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(영문) 서울중앙지방법원 2018.09.05 2018나26542
양수금
Text

1. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

Purport of claim and appeal

1...

Reasons

1. Basic facts

A. On March 4, 2008, the court of first instance rendered a judgment citing the Plaintiff’s claim on March 4, 2008 after delivering a copy of complaint and a notice of date for pleading to the Defendant by means of service by public notice. On March 20, 2008, the original copy of the said judgment was served by public notice to the Defendant.

B. On January 23, 2018, the Defendant served the original copy of the payment order issued by Seoul Central District Court No. 2018 (Seoul Central District Court) No. 91063) upon the Plaintiff’s application, and submitted the instant written appeal for the subsequent completion on February 14, 2018.

[Grounds for recognition] The substantial facts in this Court and the purport of the whole pleading

2. According to Article 396(1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Act regarding the legality of a subsequent appeal, an appeal shall be filed within two weeks from the date on which the written judgment was served, and the above period shall be a peremptory term.

According to Article 173(1) of the Civil Procedure Act, where a party is unable to comply with a peremptory term due to a cause not attributable to him/her, he/she may supplement the procedural acts neglected within two weeks from the date such cause ceases to exist.

Unless there are special circumstances, if a copy of complaint, original copy of judgment, etc. were served by service by public notice, the defendant was not aware of the service of the judgment without negligence, and in such a case, the defendant is unable to observe the peremptory period due to a cause not attributable to him and thus the defendant is entitled to file a subsequent appeal within two weeks after such cause ceases to exist. "after the cause ceases to exist" here refers to the time when the party or legal representative becomes aware of the fact that the judgment was served by public notice, rather than to the time when the party or legal representative becomes aware of the fact that the judgment was served by public notice. Thus, in ordinary cases, barring any special circumstances, it shall be limited to the time when the party or legal representative

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