The judgment below

The part against the Defendant is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The expression of critical opinion on the existence of a public figure through a private opinion is deemed unlawful in principle, since it belongs to the function of the press as a principal organ.

However, if the form and content, etc. of an expressive act falls under an insulting and definite personal attack or an act of publishing distorted facts going beyond a certain degree of exaggeration as to another person’s personal affairs, etc., thereby infringing on such personal rights, it may be deemed a tort that deviates from the limit of expression of opinion and constitutes a tort.

(2) In light of the fact that a public official’s morality, integrity issue, and duty performance should always be subject to citizen’s surveillance and criticism (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2005Da37647, Jan. 24, 2003; 2010Da108579, Feb. 14, 2013). In addition, considering that “E, a representative of a citizen, has a wide range of authority for legislative and government control, etc., and is duly authorized to perform his/her duties, and whether his/her duties are being performed, the function of monitoring and criticism against public official’s freedom of speech should not be readily restricted unless it does not reach the extent that it is malicious or considerably unreasonable (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 200Da37647, Jan. 24, 2003; 2010Da108579, Feb. 14, 2013).

2. After recognizing the facts as indicated in its reasoning, the lower court acknowledged the following facts: (a) the Defendant, a newspaper company, expressed that the Plaintiff had “L” against the press as to the instant speech made by the G Committee; and (b) the main text of the text also states that “the Plaintiff was at the face of journalists,” and that “the Defendant was at the discretion of journalists.”