A. Where a decision of permission for an appeal is rendered with respect to an application for permission for an appeal that did not submit a written reason for appeal (negative)

B. The binding force on the Re-appeal Court of Justice that rendered a judgment of remand

C. The case holding that an additional amendment to the claim in the appellate trial is lawful

(d) The objective scope of res judicata of the final and conclusive judgment on the claim for performance of the procedure for ownership transfer registration.

E. Nature of possession of the reverted property

(f) As to the acquisition by prescription between January 1, 1965 and April 30, 197, in a case where a parcel of land, which is the property devolving upon ownership, has been purchased and occupied (affirmative)

A. The appeal based on permission shall meet the requirements for filing an application for final appeal within the period of final appeal and submitting a statement of reasons for final appeal within 14 days from the date of receipt of the records of trial. Even if there was a decision to permit final appeal with respect to an application for final appeal for which the requirements are not satisfied, it is merely limited to the effect that the appeal is considered to have been filed on the day when the application was received by the original court, and it does not result in the cure of

B. The court of final appeal is bound by the legal judgment of the previous judgment of remanding, and thus cannot take any other opinion in the relevant case.

C. The plaintiff filed the lawsuit in this case on the ground that the land was distributed by the non-party company on the premise that it was owned by the non-party company, but at the appellate court, the plaintiff filed the lawsuit in this case as the preliminary claim, and even if the new claim was changed as the claim for confirmation of ownership and the claim for cancellation of registration as the primary claim, which added the plaintiff's claim for cancellation of registration based on ownership, to the primary claim, the above main and conjunctive claim are different methods of resolution in disputes over the same economic interest, so it cannot be deemed that there is a change in the foundation of the claim, and since most of the previous litigation data can be used for the deliberation of the new claim, it cannot be said to significantly delay the litigation procedure, and if there is an additional change in the legitimate claim,

D. Res judicata of a final and conclusive judgment is included in the text of the judgment, i.e., the conclusion of the judgment on the existence of legal relations claimed as a subject matter of lawsuit, and the existence of legal relations, which are the premise of the judgment, does not affect the existence of such legal relations. Therefore, res judicata of a final and conclusive judgment on the claim for performance of registration of ownership transfer does not affect the existence of the right of ownership of the subject matter of lawsuit, and does not affect the existence

E. Article 33 of the Military Administration Act, which provides for the duty to keep property devolving upon the State, is deemed to have been repealed by January 24, 1962 pursuant to the provisions of Articles 1 through 3 of the former Act on Special Measures for the Amendment of the Act (Act No. 659 of July 15, 1961), but in light of the provisions of Articles 2(1), 3, 4, 22, 25, and 34 of the Act, the possession of property devolving upon the State shall be deemed to constitute possession upon the nature of the title.

F. In a case where the land, which is the property devolving upon the State, has been purchased and occupied, it shall be deemed that the possession of the land was returned to the possession with the intention of self-ownership from January 1, 1965 under Article 2 subparagraph 1 of the Act on Special Measures for the Disposal of Property Belonging to the State Property (Act No. 1346 of May 29, 1963), and Article 5 (2) of the former State Property Act (Act No. 2950 of December 31, 1976), which provides that the State property shall not be subject to the prescriptive acquisition, is applicable only after May 1, 197, and even if it is a State property before that date, it cannot be excluded from the subject of the prescriptive acquisition unless it is for the public use of the property for administrative purpose, so it shall not affect any effect of the prescriptive acquisition already completed before that date.

A. Article 12 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings; Articles 8 and 12 of the Enforcement Rule of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings; Article 406(c) of the Civil Procedure Act; Articles 235, 377, and 385(d) of the Civil Act; Article 202(e) of the Civil Act; Article 245 of the Military Affairs Act; Article 33(f) of the Military Affairs Act; Articles 4 and 22 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Disposal of Property Belonging to State (Law No. 1346, May 29, 1963); Article 5 of the Addenda to the Act on Special Measures for the Disposal of Property Belonging to State; Article 5 of the former State Property Act (Act No. 2950, Dec. 31, 1976)

B. Supreme Court Decision 80Da2029 delivered on February 24, 1988, 88Nu4249 delivered on August 23, 198. Supreme Court Decision 73Da702 delivered on October 23, 197, 87Da7225 delivered on October 7, 1987. Supreme Court Decision 72Da1430 delivered on October 10, 1972, 72Da746 delivered on May 27, 1975, 79Da1218 delivered on September 25, 197, 80Da164 delivered on April 24, 198, 86Da1979 delivered on June 16, 197, 197.

Hongk Law Firm, Attorneys Kim Jong-young et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant-appellant

Plaintiff (Supplementary Intervenor) and one other, Counsel for the defendant-appellant and one other, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant 1 (Appointed Party) and 78 others

Defendant 3 and 6 others, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant-appellee and 5 others

Seoul High Court Decision 86Na1406 delivered on August 12, 198

The part of the judgment below regarding Defendant Korea Life Insurance Co., Ltd., Korea Education Insurance Co., Ltd., interesting life insurance Co., Ltd., Defendant 3, Defendant 7, Defendant 1 (Appointed Party) and Defendant 2 (Appointed Party) is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.

The appeal by Defendant Dong Dong Life Insurance Co., Ltd. and Defendant 9 shall be dismissed, and the costs of appeal regarding this dismissed appeal shall be assessed against the said Defendants.

1. As to the legality of appeal by Defendant Dongdong Life Insurance Co., Ltd.:

According to Article 12 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings, Articles 8(1) and (5), and 12 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act, in filing an appeal based on permission, an applicant shall submit an application for permission of an appeal to the court of original judgment before the judgment of the court below becomes final and conclusive, and where the applicant fails to state the grounds for the application, the applicant shall submit a written reason for the application to the Supreme Court within 14 days after receipt of the records of trial to the Supreme Court. If the applicant fails to submit a written reason for the application within the above period, the Supreme Court shall dismiss the application by

Therefore, the final appeal based on permission shall meet the requirements for filing an application for final appeal within the period of final appeal and submitting a statement of reasons for final appeal within 14 days from the date of receipt of the records of trial. Even if there was a decision granting permission for final appeal with respect to an application for final appeal which does not meet such requirements, the effect of deeming the appeal to have been filed on the date when the application was received by the original court is considered to have been filed is nothing more than the effect of recovering

In this case, the defendant Dong Dong Life Insurance Co., Ltd. received notification of receipt of the records of trial from the party members on October 1, 1988, and submitted the written reason of application for the final appeal on October 18 of the last year, and it is evident that the written reason of application for the final appeal is not indicated in the written reason of application for the final appeal. Therefore, the above defendant's final appeal by the above defendant cannot be deemed lawful regardless of the party members' decision of permission for final appeal as of December 6, 198

2. Each of the grounds of appeal by Defendant 3 and Defendant 7’s attorney on the misapprehension of the legal principles under Article 2, 33, and 103 of the Military Administration Act, and Article 7 of the Decree of the United States Armed Forces.

As to the grounds of appeal by Defendant 1 (Appointed Party) and Defendant 2 (Appointed Party)

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below held that the land in the dispute of this case (other than the land in No. 8 and No. 9 of No. 2 list among the land in the 1, No. 2 list attached to the judgment of the court of original judgment) was originally owned by Mano-si, Japan (the land except for the land in No. 8 and No. 9 of this case was originally owned by the non-party No. 1). The non-party No. Yan Agriculture and Forestry Co., Ltd. (the co-defendant in the court of first instance, the trade name was changed to the Japanese Real Estate Construction Co., Ltd. after the judgment of the court of first instance; hereinafter referred to as the non-party Co., Ltd.) promised to purchase the land on Jan. 8, 1942 and made a provisional registration for the preservation of the right to claim ownership transfer registration on the ground that the plaintiff had the ownership ownership ownership ownership ownership ownership ownership ownership ownership ownership ownership ownership ownership rights after the sunset, and on December 111, 1962.

1. On September 30, 1943, the court below issued a favorable judgment to the non-party 1 who acquired the ownership by paying the price to the non-party 4 before August 9, 1945, or by paying all public charges for the above land after delivery of all necessary documents for the registration of transfer of ownership to the non-party 1. The court below held that the non-party 2 did not obtain the ownership transfer registration from the non-party 1 to the non-party 3 who acquired the ownership by full payment of the price to the non-party 4 before August 9, 1945. The judgment became final on January 25, 1963. The non-party company failed to obtain the ownership transfer registration from the non-party 1 to the non-party 4 company or the non-party 2 company's first procedure for the cancellation of ownership transfer registration from the non-party 1 to the non-party 3 company's provisional registration or the non-party 3 company's first procedure for the cancellation of ownership transfer registration to the non-party 3 company.

The above judgment of the court below is justifiable as it is based on the legal judgment of the party members for the reason of reversal, and the party members also cannot take any other opinion in the case in question as they are bound to the legal judgment of the previous judgment of remand (see Supreme Court Decision 80Da2029, Feb. 24, 1981; Supreme Court Decision 88Nu4249, Aug. 23, 1988). Thus, the judgment of remand is erroneous in the legal opinion of the court below as the reason of reversal, and the judgment of the court below is also erroneous in the misapprehension of the legal principle, and it cannot be accepted as it is without merit.

3. As to the grounds of appeal by Defendant 3 as to the misapprehension of legal principles under Articles 235, 385, and 377 of the Civil Procedure Act, and the grounds of appeal by Defendant 1 (Appointed Party) and Defendant 2 (Appointed Party)

According to the records, on December 13, 1978, the plaintiff filed the lawsuit in this case on the premise that the land in this case was owned by the non-party company as the cause of the claim that the land in this case was distributed in kind, which is its remaining property, from the non-party company, and lost the court of first instance. After the judgment of the court below, only based on a preparatory document dated November 22, 1983 and a written extension report dated December 17, 1983, the original claim was the preliminary claim, and the new claim was the preliminary claim, and the new claim was changed as the exercise of the claim for confirmation of ownership and the claim for the cancellation of the registration as the exercise of the claim for the removal of disturbance based on ownership, which added to the primary claim. The court below rejected the plaintiff's above alteration of claim on the ground that the court below was legitimate, and rejected the

In theory, the purport of the lawsuit is that the above measure of the court below is illegal because it violates Articles 235, 385, and 377 of the Civil Procedure Act.

The modification of a claim can be made until the time of the conclusion of arguments in the fact-finding court, unless it is obvious to delay the proceedings. The modification of the purport of the claim, which is merely a different resolution method, in the same facts of living or disputes concerning the same economic interest, should not be considered to be the basis of the claim (see Supreme Court Decision 73Da702 delivered on October 23, 197; Supreme Court Decision 87Da225 delivered on July 7, 1987). In this case, even though the plaintiff made a change in the claim to add the main claim as seen above, the plaintiff has a different resolution method in the dispute concerning the same economic interest, and it cannot be deemed that there is a change in the basis of the claim. In addition, since most of the previous litigation data can be used to examine a new claim, it cannot be said that there is a significant delay in the proceedings. In addition, if there is a legitimate change in the appellate court's new claim, it is naturally the subject of a trial for the appellate court's additional appeal, and the court's decision is not justified.

4. As to the grounds of appeal by Defendant 3, Defendant 9’s attorney, Defendant 1 (Appointed Party) and Defendant 2 (Appointed Party) on the misapprehension of legal principles as to the promotion of res judicata effect and creditor subrogation lawsuit, etc.

(1) Res judicata of a final and conclusive judgment is included in the text of the judgment, i.e., the conclusion of the judgment on the existence of legal relations asserted as a subject matter of lawsuit, and does not affect the existence of legal relations, which are the premise of the judgment. Thus, res judicata of a final and conclusive judgment on the claim for the performance of the procedure for the transfer registration of real estate ownership does not affect the existence of the right to claim the transfer registration, which was a subject matter of lawsuit, and does not affect the existence of ownership of the subject matter of lawsuit, and it does not affect the existence of ownership of the subject matter of lawsuit, and it does not affect the existence of ownership of the subject matter of lawsuit (Supreme Court Decision 72Da1430 Decided October 10, 1972; Supreme Court Decision 79Da1218 Decided September 25, 1979; Supreme Court Decision 80Da164 Decided April 22, 198; Supreme Court Decision 86Da1958 Decided March 24, 1987).

Therefore, even though there was a final and conclusive judgment ordering the plaintiff to implement the procedure for ownership transfer registration of the non-party company with respect to the land in the dispute in this case, and there was a part rejecting the plaintiff's defense, such as the part stating that the land in this case was owned by the non-party company and the cause of the main claim in this case, the res judicata of the above final and conclusive judgment cannot affect the main claim in this case seeking the confirmation of ownership and the exclusion of disturbance based on ownership, on the premise that the land in this case is owned by

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error in the judgment of the court below.

The precedents pointed out by the theory are not appropriate in this case. Also, the conjunctive claim of this case conflicts with the res judicata of the final and conclusive judgment rendered in Seoul High Court 71Na1597,1598. However, the judgment of the court below did not accept all the main claim of this case and accepted the conjunctive claim, and there is no reason to view it further.

(2) A lawsuit demanding confirmation of ownership concerning real estate or a lawsuit demanding cancellation of registration of ownership transfer may be instituted on the part of a legal legitimate owner, and it is not always possible to file a lawsuit with the Real Estate Registration Board for registration of ownership acquisition. In addition, a claim for cancellation of registration of the cause of invalidation, which was directly made with respect to the land of this case by exercising the right to claim removal of obstruction of ownership, which is the content of ownership, is not a claim for cancellation of registration of invalidity of cause, which is directly made with respect to the land of this case, by exercising the right to claim removal of obstruction of ownership, which is the content of ownership. Even if the Defendants received a registration of ownership transfer again from the non-party company that made the registration of ownership transfer by the final judgment, if the Plaintiff is not the non-party company, but the legitimate owner of the land of this case, the Plaintiff may seek

No theory can be employed because it is an assertion of misunderstanding legal principles, which led to the argument of objection or misunderstanding the purport of the judgment of the court below.

5. As to Defendant 9’s ground of appeal on the part of the principle of good faith

The plaintiff initially filed a claim on the premise that the land in this case was owned by the non-party company as the cause of the claim that was distributed in kind from the above company, and the appellate court changed the claim and added the main claim on the ground that the land in this case was owned by the non-party company rather than the non-party company's ownership. Unlike the previous assertion, the fact that the land in this case was not owned by the non-party company and added the main claim on the ground that it was owned by the plaintiff does not constitute litigation against the non-party company's principle. Further, since the shares of the non-party company belong to the plaintiff most of the shares of the non-party company, the plaintiff could suspend or dismiss the plaintiff's performance of duties as the de facto owner of the company's apparent representative, etc., and even if there was a situation where the plaintiff could proceed with dissolution and liquidation proceedings, the plaintiff's filing of the lawsuit in this case cannot be concluded to violate the principle of trust and good faith (see Supreme Court Decision 67Da43, Nov. 25, 1986).

In addition, Article 395 of the Commercial Act provides that a director, who is not the representative director of the company, conducts a transaction by using a name that may be recognized as having the power of representation of the company, and is responsible for the company's act of representing the company in appearance, the company shall be liable for the third party acting in good faith. Therefore, the plaintiff, who is not the non-party company, shall not be liable for the transactional act of the expressed representative director of the non-party company. Therefore, even though the plaintiff is liable for the land disposal act of the expressed representative director, such as the non-party company's non-party 2

6. As to Defendant 3’s ground of appeal regarding the right to perform the litigation

According to Articles 1 through 3, 13, and Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on Litigation to Which the State is a Party, the State shall represent the State in so-called state litigation to which the State is a party or intervenor. The Minister of Justice shall designate an employee of the Ministry of Justice or an attorney-at-law or appoint an attorney-at-law as an attorney-at-law and have him/her conduct the state litigation. If deemed necessary in state litigation with respect to affairs under his/her jurisdiction or supervision, the Minister of Justice may hear the opinion of the head of the administrative agency concerned and then designate an employee of the administrative agency and let him/her conduct the litigation concerned. The

According to the records, the head of the prosecutor's office of each level who has been delegated with the authority to conduct state litigation by the Minister of Justice, the legal representative of the plaintiff, shall designate the prosecutor's office of each level and the staff of the Seoul regional prosecutor's office as the litigation performer, and appoint the lawyer as the litigation lawyer and have them jointly conduct the litigation of this case. Thus, even if the land of this case is a state forest managed by the Minister of the Korea Forest Service and does not belong to the management of the Minister of Finance and Economy or the Commissioner of the National Tax Service, all the litigation acts conducted by the staff of the Seoul regional

7. As to the grounds of appeal by Defendant Korea Life Insurance Co., Ltd., Korea Education Insurance Co., Ltd., Korea Interest and Life Insurance Co., Ltd., Defendant 3, Defendant 7’s attorney, Defendant 1 (Appointed Party) and Defendant 2 (Appointed Party) as to the prescriptive acquisition:

(1) According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the defendants' assertion that the above defendants purchased or acquired the above land from the above company on May 14, 1963, and completed the registration of ownership transfer in the future of the above defendants, and acquired each of them by prescription in accordance with Article 245 (2) of the Civil Code since 10 years have passed since each of the above defendants acquired or acquired the above land in good faith and without negligence after the above defendants acquired or acquired the ownership transfer registration from the above company's intent. However, even if the property devolving was acquired from the possessor and occupied the property with the intention of possession, the court below ordered the possessor of all of the property under Article 33 of the military law to occupy the country with the intention of possession. Thus, the court below rejected the reasoning that the possession cannot be regarded as possession independently in the nature of the title. Further, since the defendant Korea Life Insurance Co., Ltd. and the defendant Education Insurance Co., Ltd., Ltd. received the registration of ownership transfer by compulsory transfer order under Article 115 of the former Insurance Business Act.

According to Articles 2(1), 3, 4, 22, and 25 and 34 of the Act on Special Measures for the Settlement of Property Belonging to the State, promulgated from December 19, 1949, the possessor of property devolving upon the State is obligated to keep the State in custody pursuant to Article 33 of the Military Act, and Articles 2(1), 3, 4, 22, and 25 and 34 of the Act on Special Measures for the Settlement of Property Belonging to the State, the possessor of the property devolving upon the State and the United States government shall lease or manage all devolved property to the Government pursuant to Article 5 of the first Agreement on Establishment and Property between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the United States, until it is designated as State-owned or public property, or sold to the State or corporation, and the lessee, manager, or purchaser of the property devolving upon the State shall preserve the property with the care of a good manager until the ownership of the property is transferred without the approval of the Government; therefore, it shall not be deemed that the above military law constitutes possession of property devolving upon the State-owned 164.6.

The Supreme Court Decision 69Da763 delivered on July 29, 1969; Supreme Court Decision 80Da3121 delivered on September 22, 1981 ruled that the party members pointed out that the theory of lawsuit had acquired the ownership of the farmland at the time of the original acquisition of the ownership of the farmland by completing the reimbursement after receiving a share of the farmland from the government, and therefore, it cannot be viewed as an appropriate precedent in this case, claiming that the land has been acquired by succession.

(2) However, Article 2 subparagraph 1 of the Act on Special Measures for the Disposal of Property Belonging to State (Act No. 1346 of May 29, 1963) and Article 5 of the Addenda of the same Act provide that property devolving upon State property shall be State property free of charge. Thus, property devolving upon State property not sold by the same date shall become State property from January 1, 1965 (see Supreme Court Decision 69Da1809 delivered on January 27, 1970). In a case where one purchased and occupied the land devolving upon State property from January 1, 1965, which became State property, it shall be deemed that the possession of the land shall be reverted to State property from the time of possession to the time, so it is possible to proceed with the prescriptive acquisition. Since Article 5 (2) of the State Property Act, which provides that property shall not be subject to prescriptive acquisition, was enacted by Act No. 2950 of December 31, 1976, it shall not be subject to prescriptive acquisition until 15, 1975Da15.25.

Since there is no proof of the plaintiff as to the property that is officially offered for the administrative purpose of this case, the court below's rejection of the above defendants' claim for the ownership transfer registration on the ground that it does not examine the above point as to the above point, and on the ground that the possession of the property devolving upon the nature of its title constitutes the possession of another owner, which constitutes an unlawful act affecting the conclusion of the judgment, by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the conversion of the property devolving upon the pen and the prescriptive acquisition of State property, which constitutes an unlawful act which affected the conclusion of the judgment, and it also shows that the court below's reasoning for pointing this out under Article 12 (2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings (No. 1 omitted), No. 189, No. 208, No. 620, Jun. 1, 207, No. 2017, No. 1797, May 30, 207; No. 1769, Jun. 16, 20197>

Therefore, since each appeal by Defendant Korea Life Insurance Co., Ltd., Korea Education Insurance Co., Ltd., interesting and life insurance Co., Ltd., Defendant 3, Defendant 7, Defendant 1 (Appointed Party) and Defendant 2 (Appointed Party) is with merit, the part concerning the above Defendants in the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below. Defendant Dong Life Insurance Co., Ltd. and Defendant 9’s appeal by Defendant Dong Life Insurance Co., Ltd. and Defendant 9 are not legitimate appeal, and are all dismissed, without merit, and the costs of appeal

It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Yoon Young-young (Presiding Justice)