[1] Purport of Article 6 of the Automobile Management Act / Whether the acquisition of ownership of an automobile to which the Automobile Management Act applies can be based on “delivery” (negative in principle), and whether the provision of bona fide acquisition under Article 249 of the Civil Act applies in this case (negative in principle)

[2] Cases where the acquisition of ownership of an automobile subject to the Automobile Management Act can be based on “delivery”, and whether the provision of bona fide acquisition under Article 249 of the Civil Code is applied (affirmative)

[3] The requirements to be presumed as a genuine official document by a party as a foreign official document, and the method to determine whether the above requirements are met by the court

[1] Article 6 of the Automobile Management Act provides, “The acquisition and loss of the ownership of an automobile shall take effect only with the registration thereof.” This is to protect the ownership of an automobile and its transaction safety by publicly announcing the change of ownership through the “registration” rather than the “delivery,” which is an incomplete method of public announcement under the Civil Act, rather than the “registration,” which is a systematic method of public announcement by public books. Therefore, in acquiring the ownership of an automobile subject to the Automobile Management Act, the acquisition of the ownership of an automobile cannot be based on the “delivery” which is the method of public announcement under the Civil Act, and furthermore, the bona fide acquisition of an automobile under Article 249 of the Civil Act premised on this principle

[2] Even if an automobile is subject to the Automobile Management Act, if the structure and devices of the automobile are not in conformity with the motor vehicle safety standards as prescribed by the Automobile Management Act from the time of its manufacture, and if there are special circumstances, such as that it is impossible to legally register the automobile without any special administrative measure, and its ordinary usage is used only at a place other than road, it is difficult to expect a public announcement of ownership change only by the "registration", which is the method of public notification as prescribed by the Motor Vehicle Management Act, the acquisition of ownership may be based on the "delivery" which is the method of public notification under the Civil Act. In this case, the provisions of bona fide acquisition under

[3] Article 356(1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides, “When a public official is deemed to have prepared on his/her duty in accordance with the method and purport of preparing documents, it shall be presumed to be a genuine official document.” Paragraph (3) provides, “The provisions of Paragraph (1) shall apply mutatis mutandis to the document recognized as having been prepared by a foreign public agency.” Therefore, the method of document submitted by the party to be presumed to be a genuine official document must be in conformity with the method that is written by a foreign public agency in the course of performing his/her duties, and the document must be deemed to have been prepared by a foreign public agency in the course of performing his/her duties. When examining whether such requirements are met, it is desirable for the court to obtain the certification or confirmation of a diplomatic mission of the Republic of Korea located in a foreign country in which the document was prepared, but this is a

[1] Article 6 of the Automobile Management Act, Articles 188 and 249 of the Civil Act / [2] Article 6 of the Automobile Management Act, Articles 188 and 249 of the Civil Act / [3] Articles 202 and 356 (1) and (3) of the Civil Procedure Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 64Da650 Decided September 8, 1964 / [3] Supreme Court Decision 2013Du14269 Decided March 10, 2016 (Gong2016Sang, 579)

Co., Ltd., a small-scale special vehicle transport company

Seo Young Special Co., Ltd. and four others (Attorney Jeon Byung-soo, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

High Sea Co., Ltd. (Law Firm LLC, Attorneys Kim Young-young et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Gwangju High Court ( Jeonju) Decision 2014Na760 decided December 10, 2015

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal by the Plaintiff are assessed against the Defendants. The costs of appeal by the Plaintiff are assessed against the Defendants. The costs of appeal by the Plaintiff are assessed against the Defendants.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the Plaintiff’s grounds of appeal (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed)

A. As to the claim that the third franchise of this case is not subject to bona fide acquisition

Article 6 of the Automobile Management Act provides, “The acquisition and loss of the ownership of an automobile shall take effect upon registration.” This purport is to protect the ownership of an automobile and the safety of transactions related to the ownership of an automobile by publicly announcing the change of ownership through the “registration,” rather than the “delivery,” which is an incomplete method of public announcement under the Civil Act, rather than the “registration,” which is a method of public announcement in a public book. Therefore, in acquiring the ownership of an automobile subject to the Automobile Management Act, the acquisition of ownership of an automobile cannot be based on the “delivery” which is a method of public announcement under the Civil Act, and furthermore, the bona fide acquisition provision under Article 249 of the Civil Act premised on this principle is not applicable (see Supreme Court Decision 64Da650, Sept. 8, 1964, etc.).

However, even if an automobile to which the Automobile Management Act applies is a motor vehicle, if its structure and devices are not consistent with the motor vehicle safety standards as prescribed by the Automobile Management Act, and if there are special circumstances, such as that it is impossible to be duly registered without administrative special measures because they are not in conformity with the motor vehicle safety standards as determined by the Decree from the time of manufacture, and that the ordinary use is used only at a place other than the road, it is difficult to expect a public announcement of ownership change only by the "registration", which is the method of public announcement as determined by the Motor Vehicle Management Act, the acquisition of ownership can be based on the "delivery" which is the method of public announcement under the Civil Act. In this case,

According to the records, the following facts are revealed. ① The third franchise of this case is mainly produced for the special purpose of transporting primary cargo, such as parts of the hull of a large vessel in the shipbuilding yard. From the time of the Plaintiff’s manufacture, about 18 meters of length, about 6.1m of width, about 1.6m of height, and about 64m of total weight, and the structure itself cannot be satisfied with the safety standards under the Automobile Management Act (see Articles 4 and 6 of the Rules on the Performance and Standards of Motor Vehicles and Parts (hereinafter “Rules on Automobile Performance Standards”)). ② The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport from March 2008 (2) applied the special exception under Article 114(3) of the Rules on the Standards of Motor Vehicles to the said "franchise" on the roads where it is necessary to operate the "franchise", and the Defendant seems to have operated the said cargo on the roads without permission from the road management authority to operate it on the roads suitable for the motor vehicle safety standards, and it seems to have been permitted to operate it on the 30th franchise of this case.

Examining these circumstances in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, it is reasonable to conclude the judgment of the court below that the third franchise of this case is subject to bona fide acquisition inasmuch as the structure and devices of this case fail to meet the safety standards as prescribed by the Automobile Management Act from the time when they were manufactured to make the structure and devices so they are unable to be duly registered without any special administrative measure, and thus, they cannot be deemed to fall under an automobile used only at a place other than road and its ordinary use is deemed to fall under an automobile used only at a place other than road. Although the reasoning of the court below is inappropriate, the judgment of the court below that the third franchise of this case constitutes the object of bona fide acquisition is just, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles

B. As to the assertion that there was negligence on E. E. E. E. E.S.

The lower court, based on the circumstances indicated in its reasoning, determined that Nonparty 1 was not negligent in having known that Nonparty 1 purchased the instant third franchise from the Defendant Seo Young Special Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant Seo Young Special”) and received the delivery of the instant third franchise from the Defendant Seo Young Special Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant Seo Young Special”).

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and there is no violation of law as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

2. As to the grounds of appeal by Defendant Seo Young-young special, company superior goods distribution (hereinafter “ordinary goods distribution”), promotion transportation company (hereinafter “promotion transportation”), Industrial Bank of Korea, and Hoyeong Heavy Industries Company

A. As to the ground of appeal on the requirement to use official documents prepared by a foreign public institution as evidence

Article 356(1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides, “When a public official is deemed to have prepared on his/her duty in accordance with the method and purport of preparing documents, it shall be presumed to be a genuine official document.” Paragraph (3) of the same Article provides, “The provisions of paragraph (1) shall apply mutatis mutandis to a document that is recognized to have been prepared by a foreign public agency.” Therefore, the method of document submitted by the party as a foreign public document in order to be presumed to be a genuine official document must be in conformity with that of a foreign public agency in the course of performing his/her duties, and the document should be deemed to have been prepared by a foreign public agency in the course of performing his/her duties (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2013Du14269, Mar. 10, 2016). When examining whether such requirements are met, it is desirable to obtain the certification or confirmation of a Korean mission located in a foreign country that prepared the relevant public document, but this is a matter of determination

For reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that the Plaintiff’s substantive entity, Nonparty 2’s former representative, and the Plaintiff’s attorney’s authority of attorney in the first instance trial, based on the organization, marijuana, corporate corporate business house, and tax registration certificate, which are official documents in the name of the administrative agency of the People’s Republic of China

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, the judgment below is just and acceptable. Contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the requirements for using documents prepared by foreign public institutions as evidence and Article 356

B. As to the omission of judgment

In the instant case where the Plaintiff seeks the ownership transfer registration under the ownership of the first and second franchises and the second franchises, the ownership transfer registration under the name of the Defendant, and the cancellation of the ownership transfer registration under the name of the Defendant Seocho Special Name, the Plaintiff has a legal interest in seeking the cancellation of each registration under the above Defendants’ names in order to avoid interference with the ownership, and it is irrelevant to whether or not the Plaintiff can newly complete the new ownership registration. Even if the lower court omitted the judgment, it does not err in the misapprehension of the judgment that affected the conclusion of the judgment. The allegation in the grounds of appeal on this part is not acceptable.

C. As to the allegation in the grounds of appeal that the registration of ownership transfer under the name of the defendant Lee Jong-won, the registration of ownership transfer under the name of promotion transportation, the registration of ownership transfer under the name of the defendant Seo-young Special, and the registration of

After comprehensively taking account of the adopted evidence, the lower court acknowledged the facts as indicated in its reasoning, and determined to the effect that, in light of the contents of the instant lease agreement, the ownership new registration under the name of the Defendant’s superior logistics or promotion transportation was made against the Plaintiff’s will, and thus, the cause is null and void. The lower court determined to the effect that the ownership transfer registration under the name of the Defendant’s subordinate logistics or promotion transportation was also null and void, and that the ownership transfer registration under the name of the Defendant’s subordinate special name and the mortgage creation registration under the name of the Industrial Bank of Korea was also void.

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the judgment of the court below is just and acceptable. Contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the reservation of ownership, the sale of an automobile, the acquisition and loss of ownership and the interpretation

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal by the Plaintiff are assessed against the Defendants. The costs of appeal by the Plaintiff are assessed against the Defendants. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jo Hee-de (Presiding Justice)