1. Of the part concerning the counterclaim of the judgment of the court of first instance, the following amount constitutes an additional payment order.

A principal lawsuit and a counterclaim shall be deemed simultaneously.

In the first instance trial, the Plaintiff claimed KRW 4,078,584 as unjust enrichment equivalent to the rent for the subject matter of sale used by the Defendant due to the cancellation of the sales contract, and KRW 605,890 in total, and KRW 700,000 in the remuneration for the total sum of the electricity and water supply and drainage fees incurred during the period of possession, and KRW 700,000 in the total of the rent for the total sum incurred during the period of possession, by asserting that the sales contract with the Plaintiff was cancelled due to deception or mistake of the Plaintiff or the cancellation of the Plaintiff’s nonperformance of the obligation. The Defendant claimed a counterclaim that the sales contract with the Plaintiff was cancelled due to the Plaintiff’s deception or mistake, and that the Plaintiff paid KRW 30,00,00 in return for the beneficial expenses incurred for the subject matter of sale, which was claimed by the Plaintiff.

In regard to this, the first instance court accepted part of the Plaintiff’s claim for return of unjust enrichment equivalent to the rent, dismissed all of the claim for electricity and water supply and drainage fees and the claim for astronomical collection expenses. With respect to the Defendant’s counterclaim, part of the Defendant’s claim for reimbursement of beneficial expenses was accepted, and dismissed all of the claim for return of down payment.

Therefore, since only the defendant appealed against the part against the principal lawsuit and the part against the counterclaim, the scope of the judgment of this court is limited to the claim for restitution of unjust enrichment equivalent to the rent partially accepted in the principal lawsuit and the part dismissed in the defendant's counterclaim.

Basic facts, such as the ownership of the instant land and buildings, the Plaintiff purchased each real estate listed in the separate sheet on June 7, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the “instant land”) from among the real estate listed in paragraph (1), and the real estate listed in paragraph (2) from the “instant building,” and “the instant land and buildings” when collectively referred to as the “each of the said real estate,” and on June 21, 1995.