Whether a request for adjudication against the acts of refusing to attend the first and third extraordinary meetings set forth in Article 209 of the Operating Administration Committee of the Busan Metropolitan Council of the Organization of the Organization of the Organization of the Organization of Busan Metropolitan City (hereinafter referred to as “act of refusing to attend the meeting of the Organization of the Organization of the Organization of the Organization of the Organization of the Organization of the Organization of the Organization of the Organization of the Organization of the Organization of the Organization of the Organization of the Organization of the Organization of Busan Metropolitan City (negative)

The interests of the protection of rights were extinguished as the first and third extraordinary meetings of the Operating Administrative Committee at issue in the instant case’s act of refusing to attend the meeting all ends. The chairperson of the local council determines whether to permit a specific application for attending the meeting in consideration of specific circumstances, and the meeting of the committee differs in nature, so long as discussions are not continued, the act identical to the act of refusing to attend the meeting in this case is not likely to be repeated. Even if repeated risks exist, the illegality of the act of refusing to attend the meeting in this case is a matter of law as to whether the act of refusing to attend the meeting in this case satisfies the legitimate requirements of Article 60(1) of the Local Autonomy Act, and therefore, it is difficult to view that there is a significant meaning of constitutionally. Accordingly, a request for

Dissenting Opinion by Justice Ahn Chang-ho, Justice Lee Dong-won, and Justice Lee Dong-young

A. The instant act of refusing to attend a meeting can be conducted continuously and repeatedly under the recognition that it is a legitimate act as an exercise of public authority under Article 60(1) of the Local Autonomy Act, which is a discretionary provision. The issue of establishing the constitutional limit of the act of refusing to attend a meeting conducted by the chairperson of the local council and setting constitutional standards is to confirm the scope of right to know and the principle of disclosing opinions, and to determine the constitutional limit

Since there is a need for constitutional explanation. The interest in the protection of rights is extinguished, but the interest in the appeal can be recognized.

(b)(1)The principle of disclosure of intention is the constitutional principle that guarantees the right to know about the administration of state affairs in representative democracy, enables the formation of the political will of the sovereign people and the monitoring, check and participation in the administration of state affairs, and also plays a role in the protection of political unity and corruption as well as in securing the fairness of parliamentary decision-making. These principles of disclosure of will need to be more emphasized at meetings of the local council which are the representative body and decision-making body.

(2) The freedom to attend a meeting of the local council constitutes a matter of the principle of disclosure of intention, and is the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution as part of the right to know. Inasmuch as the restriction on the right to know, restriction may be justified only in extenuating and exceptional cases pursuant to Article 37(2) of the Constitution. The same applies to cases where the act of refusing to attend a meeting satisfies the quorum for non-disclosure of meeting, and the autonomy of the local council needs to be respected, but the local council may not restrict the attendance of the meeting

(3) Although the Defendant’s refusal to attend the instant case was made by guaranteeing the opportunity for members of the Operating Administrative Committee to freely express their opinions, there is no evidence to acknowledge such circumstances.

The reason why the chairperson of a local council may refuse to attend a meeting in relation to an agenda item of public nature unrelated to national security is limited to cases where it is inevitable due to the temporary restriction of the meeting place, etc., such as where it is necessary to maintain order of the meeting, such as the smooth progress of the meeting. However, there is no evidence to prove that there was such reason at the time of refusing to attend the meeting of this case, and the respondent did not fully notify the applicants of the specific reason for refusing to

In contrast to the uncertainty of the public interest to be achieved by the act of refusing to attend the meeting of this case, the disadvantage, etc. that the applicant could not form a political intent on the agenda discussed at the time, is serious. Therefore, the act of refusing to attend the meeting of this case infringed the right to know in violation of the excessive prohibition principle.

Articles 50 and 118 of the Constitution

Article 60 (Attendance, etc. at Committee Meetings) (1) Persons other than the relevant local council members may attend Committee meetings with the permission of the chairperson.

(2) The chairperson may order visitors to leave the Council room, if necessary to maintain order.

Article 65 of the Local Autonomy Act (amended by Act No. 10827, Jul. 14, 2011) (1) (1) A meeting of a local council shall be open to the public: Provided, That a meeting may be closed to the public where at least three members proposed, approved by at least two thirds of the members present, or where the chairperson deems it necessary to maintain social safety and order.

(2) omitted.

Cheong-gu 1. Park ○-ju

2. Sexual ○○;

Attorney Yoon Jae-chul et al., Counsel for appellant

The chairperson of the Busan Metropolitan Council of Captain;

All of the instant appeals are dismissed.

1. Summary of the case;

A. The petitioners are residents of Busan Metropolitan City, who reside in the plane captain-gun, and are members of the Busan Metropolitan Government Government Office and the Local Self-Governing Group of the Captain of Busan Metropolitan Government (hereinafter referred to as the “Local Self-Governing Group of the Deputy Captain”).

(b)The local self-governing body of the commander of Busan Metropolitan City on October 12, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the "Council of the Captain") requested the Council to cooperate in attending the meeting of the Standing Committee on October 14, 2015, and the chairperson of the Council of the captain of the Busan Metropolitan City on October 14, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the "Council of the Captain") shall open the meetings of the Council of the captain of the Guns in accordance with Articles 60(1) and 65(1) of the Local Autonomy Act, and Article 83 of the Rules of the Council of the Captain-gun of the Busan Metropolitan City on October 14, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the "Council of the Captain-

If deemed necessary, a reply was sent to the Committee’s meeting to the effect that it may not be disclosed, and that the Committee’s meeting may attend with the permission of the chairperson.

C. On October 26, 2015, on which the first extraordinary session of the Steering Administration Committee (hereinafter “Operation Administration Committee”) was scheduled, the petitioners applied for the attendance of a special meeting at the meeting of the plane captain at around 30:30:00 a.m. on October 26, 2015. On the same day, at around 10:30 a.m., the respondent decided to grant permission for the attendance after the opening of the special meeting at around 30 p.m., and at least 6:4 of the present members, the applicants decided not to grant the attendance application as opposed to the opening of the meeting. Thereafter, the petitioners filed an application for the attendance at the meeting of the plane captain at around 30:0 a.m. on October 28, 2015, the third extraordinary session of the Operation Administration Committee was scheduled at around 209:30 p.m. on the same day, the respondent decided to be the vote of the members present at around 10:00 a.m., and the respondent did not make an application for the attendance.

D. On October 30, 2015, the chairperson of the captain-Gun council sent a reply to the local self-government council of the captain-general of the Busan Gyeonggi-do, stating that “the act of refusing to attend the meeting on October 26, 2015, and the act of refusing to attend the meeting on October 28, 2015, which met the requirements of the proviso of Article 65(1) of the Local Autonomy Act to ensure the free opportunity for speaking of the members of the Administrative Committee on Operation and to ensure the smooth progress of the meeting.”

E. The petitioners filed a constitutional complaint on January 21, 2016 on the grounds that the respondent’s refusal to attend the meeting on October 26, 2015 and the refusal to attend the meeting on October 28, 2015 infringed upon the claimant’s right to know.

2. Object of adjudication;

The subject of the instant case is whether the respondent’s act of refusing to attend the first extraordinary meeting of the Claimant No. 209 on October 26, 2015, and ② the act of refusing to attend the third extraordinary meeting of the Claimant No. 209 on October 28, 2015 (hereinafter “the act of refusing to attend the instant meeting”) infringes on the basic rights of the Claimant. The relevant provisions are as follows.

[Related Provisions]

Local Autonomy Act (wholly amended by Act No. 8423, May 11, 2007)

Article 60 (Attendance, etc. at Committee Meetings) (1) Persons other than the relevant local council members may attend Committee meetings with permission of the chairperson.

(2) The chairperson shall order visitors to leave the Council room, if necessary to maintain order.

the corporation.

Local Autonomy Act (amended by Act No. 10827, Jul. 14, 2011)

Article 65 (Opening of Meetings to the Public) (1) The meetings of local councils shall be open to the public: Provided, That the meetings may be closed to the public when three or more members proposed, when two thirds or more of the members present agree, or when the Speaker deems it necessary to maintain the social safety

3. Summary of the claimant's assertion

The freedom of local government residents to attend the local council committee is protected by the right to know that local government residents will guarantee the participation of the local council activities.However, the respondent did not meet the requirement of non-disclosure of the meeting under the proviso of Article 65 (1) of the Local Autonomy Act and thus, the respondent violated the right to know of the applicants

4. Determination

Inasmuch as the constitutional complaint system is a system that relieves the infringement of fundamental rights of the people, in order to lawful filing of a constitutional complaint, there must be interests to protect the rights for the purpose of the system (see, e.g., Constitutional Court en banc Decision 8Hun-Ma3, Apr. 17, 1989; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 201Hun-Ma398, Sept. 26, 2013). However, even if the interests to protect the rights have ceased, if there is a risk that infringement of fundamental rights will be repeated or the settlement of the dispute is essential for the maintenance and protection of the constitutional order, and thus, the interests to file a constitutional petition may be exceptionally recognized (see, e.g., Constitutional Court Decision 91Hun-Ma44, May 25, 1995; 201Hun-Ma285, Dec. 29, 2011).

In this context, “a case with significant meaning of unconstitutional piracy” refers to a case where piracy is essential for the maintenance and protection of constitutional order, and where an administrative agency interpreted and applied legal provisions unconstitutionally by misunderstanding or misunderstanding the effect on fundamental rights in interpreting laws applicable to administrative agencies, there is no need for constitutional harm in a case where the illegality of “the act of an administrative agency conforms to the provisions of law.” However, in a case where illegality is at issue, there is no need for constitutional harm. In such a case, even if there is risk of repeated acts in the future, even if there is danger of repeated acts in the future, the interest in a trial request is denied as there is no benefit in confirming the unconstitutionality of public power (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2002HunMa106, Feb. 27, 2003; 2014Hun-Ma626, Oct. 27, 20

In the instant case, the first and third extraordinary meetings of the Operating Administrative Committee No. 209, which were at issue in the instant refusal of the attendance, have already been completed, and thus the benefit of protection of rights has ceased to exist. In addition, the chairperson of the local council committee, with respect to the application for the attendance to a specific meeting, specific details such as the duties and jurisdiction of the relevant committee, the subject

In light of the circumstances, the Committee shall decide whether to grant permission. Unless the discussion on the agenda is continued, the Committee’s meetings are dealt with each other whenever the Committee holds a new agenda, and the nature of the meeting is different for each other. Therefore, it is difficult to deem that other meetings are always prohibited from attending the meeting in the future. Therefore, the same act as the act of refusing to attend the meeting

Even if such acts are likely to be repeated, the part directly at this case pertains to whether the act of refusing to attend the meeting of this case satisfies the legitimate requirements for refusing to attend the meeting of this case under Article 60(1) of the Local Autonomy Act. This is merely an issue of illegality of refusing to attend the meeting of this case, and it is difficult to see that the act of refusing to attend the meeting of this case has a significant meaning in the Constitution. Thus,

Therefore, a petition for a trial on the act of refusing to attend the present case does not have a benefit of protection of rights, and it is not exceptionally recognized.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal of this case is unlawful and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices. This decision is delivered with the assent of all participating Justices, except for a dissenting opinion by Justice Cho Chang-ho, Justice Kang Jong-won, and Justice Lee Jae-soo as shown in the following 6.

6. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Cho Chang-ho, Justice Lee Dong-won, and Justice Lee Dong-young;

We think, unlike the majority opinion, we should exceptionally recognize the interest of the trial on the instant request and proceed to the judgment on the merits. Also, we think that the instant refusal of attendance violates the Constitution, such as infringing the claimant's right to know by violating the principle of excessive prohibition under the Constitution, and therefore express their opinions as follows

A. Whether to recognize the interest of the appeal

(1) The special meeting of the captain-general administrative committee of the local council, which the claimant had attempted to attend in the instant case, has already been completed. However, in a case where the infringement of fundamental rights is likely to be repeated or the resolution of the dispute is essential for the maintenance and protection of the constitutional order, and its life has a significant meaning, the interests of adjudication may be exceptionally acknowledged (see, e.g., Constitutional Court Decision 2010Hun-Ma285, Dec. 29, 201; Constitutional Court Decision 2013Hun-Ma879, May 26, 2016).

In the event that the underlying law of the exercise of public authority is a discretionary regulation and the exercise of public authority can be deemed to be in accordance with the content prescribed in that law, such exercise of public authority

The possibility of repeating the infringement of fundamental rights is recognized inasmuch as it may be continuously and repeatedly achieved under the recognition that it is lawful. If the exercise of public authority continuously and repeatedly takes place under the recognition that it is legitimate, and the constitutional limit of the general and abstract contents of the exercise of public authority resulting from the relevant underlying law is established, and it is necessary to present constitutional standards therefor (see the concurring opinion with the Constitutional Court Decision 2014Hun-Ma626 decided Oct. 27, 2016, 201).

(2) The Local Autonomy Act provides that “Any person, other than the relevant local council members, may attend a meeting with the permission of the chairperson” (Article 60(1)). The Local Autonomy Act provides for the discretion of the chairperson to allow the attendance of a meeting of the local council committee as the discretion of the chairperson. In any case, there is no provision specifying whether the chairperson may allow or allow the attendance of the meeting.

In this case, the respondent was allowed to not attend the instant case upon the resolution of the members of the Operating Administrative Committee. Such refusal to attend the instant case may be continuously and repeatedly conducted under the recognition that it is a legitimate act as an exercise of public authority in accordance with the contents prescribed by the Act. Therefore, in this case, the possibility of repeating the infringement of fundamental rights

(3) On the other hand, the claimant’s argument in the instant appeal is about whether the respondent violated fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, which are guaranteed by the administrative committee meetings of the applicants, based on relevant provisions under the Local Autonomy Act, and whether it exceeds the bounds of the principle of disclosure of will under the Constitution. This can be determined by establishing the constitutional limits and presenting the constitutional standards for the refusal of attendance, which can be continuously and repeatedly conducted on the basis of law.

Of course, in relation to attending a meeting of the local council, determination of the unconstitutionality of a specific act of refusing to attend the meeting may vary in consideration of specific circumstances, such as the duties and jurisdiction of the relevant committee, the subject of agenda items, the status of applicants for attending the meeting, and the conditions of attending the meeting. However, the issue of constitutionality that the chairperson of the local council determines the constitutional limit on the act of refusing to attend the meeting conducted under Article 60(1) of the Local Autonomy Act, which is beyond the issue of whether the act of refusing to attend the meeting of the local council is illegal, and the constitutional limit of the act of confirming the scope of freedom to attend the meeting of the local council beyond the issue of whether the act of refusing to attend the meeting of the local council is necessary to be resolved.

(4) If so, a request for a trial on the act of refusing to attend the instant case has ceased to have a subjective benefit of protection of rights, but it can be recognized that the possibility of repeating the act of infringement of fundamental rights and the need

B. Determination on the merits

(1) The right to know and the principle of disclosure of intention

(A) The right to know refers to the right to freely collect necessary information or to request information from government agencies, etc. in order to guarantee national participation and promote the free development of character and to secure a life worthy of human dignity in a democratic country (see, e.g., Constitutional Court Decision 2012Hun-Ma167, Jul. 25, 2013). This is closely connected with the national sovereignty principle under Article 1 of the Constitution in that it is the fundamental right that is the premise for realizing the freedom of expression, which is one of the most important fundamental rights of citizens in a democratic country (see, e.g., Constitutional Court Decision 89Hun-Ma104, Feb. 25, 1992).

In particular, in representative democracy adopted by most democratic countries, the people are likely to obtain accurate information about the state administration without proper guarantee of the right to know, and in such a case, it is also impossible to form a proper political will of the people. The fact that the sovereign citizens are aware of the state administration is not merely merely to obtain information on the state administration, but to monitor and check the state administration through the formation of political opinions, and to participate in the state administration. Therefore, in representative democracy, the right to know in representative democracy becomes the beginning of the formation of the political will of the sovereign citizens and the basis for securing democratic legitimacy of the state administration.

(b)Emocracy is the basis for integrating social conflicts within the framework of politics to form a social consensus. In particular, in our society where conflicts between ideology, region, and generations come to have serious problems, a variety of interests should be democraticly coordinated so as to ensure fair state administration. This is because fair state administration can resolve social conflicts and achieve social integration by enhancing people’s trust and national security (see the supplementary opinion to the Constitutional Court Decision 2016Hun-Ba1, Mar. 10, 2017). State administration should be transparent in order to ensure fairness in state administration. Such a request for transparency is not merely a transparent disclosure of the results of state administration. Democracy is “the process for constantly obtaining the legitimacy of state administration,” and transparency in the process is to ensure fairness in the outcome of state administration, thereby ensuring transparency in the process of state administration.

It is more important to secure.

Transparency in the process of national administration is more meaningful in the process of parliamentary proceedings, which is the “contributing body” comprised of direct elections of the people. The process of parliamentary proceedings is the process of recognizing and resolving the diverse opinions and interests of the people through discussions in the “contributing body of multi-unit human resources comprised of representatives of the people.” This is, unlike the administrative procedures that are made by professional officials, to discover and reflect the public’s will and coordinate conflicting interests, so that transparency in the process of parliamentary proceedings is more necessary for the citizens to transparently disclose the procedures of parliamentary proceedings (see, e.g., Constitutional Court Decision 201Hun-Ma82, Mar. 25, 2004).

Considering the characteristics and functions of the parliamentary proceedings as well as the significance of the right to know in the representative democracy, it is important to ensure the transparency of the parliamentary proceedings in the process of the parliamentary proceedings, which is the representative organ, to the greatest extent possible, so such a procedure should be disclosed in principle (see the concurring opinion with the Constitutional Court Decision 2016Hun-Ba10, Mar. 10, 2017).

(C)The Constitution declares the principle of open hearing by stipulating that “The meeting of the National Assembly shall be open to the public” in the main sentence of Article 50(1).

1) The principle of disclosure of intention is derived from a democratic request to disclose the contents and policy-making process of the parliamentary process, which is a “contestative representative organ,” which is a direct election of the people, to the public, thereby disclosing the contents and decision-making process of the parliamentary process. The principle of disclosure of intention is not only to guarantee the right to know about the state administration in the representative democracy system, to allow the formation of the people’s political will, to monitor, check, and participate in the state administration, to ensure the fairness of the decision-making of the parliamentary council, but also to play a role

Considering the constitutional meaning and function of the principle of disclosure of intention, the principle of disclosure of intention is an essential element for realizing a democratic state based on the principle of national sovereignty in representative democracy, and it is the constitutional principle applied to Congress, which is a "Council representative organ" composed of direct elections by the people. Therefore, Article 50(1) of the Constitution declares that all meetings related to the constitutional functions of the National Assembly (excluding simple administrative meetings) should be made public, in principle, when confirming that the principle of disclosure of intention is the constitutional principle.

Today, the center of the function of the National Assembly is transferred to the committee at the plenary session and is operated as the committee-orientedism, and the actual deliberation of the bill is made by the committee.

Therefore, since it is difficult to secure the effectiveness of the principle of disclosure without disclosing a meeting of the National Assembly, the principle of disclosure of intention declared by Article 50(1) of the Constitution shall be deemed as naturally applicable to the meeting of the National Assembly Committee (see, e.g., Constitutional Court Decision 98Hun-Ma443, Jun. 29, 2000).

2) Unlike the National Assembly, the local council has the right to deliberate and determine the budget, approval for settlement of accounts, and other matters provided for in other Acts and subordinate statutes, as well as the right to vote on the enactment and amendment of the regulations on autonomy within the scope of statutes, and has the right to inspect and investigate the administrative affairs of the local government in accordance with the provisions of Acts and subordinate statutes (Articles 117(1) and 118 of the Constitution, and Articles 39 and 41 of the Local Autonomy Act). As such, the local council cannot deny the fact that it is the institution in charge of state affairs within the scope of statutes and is the collegiate representative and the deliberative body composed of the direct election of the residents. Accordingly, the democratic request for government administration based on the citizen is reasonable to the local council like the National Assembly, so the process of the local

In particular, the local council consists of members elected in a relatively limited area, and the fixed number of the members of the local council is smaller than that of the members of the local council, and local elarts, such as members of the local council, may form a "political cartel" only one of them more easily. In addition, since the members of the local council may have occupation other than occupation prescribed by law, such as officers and employees of public institutions and executives and employees of agricultural cooperatives, etc., as prescribed by the National Assembly and law, they may engage in profit-making occupation (Article 35 of the Local Autonomy Act). These points are combined with the principle of justice in our society, i.e., the fairness of decision-making, the possibility of causing damage to the fairness of decision-making, political unity and corruption, and as a result, damage the people's trust in local autonomy. In order to overcome this, the

Today, the center of the function of the local council is transferred to a committee at the plenary session as in the National Assembly and is operated as a committee-oriented principle, and substantial deliberation on the bill such as the bill is carried out by the committee. Therefore, it is difficult to secure the effectiveness of the disclosure principle without disclosing the meeting of the local council committee. Therefore, the disclosure principle of intention should be viewed as being naturally applied to

3) The Constitution stipulates, “The local government shall have a local council (Article 118(1)),” and “the organization, authority, election of council members, and other matters concerning the organization and operation of the local council shall be prescribed by Act (Article 118(2)).” The Local Autonomy Act has since its enactment

Article 65(1) of the Local Council only declares that a meeting of the local council is open to the public (see Article 65(1)) and does not explicitly stipulate that a meeting of the local council is held by the local council. However, as seen earlier, in the representative democracy system, the principle of disclosure of intention, which is the constitutional principle, shall be deemed to apply to a meeting of the local council, as there is no special reason for the disclosure of the constitutional meaning and function in relation to the meeting of the

(iv)The meetings of the plenary session of the National Assembly of the plenary session, meetings of the committees of the local council as well as those of the plenary session of the local council shall be open to the public in principle, and all nationals wish

(2) Criteria for review

(A) Residents of local governments shall be allowed to obtain information necessary for residents' participation by attending the meetings of the plenary session and committee meetings of the local council, and may form political opinions based on such information. The residents so formed shall allow the sound surveillance, check, and participation in the state administration, and the possibility of controlling the state administration secured through this process serves as the foundation of desirable residents' autonomy, such as ensuring the fairness in decision-making of the local council and preventing political harmony and corruption.

Therefore, the freedom to attend the meetings of the plenary session and committees of the local council is the content of the principle of disclosure, which is the constitutional principle (see, e.g., Constitutional Court Decision 98Hun-Ma443, Jun. 29, 2000). Furthermore, such freedom is not profits or legal rights that the plenary session or committee of the local council may enjoy by disclosing its meetings to the public, but as part of the right to know.

(B) Inasmuch as the restriction on the freedom to attend the plenary session and committee meetings of the local council limits the right to know, it cannot be justified immediately pursuant to Article 118(2) of the Constitution and Articles 60(1) and 65(1) of the Local Autonomy Act. In particular, as seen earlier, the right to know in the representative democracy system becomes the beginning of the formation of the political will of the sovereign citizens and the basis for securing democratic legitimacy of state administration. Thus, the restriction on such fundamental rights can be justified only in exceptional cases where it is necessary and inevitable for national security, maintenance of order, and public welfare pursuant to Article 37(2) of the Constitution, and even in such cases, the essential contents of the freedom to attend the plenary session and committee meetings of the local council may not be infringed on. Furthermore, the principle of disclosure of intention can be deemed an essential requirement for realizing democratic state based on the principle of citizen sovereignty in representative democracy, and thus, the act of refusing to attend the committee contrary thereto shall be restricted pursuant to Article 37(2) of

shall be strictly observed on one floor. The same shall also apply to cases where the local council's refusal to attend the meetings of the plenary session and the committee meeting satisfies the quorum for disclosure of the meeting.

(C) A member of a local council who has received free delegation of a local government’s policy decision should be able to carry out state affairs efficiently from the suspicion of a short-term person’s speech and resolution and social pressure, and to this end, the autonomy of the local council should be respected. However, since the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea lies in citizens and all powers are generated from citizens (Article 1(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea), the local council should exercise the autonomy so that the intent of the sovereign citizens can be faithfully reflected and democratic efficiency rather than the collusion of minority representatives. Therefore, the local council should not restrict the freedom to attend a meeting on the ground of autonomy, and the examination of constitutionality of the act that limits the freedom to attend a meeting of the local council, the local council’s plenary session and committee’s meeting should be subject to a strict proportionality pursuant to Article 37(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea. Furthermore, if a member

(3) Whether the act of refusing to attend the present case is unconstitutional

(A) On October 30, 2015, the respondent notified the applicants of the “documents reply to the questions related to the attendance at the meetings of the Standing Committee of the Captain-gun,” that the instant act of refusing the attendance was conducted for the purpose of guaranteeing the opportunity for members of the Operating Administrative Committee to freely express their opinions and promoting smooth meetings. However, the minutes of the meeting held on October 26, 2015 and October 28, 2015, when a special meeting of the Operating Administrative Committee was held by the Operating Administrative Committee, did not state any purpose of refusing the attendance. In addition, the respondent merely explained to the applicants that it is impossible to allow the attendance of the meeting due to their refusal by the members of the Operating Administrative Committee at the time of the instant refusal to attend the meeting. Accordingly, it cannot be concluded that the instant refusal to attend the meeting was made with the same purpose as the notification as the content of October 30, 2015, and there is no clear circumstance to recognize the legitimacy of the objective and the means of suitability.

(B) We examine whether the instant act of denying the audience attendance satisfies the minimum requirements of infringement.

1) The Local Autonomy Act provides that “Any person, other than the pertinent local council members, may attend a meeting with the permission of the chairperson (Article 60(1)).” As seen earlier, the principle of disclosure of intention is the constitutional principle, and as a matter of course, the meeting of the local council committee is fit.

As such, Article 60 (1) of the Local Autonomy Act is interpreted as a provision on the premise that the meeting of the local council should be disclosed to the public unless there are special circumstances.

Therefore, it is not possible for the chairperson of the local council to arbitrarily refuse to attend the meeting without any restriction. In light of the fact that the chairperson of the local council committee has a duty to maintain order and supervise affairs (Articles 82 and 84 of the Local Autonomy Act). The chairperson may order visitors to leave the meeting when necessary to maintain order (Article 60(2) of the Local Autonomy Act), etc., the reason why the chairperson of the local council committee may refuse to attend the meeting is limited to cases where it is inevitable due to the temporary restriction of the meeting place, such as smooth progress of the meeting (see, e.g., Constitutional Court Decision 98Hun-Ma443, Jun. 29, 200).

In this case, the agenda at the time of the special meeting of the Operating Administration Committee is about the budget of the captain-in-house army or the public matters unrelated to national security, such as resident tax rates, etc. The Busan Gyeonggi-do local self-governing group to which the petitioners belong is continuing to attend the meetings of the local council plenary session and the committee in order to realize economic justice. This organization revealed that the applicants apply for the attendance for the purpose of monitoring and checking the democratic and sound parliamentary activities of the members of the local council. There was no fact that there was no disturbance in the meeting place, such as avoiding disturbance or interfering with the progress of the proceedings. In addition, there was no other reason that may interfere with the maintenance of order of the Operating Administration Committee at the time of visiting the meeting of this case. Thus, the act of refusing to attend the meeting of this case does not constitute a reason for refusing to pass

2) The respondent asserts that he/she was not allowed to attend the meeting in order to guarantee the Council members’ opportunity to free speak on the agenda at the time and to facilitate the progress of the proceedings.

As seen earlier, it is limited to cases where it is necessary to maintain order at a meeting for the reason that the chairperson of the local council may refuse to attend the meeting in relation to the agenda items of public nature unrelated to national security. However, the chairperson of the local council may order visitors to leave the meeting when necessary to maintain order pursuant to Article 60(2) of the Local Autonomy Act. As such, it is insufficient to presume that the reason for refusing to attend the meeting on the ground of maintenance of order is likely to interfere with the smooth progress of the meeting, and there is a specific possibility that such possibility may be realized.

If the attendance of a meeting is denied on the abstract grounds that there are concerns about the possibility of being present at the meeting, the guarantee of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution as part of the principle of disclosure and the right to know, which is the constitutional principle, can be punished.

At the time of a special meeting of the Operating Administration Committee, the agenda for deliberation may be likely to interfere with the smooth progress of the meeting if the meeting is allowed to attend as much as the agenda items related to the rights and obligations of residents, such as budget or resident tax rate, were included. However, the circumstances other than such abstract reasons, which are not found in any material, that there is a specific possibility that it may interfere with the maintenance of order of the Operating Administration Committee. Accordingly, the respondent's assertion cannot be accepted.

3) Of course, the respondent, after the act of refusing to attend the meeting of this case, opened the minutes related thereto to the public on the website of the captain-general meeting. However, checking the minutes after the fact alone cannot grasp the atmosphere at the time of the meeting or the actual contents, attitude, etc. of the members, and it is difficult to fully monitor and check the process of the committee’s formation and decision-making process. In the meeting of the commission, it is the most effective way to attend the meeting where a debate is held in order to accurately grasp the process and contents of the debate and to monitor and check the parliamentary activities in a timely manner. Therefore, the unconstitutionality of the act of refusing to attend the meeting of this case is not cured merely because the respondent ex post facto disclosed the minutes.

4)On the other hand, the agenda at the time of the extraordinary meeting of the Operating Administration Committee is closely related to the activities of monitoring and checking civil groups to which applicants belong, most of the agenda items are related to the local finance of the captain group. In this case, when the chairperson of the local council makes a decision not to allow the attendance of the Committee, he/she shall, without delay, notify the applicants for the attendance of the detailed reasons for the decision not to allow the attendance and the methods

However, as seen earlier, the respondent provided an explanation to the applicants that at the time of the refusal to attend the meeting of this case, the applicants cannot be allowed to attend the meeting due to the intention of the members of the Operating Administrative Committee, and did not explain any specific reasons. Only after the closing of a special meeting of the Operating Administrative Committee, the respondent only provided written notification that the act of refusing to attend the meeting of this case is to guarantee the members’ free opportunity for speaking and to smoothly proceed with the meeting. Such abstract and formal notification after the closing of a special meeting of the Operating Administrative Committee only provided that the applicants only provided written notification that the act of refusing to attend the meeting of this case was conducted

The method and procedure of this is unknown.

5) In full view of these facts, the instant audience activity cannot be deemed to meet the minimum requirements of infringement.

(C) As seen earlier, the act of refusing to attend the instant meeting is not only unclear, but also abstract contents that may interfere with the smooth progress of the meeting even if the public interest is acknowledged. The degree of public interest resulting from the act of refusing to attend the instant meeting is larger than the disadvantage that the applicant could not form political intent with respect to the agenda closely related to the rights and obligations of the residents discussed as he did not attend the special meeting of the Operating Administrative Committee.

Therefore, the act of denying the audience of this case cannot be deemed to meet the requirements of balance of legal interests.

(d) If so, it is doubtful whether the instant audience attendance in question can be justified and the means can be justified, and as such, it does not meet the minimum requirements of infringement and the balance of legal interests, it infringes on the right to know, which is the fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, in violation of the principle of excessive prohibition. As long as the instant audience attendance refusal violates the principle of excessive prohibition and infringes on the applicant’s right to know, the instant audience attendance in question cannot be justified solely on the ground that the quorum for non-disclosure was satisfied and determined.

In addition, the act of refusing to attend the meeting of this case violates the principle of disclosure of intention, which is the constitutional principle, by infringing the claimant's right to know about the state administration of the extraordinary meeting of the

C. Sub-committee

The act of refusing to attend the meeting of this case shall be revoked as it infringes the applicant's right to know in violation of the Constitution and violates the principle of disclosure of intention. However, since the act of refusing to attend the meeting of this case has already been completed, it is necessary to confirm the unconstitutionality of it in a declared sense in order to prevent

Justices Kim Jong-soo, Kim Chang-sung, Cho Chang-ho, Cho Chang-ho, Cho Jong-ho, Lee Dong-ho, Lee Dong-ho