, and thereby their honor was damaged, they are jointly liable for damages suffered by the plaintiffs to Defendant C and Defendant E, the manufacturer of the broadcast report of this case, and the employer of Defendant E.

3. Determination on the Plaintiff A’s claim

A. Whether local governments are subject to fundamental rights

1) The Plaintiff asserts that the Plaintiff City may be the subject of reputation by legal entities and other organizations other than natural persons, and thus, the Plaintiff City may be the victim of defamation of the Plaintiff City/Do.

2) The protection of honor is a kind of personal right based on the right to personality and the right to pursue happiness as stipulated in Article 10 of the Constitution (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 96Da17851, Oct. 24, 1997; 2009Hun-Ma747, Dec. 26, 2013). Accordingly, Article 751 of the Civil Act provides that a person who defames another person’s reputation shall be liable for damages. Accordingly, whether the Plaintiff’s market, a local government, is recognized as the subject of fundamental rights for the protection of honor, which is a kind of personal right.

3) First of all, there is a conflict of theories regarding the recognition of the subject of fundamental rights of a juristic person under private law, but the Constitutional Court of Korea does not have any explicit provision recognizing the ability to enjoy fundamental rights of a juristic person under private law, but the basic rights that can be enjoyed by a juristic person by nature such as the freedom of speech and publication, guarantee of property rights, etc. (see Constitutional Court Order 91Hun-Ma56, Jun. 3, 199) are naturally applicable to a juristic person (see Constitutional Court Order 90Hun-Ma56, Jun. 3, 199). The Supreme Court of Korea also recognizes a juristic person under private law as a tort against a juristic person where it infringes on the social reputation and credit of a juristic person to the extent that it may affect the performance of its purpose of business by a juristic person under civil law (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 96Da12696, Jun. 28, 196).

4) However, in the case of public corporations like the State or local governments, as a matter of principle, only the person who is the recipient of the fundamental rights can be deemed as the holder of the fundamental rights. The Constitutional Court, in light of the interpretation of each constitutional provision on guaranteeing the fundamental rights, only the people (or foreigners and judicial persons in a position similar to the people) are the subject of the fundamental rights. The State or State agencies or national organizations or public corporations are not the holder of the fundamental rights, but rather are in a position of having the responsibility and duty to protect and realize the fundamental rights of the people (see, e.g., Constitutional Court en banc Decision 96Hun-Ma345, Mar. 26, 1998; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 9Hun-Ma345, Mar. 26, 1998; Constitutional Court Decision 201Hun-Ga1, Jul. 1, 2017).

5) Therefore, in the case of a local government, the claim of this case at the time of Plaintiff A seeking compensation for damages due to defamation cannot be deemed to be subject to the protection of honor as a personal right, which is a kind of fundamental right, because the subject of fundamental right is not recognized in the case of a local government. Thus, the claim of this case at the time of Plaintiff A seeking compensation for damages due to defamation itself is without merit (i.e., the local government is not composed of public officials belonging to the local government, but consisting of district, residents, and autonomous rights. Therefore, if a report on the act of misconduct by the head of the local government is filed, it cannot be deemed that the honor of

B. Whether it is necessary to recognize the identity of the local government as a principal of defamation claim

1) The Plaintiff asserts that even local governments need minimum social approval or trust in performing the tasks and functions given in the Constitution and laws, and therefore, there is a public interest to maintain such social trust by being legally protected from abuse that considerably deviates from the freedom of speech and press such as the spread of clear false facts or malicious defamation. Therefore, the Plaintiff asserts that the claim for compensation of defamation should be recognized.

2) The Act on Press Arbitration, Press Arbitration and Remedies, etc. for Damage Caused by Press Reports (hereinafter referred to as the “Act on Press Arbitration”) provides that the State or the head of a local government may file a corrective report or a claim for counterargument news on behalf of the State or the local government (see Articles 14(3) and 16(3)). In a case where a false report is made with respect to the State or the local government, the State or the head of a local government has the validity and appropriate means to correct such false report, whereas the State or

If the authority is recognized, the function of the free press that supervises the tasks and functions of the State or local governments in accordance with the Constitution and laws and regulations, and that of the State or local governments is highly likely to lead to the occurrence of a lawsuit against the people in the name of the State or local governments. This would result in the same outcome in that, even if the expression in question is malicious or considerably unreasonable if exceptionally recognized the right to claim compensation for damages of the State or local governments, before the court's final decision is made on whether the expression in question is a malicious or considerably unreasonable attack, the relevant press or individual still bears the procedural risk of being subject to the lawsuit, thereby significantly undermining the freedom of

3) Accordingly, we cannot accept this part of the Plaintiff A’s assertion that the local government should recognize the right to claim compensation for defamation as necessary for the public interest.

4. Determination as to the plaintiff B's claim

A. The part of the claim against the defendant C

1) We examine whether the first and fifth reports among the broadcast reports in the instant case were false and detrimental to Plaintiff B’s reputation.

A) Report 1

(1) The Plaintiff B did not support the instant event or not hold the instant event, and the Plaintiff B, a market-based Plaintiff B, agreed to support KRW 5 million in return for microning in the instant event. As such, the first report damages the Plaintiff B’s reputation with false facts.

I argue that this is a matter of interest.

(2) First of all, according to the evidence of evidence Nos. 2 and 4 as to the part concerning the financial support of A, it can be acknowledged that: (a) the organizer of the instant event was indicated in the organizer of the instant event in consultation with A; (b) L, the general supervisor, was also indicated in consultation with A; and (c) the fact that A was alleged to have been either directly or in the form of advertising expenses for the instant event. In light of the above facts of recognition, the statement of evidence Nos. 1 and 3 alone is insufficient to deem that A did not provide the financial support for the instant event; and (b) there is no other evidence to acknowledge that A did not provide the financial support for the instant event. Furthermore, it is difficult to deem that Plaintiff B’s reputation is undermined solely on the basis of the fact that A

(3) Next, this part of Defendant C’s statement about the part of the events held at A City may not be deemed to have been written on the contract legally. However, the author argues that FNNN would be the main time to interpret this case. In light of the above, it is the common sense that FNN has already supported the event in this case by supporting the master and supporting the master, and it cannot be deemed to have been evaluated as “on the basis of the fact indicated as the promotion of the master,” and it cannot be deemed to have been a statement of fact.

(4) Lastly, the overall purport of Defendant C’s remarks on the part of sponsoring for microfacing, the overall purport of Defendant C’s remarks is to enhance public confidence by holding events in order to be able to satisfy the revenue and expenditure, and the head of Si/Do’s local government is to keep the faces of residents and to facilitate the revitalization of internal control, and thus, various festivals are held. In light of this purport, it is difficult to view this part of the report as impairing the reputation of Plaintiff B, the A market, and as seen earlier, it is difficult to view it as false in light of the fact that Plaintiff B was willing to directly or in the form of advertising expenses for the instant event, and that it was decided at the instant event.

(5) Therefore, Plaintiff B’s assertion on this part is without merit.

B) Report 2

(1) Plaintiff B asserts that the performance regularly undertaken in G group is held as “I(A)” and that the performance is a public performance to resolve citizens’ cultural conflicts, so it would impair Plaintiff B’s honor by making a false report on the second report that is not used as “public performance” in G square.

(2) On the other hand, the second report does not mean that the Defendant C speaks at the end of the F attorney-at-law. Furthermore, even according to the Plaintiff’s assertion, a regular performance is held in G square. (No one can know the frequency of non-regular performances), and in light of the overall purport of the Plaintiff B, the expression “share” opened is merely an exaggeration of the meaning that it is open, and it is merely an evaluation.

(3) Therefore, this part of the Plaintiff B’s assertion on the premise that the second report was a false fact made by Defendant C is without merit.

C) 3rd Report

(1) The plaintiff B asserts that the third report would impair the plaintiff B's reputation by false facts, since he did not unilaterally assist the person who is controversial in North Korea in a free contract and employment.

(2) According to the statements in the evidence Nos. 7, 7, 5, and 6, there was suspicion that Plaintiff B selected a social company established by the core personnel of the Association of Gyeonggi-do (Jongbuk-dong) as a cleaning service company on May 2012 after Plaintiff B won the A market in 2010. ② Since then Plaintiff B filed a corrective report and a claim for damages against the newspaper company that reported such suspicion, it cannot be deemed as a malicious or highly rush attack, and the content of the report cannot be deemed as a malicious or highly rush attack, and thus, it cannot be viewed as unlawful. Based on specific facts, the part of raising suspicion against Plaintiff B’s request on July 17, 2013 (Seoul High Court Decision 2012Da6420, Jun. 24, 2014). It can be recognized that Plaintiff B rejected Plaintiff B’s appeal on July 17, 2013 (Seoul High Court Decision 2014Da130814, Mar. 13, 2014).

In light of the above facts, it is reasonable to view that the third report that Defendant C unilaterally expressed that the case where the plaintiff C was engaged in the business in the city to those who are controversial in North Korea, or was employed under a negotiated contract, is false.

(3) Furthermore, in full view of the facts seen earlier, even though there was an article raising suspicion against Plaintiff B in the past, the Plaintiff continued to serve as the A market without any doubt revealed to the fact thereafter. The purport of the broadcast report of this case is to discuss the responsibility of both Plaintiff B and A market with respect to the fall accident of H exchange winding, and the purport of the broadcast report of this case is irrelevant to the preferential treatment of Plaintiff B in the past, and the third report was very conclusive, and its purport also appears to be rather than the intention of monitoring and criticism against public officials. In light of this, it is reasonable to believe that Defendant C’s third report is true. In light of this, it is difficult to view that Defendant C’s third report is related to the truth or public interest, and therefore, the third report of this case is deemed to lose substantial reasonableness as a malicious or highly rush attacking attack, and thus, it cannot be deemed unlawful.

(4) Therefore, since the third report damages the reputation of Plaintiff B by false facts, Defendant C is liable to compensate for the damages.

D) 4 Reports

(1) Plaintiff B did not have been hospitalized in his own form of mental hospital, and J claimed that the report of Plaintiff B would impair Plaintiff B’s honor by false facts as the wife and children were hospitalized in the mental hospital due to mental illness.

(2) According to the evidence Nos. 6 and 8, and the result of this court’s inquiry into the National Rice Hospital, the Plaintiff’s punishment J, who was the Plaintiff’s punishment, may be acknowledged as having been hospitalized in the National Rice Hospital by wife and child from November 21, 2014 to December 29, 2014. Comprehensively considering the above facts, it is reasonable to deem that Plaintiff B was hospitalized in the National Rice Hospital on the ground that Plaintiff B had no problem with J, and that Plaintiff B was hospitalized in the Mental Hospital on the ground that it became safe to himself/herself, even though there was no problem with J.

(3) Furthermore, even based on the above facts of recognition, the Plaintiff B’s admission to J to a mental hospital was merely an assertion of J and his wife, and there was no doubt that it was true, and even according to the J’s argument, there was an attempt to be hospitalized in a mental hospital. Therefore, it is difficult to deem that Defendant C has considerable reason to believe that the report No. 4 was dead, or that the report No. 4 was about the public interest. Rather, the report No. 4 is deemed to have remarkably lost reasonableness as a malicious or extremely rush attack, and thus, it cannot be deemed that illegality is denied.

(4) Therefore, since the 4th report damages the reputation of Plaintiff B by false facts, Defendant C is liable to compensate for the damages.

(e) 5 reports;

(1) The Plaintiff B asserts that the Plaintiff’s report would impair the Plaintiff B’s reputation by false facts, on the grounds that there was no exaggeration of exaggeration in booming in order to either use or obtain a bundance or recognition for his election, etc.

(2) The expression “B,” the issue of which is the Plaintiff B, constitutes an evaluation or opinion of Defendant C, and it is difficult to view it as a statement of fact. Therefore, this part of the Plaintiff B’s assertion on a different premise is without merit.

2) Amount of damages

Defendant C is liable for compensating for damages suffered by Plaintiff B as a result of the damage inflicted upon Plaintiff B by making a report on the third and fourth contents contrary to the truth. Furthermore, in consideration of the content of the third and fourth reports, the purpose and background of the statement, the degree of damage inflicted on Plaintiff B, the status of Plaintiff B and Defendant C, and other various circumstances shown in the pleading, the amount of damages that Defendant C is liable for compensating for shall be determined as KRW 7,00,000,000.

Therefore, it is reasonable for Defendant C to resist the existence or scope of the Defendant’s obligation from October 20, 2014, which was an illegal act against Plaintiff B, as well as the Plaintiff’s KRW 7,000,00,00.

By April 22, 2015, which is the date of this decision, the Civil Act is obligated to pay 5% interest per annum and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the day of full payment under the Act on Special Cases concerning Expedition, etc. of Legal Proceedings.

B. The part of the claim against the defendant channel

1) Plaintiff B asserts that the responsibility for producing the instant broadcast report to the Defendant channel and the user of the proceeding E, who is an inappropriate user, bears the responsibility for the unlawful progress of the broadcast, such as aiding and abetting Defendant C’s remarks.

2) In light of the following circumstances acknowledged by the purport of Eul’s video and the entire pleading as evidence No. 2, it is difficult to view the Defendant channel as an intentional or negligent unlawful act against Plaintiff B’s defamation in producing the instant broadcast report and proceeding E, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge otherwise.

① Since the broadcast report of this case was carried out as a protogram, it was difficult to see that Defendant C had a duty of care to confirm in advance all the statements to be made in the broadcast of this case, and that Defendant C had a duty of care to confirm in advance.

② In the process of discussing whether the instant broadcast report was holding or supporting the instant event in relation to the fall accident of the spawn which occurred during the instant event, and whether the instant event was intended or legally responsible for the instant event, the broadcast report of this case made a statement to the President about the spawn of the past Sewol ferry, while speaking for the spawn of the instant event at the time and the Plaintiff, who made a statement that was not liable to the President, both A and A market.

③ In such context, it is difficult to deem that Defendant C knew or could have known that Defendant C had known that prior to the instant broadcast, Defendant C had been hospitalized in a mental hospital with the Plaintiff’s business in the city, or had known or could have anticipated that the Plaintiff C had been hospitalized in the mental hospital because it was good for himself and herself to have known of the business in the city.

(4) On the other hand, Defendant C’s above remarks are not clear or reliable, and Defendant C tried to stop speaking, but continued to make a statement by saying, “I would not have a sa sa sa sa sa sa sa sa sa sa sa sa sa sa sa sa sa sa sa sa sa sa sa sa

(2) Defendant C’s statement on this part was not expressed through a caption, etc.

3) Therefore, we cannot accept the Plaintiff B’s assertion on the Defendant channel.

5. Conclusion

Thus, the plaintiff B's claim against the defendant C is accepted within the scope of the above recognition, and the remaining claim and the defendant's claim against the plaintiff B's defendant channel and the defendants' claim against the plaintiff A are all dismissed as it is without merit.