Whether the insurer's duty of disclosure is limited to the matters asked in writing by the insurer.

The duty of disclosure is recognized only for the matters asked by the insurer in writing.

Article 651 of the Commercial Act

Kim Sang-sung

New Postal Agricultural Cooperatives

1. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 5 million won with the annual interest rate of 5% from May 16, 1987 to November 4, 1987, and 25% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment.

2. The plaintiff's remaining claims are dismissed.

3. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant.

4. Paragraph 1 can be provisionally executed.

Except for the damages for delay referred to in paragraph (1), the provisions of Articles 1, 3 and 4 shall apply.

With respect to the damages for delay as referred to in paragraph (1), the plaintiff shall be entitled to the rate of 25 percent per annum from May 16, 1987 to the full payment day.

1. Facts of the dispute;

On February 21, 1984, the non-party and the defendant's association entered into a mutual aid agreement with the non-party that made it impossible for the non-party to engage in life service as a result of the non-party's failure to function as a chest long-term, and the non-party entered into a mutual aid agreement with the effect that the non-party's wife and the insured should pay the non-party a mutual aid amount of KRW 5 million to the plaintiff who is the insured, on June 1986.

Accordingly, the plaintiff requested the defendant to pay the amount of KRW 5 million on the ground that the grounds for the payment of the mutual aid amount occurred.

2. First issue (whether the mutual-aid contract is invalidated or not);

(A) As to this, the Defendant asserts that the mutual aid contract was invalidated because the Nonparty did not pay the second installment of the mutual aid premium until the end of August 1985, and the Plaintiff asserts that the mutual aid contract was restored by receiving the second and third installment of the mutual aid premium thereafter.

Therefore, by the end of August 1985, the mutual aid contract was invalidated because the non-party did not pay the second mutual aid premium until the end of the 1985 (no dispute). However, since the defendant was paid the second and third mutual aid premium on September 21, 1985 and August 30, 1986, the contract was restored as a mutual aid contract (no dispute).

(B) The defendant asserts that the non-party and the defendant did not have a clear agreement on the activation of the mutual aid contract and that it was not prepared in writing, and therefore the activation of the mutual aid contract is null and void. However, it is reasonable to view that the act of paying and receiving the mutual aid fee as above includes the non-party and the defendant’s non-party’s mutual aid contract activity agreement, and that it is not necessary to prepare

3. Second dispute (whether or not to violate the duty of disclosure);

The defendant asserts that the non-party did not comply with the duty of disclosure because he did not notify the non-party of the fact that the non-party suffered infection from the doctor before the contract termination, but did not notify the contract termination.

However, the insurer's duty of disclosure is recognized only for the matters asked in writing by the insurer, and there is no evidence to acknowledge that the defendant asked the non-party about his medical history in writing at the time of contract activation. ② Unlike the insurance company or mutual aid association, the insurance company or mutual aid association, which is an insurance expert, the policyholder (in particular, in the case of the non-party in the case of the non-party in the case of the non-party in the case of the non-party who is close to the non-school, it is more accessible to the extent that applying the duty of disclosure is substantially equal

Even if the non-party, prior to the restoration of the contract, transferred the fact that the non-party was subject to a prevention of liver infection or suffered from liver infection from the doctor, the non-party cannot be said to have failed to comply with the duty of disclosure.

4. Third dispute;

(A) The Defendant asserts that the Nonparty’s liveration does not constitute “when he could not engage in life-long labor due to the disorder of chest long-term function in a mutual aid agreement.”

However, the non-party 1 was unable to engage in physical labor except for daily life resulting from liverization and its merger (written evidence No. 5). Thus, it can be deemed that the non-party constitutes the above reasons in a mutual benefit contract.

(2) In addition, the statement of the terms and conditions alone does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the statement of the terms and conditions alone constitutes the above reasons. However, as long as the concept of the terms and conditions is unclear, such as the term "functional disability", it is in accord with the legal principles that "the disadvantage of the defendant, who is the aptitude of the terms and conditions, is disadvantageous."

③ In addition, it is not desirable to refuse the payment of insurance money if the insurer is doping only possible from the perspective of insurance policy perspective to promote the welfare of the people resulting from the insurance industry itself or the insurance industry itself (the refusal of the payment of insurance money when there are reasonable and clear grounds is necessary for the entire group of policyholders, but the establishment of the reason for the exception to the payment of insurance money and the wide application of the reason therefor are too large to bring about a decline in the insurance industry in the long term by making the general policyholders who are not able to understand the terms and conditions at the time of the insurance contract or who are not expected to anticipate such circumstances harshly).

(B) In addition, the defendant asserts that the concept of functional disability is not ‘the state of injury-related disease', ‘the state of injury', not ‘the state of injury-related disease', but ‘the state of injury is cured, but the state of damage remains permanently.' In addition, the non-party asserts that it does not fall

However, it is not possible to distinguish the functional disability from whether it is an authorization for treatment, and in particular, the above argument is groundless in light of the statement of No. 5 (Labor Default) and the principle of disadvantage in the author's work.

5. Conclusion

(A) Therefore, from May 16, 1987 to the date following the delivery of a complaint to the Plaintiff, the Defendant is obligated to pay to the Plaintiff an amount equivalent to 5% per annum as prescribed by the Civil Act (this period is equivalent to the Defendant’s dispute) from May 16, 1987 to the date of the imposition of the complaint, and to pay to the Plaintiff an amount equivalent to 25% per annum as prescribed by the Special Les Special Act on the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the following day to

(B) The costs of lawsuit shall be assessed against the defendant who has not lost the whole amount or provisional execution.

Judge Lee Jae-de