1. All appeals filed by the Plaintiff and the Defendants are dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by each party.

The reasons for this judgment of this court shall be the same as the judgment of the first instance.

(The main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act): Provided, That part of the grounds for the judgment of the court of first instance shall be dismissed as follows:

1. From the 7th bottom of the judgment to the 8th day above the 7th day above the 7th day of the judgment, the following shall take place:

The plaintiff asserts to the purport that not only the internal situation of the clan but also the ownership relationship of the land of this case should be seen as being good faith in the commencement of possession, but also as being negligent.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant B received a mortgage on the P share in a lot of land including the instant land for a considerable period prior to acquiring the share in the instant land due to a successful bid. The first lawsuit on one parcel was filed between Defendant C and the co-owned property partition lawsuit between Defendant C, but was adjusted in consideration of the entire relevant land.

However, such circumstance alone cannot be deemed as having acted in good faith or as having been negligent, and rather, the good faith is presumed to be still presumed, and since it acquired the shares of the instant land through an auction, it shall be deemed as without fault. Therefore, this argument shall not be accepted.

2. From the 5th to the 10th 10th st day of the judgment, the following shall apply:

2. The remaining 5/6 shares among the instant 2 real estate and the remaining 5/6 shares among the instant 1/6 shares among the instant 2 real estate and 1/6 shares among the instant 3 real estate, are the fact that the transfer registration under Defendant B’s name was completed on December 27, 2007, and it is apparent that 10 years have not elapsed from that time, and this part of the assertion is rejected.

As to this, the remaining 5/6 shares of the instant 2 real estate are substantially identical to 1/6 shares among the instant 1/3 real estate, it is argued to the purport that the registration of 1/6 shares among the instant 1/3 real estate and the point of possession should be determined based on the point of possession. However, this is recognized.