[1] The purpose of the provision of Article 30(2) of the Labor Standards Act concerning restrictions on dismissal, and the case where dismissal cannot be regarded as the suspension period of business where dismissal is limited

[2] Whether the academic background or false entry in the curriculum vitae can be used as a ground for dismissal (affirmative with qualification), and the validity of the rules of employment stipulating that the act of false entry or false entry in the career experience at the time of employment of workers shall be subject to disciplinary action (effective with qualification)

[3] Whether an employer may set new grounds for disciplinary action under the rules of employment unless it is contrary to a collective agreement (affirmative)

[1] The purport of restricting the dismissal of an employee under Article 30(2) of the Labor Standards Act is to absolutely protect an employee from a threat of his/her position during the period of loss of the labor force due to an occupational accident and the period of 30 days thereafter to recover the labor force. Thus, even in cases where an employee is under medical treatment due to an occupational injury, etc. but is under normal work without suspending his/her business or suspending his/her business due to an occupational injury, if it is not deemed necessary to suspend his/her business for medical treatment, the dismissal under the above provision does not constitute the suspension

[2] The reason why a company requires a resume or certificate stating an academic background or a career while employing workers is not only to evaluate the worker's ability to work, i.e., the worker's ability to work, but also to determine whether to work through a prior personal judgment, such as the worker's intelligence and experience, educational degree, the degree of suspension from office and adaptation to work, etc. In order to maintain the trust and corporate order. Thus, in a case where it is deemed that the employer would not conclude an employment contract if the employer had known such false facts in advance or at least did not enter into a contract on the same condition, it cannot be deemed unfair to dismiss the worker as a ground for dismissal, and the rules of employment stipulating a false entry or a false entry of career or career experience at the time of employment as a ground for disciplinary action shall be deemed valid as a legitimate ground for dismissal unless there are special circumstances such as the employer's error in the author's work ability or it is unreasonable that the content of such act is extremely minor to constitute a ground for disciplinary action

[3] The part of the rules of employment that violates the labor conditions and other criteria for the treatment of workers under the collective agreement shall be null and void, and the rules of employment shall not be contrary to the collective agreement applicable to the workplace concerned, but an employer may establish new grounds for disciplinary action under the rules of employment and may take disciplinary action based on the grounds for such disciplinary action unless it

[1] Article 30 (2) of the Labor Standards Act / [2] Articles 30 (1) and 96 of the Labor Standards Act / [3] Article 33 (1) of the Labor Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, Article 99 (1) of the Labor Standards Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 91Nu3321 delivered on August 27, 1991 (Gong1991, 2453) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 98Du4672 delivered on March 26, 199 (Gong199Sang, 790), Supreme Court Decision 98Da54960 delivered on June 23, 200 (Gong2000Ha, 1729) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 92Da48697 delivered on April 27, 1993 (Gong193Ha, 158), Supreme Court Decision 93Nu2015 delivered on June 14, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 1974), Supreme Court Decision 93Da16394 delivered on June 16, 194 (Gong194, 1974) 194Da194395 delivered on June 194, 1994

Plaintiff

Kudong Automobile Co., Ltd. (Attorney Kim-gun, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Daegu District Court Decision 2003Gahap1339 delivered on July 1, 2003

January 14, 2004

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff.

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. On March 22, 2002, the defendant confirmed that the dismissal against the plaintiff on March 22, 2002 is null and void (the plaintiff also sought a judgment ordering reinstatement, but it appears to have stated the purport of seeking confirmation of invalidity of dismissal in duplicate).

1. Basic facts

The following facts may be acknowledged either in dispute between the parties or in combination with the whole purport of the pleadings at each entry of Eul evidence 1 to 14, 2-1 to 17, and 3-14:

A. On January 7, 2002, the Plaintiff joined the Defendant company running the taxi transport business and worked as a probationary officer. On March 22, 2002, the Plaintiff was dismissed on March 22, 2002 in accordance with the resolution of the Defendant Company Disciplinary Committee (hereinafter “instant dismissal”).

B. While the Plaintiff served in an unlimited partnership company for North Korea (hereinafter “North Korea”) from August 1, 1999 to October 30, 199, from March 14, 2000 to June 10, 200, the Plaintiff omitted the career of working in each of the above companies while working in a new transport company (hereinafter “new transport company”) from April 8, 2001 to June 30, 200.

C. Article 12 Subparag. 13 of the Rules of Employment of the Defendant Company provides that “A person who falsely states his/her academic background and career in a personal history shall be deemed a disguised employment and dismissed without prior notice if he/she finds any defect in the document despite being employed.”

D. The defendant company held a disciplinary committee on March 21, 2002 and decided a dismissal disposition by disciplinary action against the plaintiff. Upon the plaintiff's request for reexamination, the open new disciplinary committee on April 1, 2002 rejected the plaintiff's request for reexamination.

E. On May 1, 2002, the Plaintiff filed an application against the Defendant for remedy against unfair dismissal, but the Plaintiff’s application was dismissed on June 25, 2002, and thereafter, on September 17, 2002, filed an application for review with the National Labor Relations Commission, but the Plaintiff’s application for reexamination was also dismissed.

2. Judgment on the plaintiff's assertion

A. On March 18, 2002, the Plaintiff sent to the Defendant Company a certificate of intent to inform the Plaintiff of the fact that the Plaintiff had already received medical care at a hospital for one month prior to receiving medical care due to occupational disease, and then sent to the Defendant Company a certificate of intention to prepare that the subsequent medical care would require stability. As such, at the time of dismissal, the Plaintiff was in the period of suspension for medical care for occupational injury or disease, and thus, the Plaintiff was in the period of suspension for occupational injury or disease. Accordingly, the Plaintiff asserted that “the employer shall not dismiss the worker during the period of suspension for medical care for occupational injury or disease and for thirty days subsequent thereto” under Article 30(2) of the Labor Standards Act providing that “The dismissal in violation of the Labor Standards Act, which violates the provision of Article 30(2) of the same Act, stating that the dismissal in question shall be legally null and void.

The purport of this provision is to restrict the dismissal of the Plaintiff under Article 30(2) of the Labor Standards Act. The Plaintiff’s assertion that the Plaintiff would have been subject to the above provision’s dismissal for the reason that the Plaintiff would not have been subject to the above provision’s dismissal for the reason that the Plaintiff would not have been subject to the above provision’s dismissal for the reason that the Plaintiff would have been subject to the above provision’s dismissal for the period of 30 days of loss of labor force due to occupational accidents, and that the Plaintiff would have been subject to the above provision’s dismissal for 20 days thereafter. Thus, the Plaintiff’s dismissal for the reason that the Plaintiff would not have been subject to the above provision’s dismissal for the reason that the Plaintiff would have been subject to the above provision’s dismissal for the reason that the Plaintiff would have been subject to the above provision’s dismissal for 20 days from February 23, 202 to March 16, 202, and that the Plaintiff would not be subject to the above provision’s dismissal for the reason that the Plaintiff would have been subject to further dismissal for 20 days from the Defendant’s dismissal.

B. The plaintiff did not cause interference with the provision of labor by omitting the work experience in North and New Transport, but in the case of a corporate taxi company like the defendant company, the plaintiff merely presents the skill level of driving skills and accidentless driving experience when employing a driver, and the career and academic background are not different depending on his work experience and academic background, and thus, the omission of work experience cannot immediately constitute a justifiable ground for dismissal. Even if the omission of work experience constitutes a ground for disciplinary action, it constitutes an abuse of the disciplinary right in violation of the principle of equity or the principle of good faith, and thus, the dismissal disposition against the plaintiff is asserted to be null and void.

The reason why the company requires the resume or certificate stating the academic background or career while employing workers is not only to evaluate workers' ability to work, i.e., the worker's ability to work, but also to determine whether to hire workers through a prior personal judgment, such as the worker's intelligence, experience, degree of education, suspension of duty, and adaptation to work, etc. In order to maintain the trust and corporate order, it shall be deemed as the necessary data to determine whether to hire workers. Thus, if the employer had known such false facts in advance, it is deemed that the employer would not enter into an employment contract or at least have not entered into an employment contract under the same conditions, it shall not be deemed unfair to dismiss the worker as the ground for dismissal. The rules of employment, etc. stipulating the grounds for disciplinary action for false entry or work experience at the time of employment of workers, etc., is valid as a legitimate ground for dismissal, except in special circumstances such as where it is unreasonable in light of social norms that the content is extremely minor to punish the worker, and thus, it shall be justified to take disciplinary action accordingly (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Da5460, Jun.

In light of the above facts, Gap 7, 12, 13, and Eul 1-7's testimony at the first instance court - the plaintiff's request for a new appellate trial against the defendant's 0-1's new appellate court's 0-1's new appellate court's 20-1's new appellate court's new appellate court's 0-1's new appellate court's new appellate court's 20-1's new appellate court's 20-1's new appellate court's 20-1's new appellate court's 20-2's new appellate court's 20-1's new appellate court's new appellate court's 20-1's new appellate court's 20-2's new appellate court's 20-1's new appellate court's 20-2's new appellate court's 20-1's new appellate court's 20-2's new appellate court's 200-1's new appellate court's 2'

According to the above facts, the plaintiff's omission of work experience in the defendant company is not considered as an act that may affect the formation of trust between labor and management, and it is reasonable to view that the defendant company would not employ the plaintiff, and intentionally omitted the above work experience if the defendant company entered the work experience in North and new transport in the resume at the time of joining the defendant company. Since the defendant company is able to expect that the defendant company would not have employed the plaintiff, and intentionally omitted the above work experience. The defendant company's omission of work experience should not be considered as an act that could affect the formation of trust between labor and management, and it should be deemed that the defendant company did not employ the plaintiff if the defendant company knew of the omission of work experience at the time of joining the defendant company or did not employ the plaintiff at least on the same condition. This conclusion is that the above disciplinary action in the previous workplace was invalid or that the defendant company did not directly have any relation with the work experience conducted at the new workplace, and thus it cannot be viewed as a disciplinary action or abuse of work experience at the time of the defendant company.

C. The plaintiff asserts that the dismissal of this case is legally null and void, since the defendant company was affected by the act of interference with employment of Lee Jae-in and decided on the dismissal of this case.

In full view of the statements in Gap evidence No. 12 and Lee Jae-in's testimony at the court of first instance, the non-party Kim Jae-in's former purpose was to inquire about the plaintiff's work experience for each company at the taxi business association on March 10, 2002. As a result, the plaintiff knew that the plaintiff omitted his work experience for North-out and new traffic in the resume submitted by the defendant company while joining the defendant company. Kim Jae-in was about the behavior at the time when the plaintiff was able to work for North-out transportation by telephone from Lee Jae-in on March 12, 2002. At that time, Lee Jae-in was able to suffer much pain due to the plaintiff's non-party Kim Jae-in's non-party Kim Jae-in's testimony at the court of first instance since he did not drink his day, and there was no other evidence to acknowledge the plaintiff's employment interference with the plaintiff's employment since it did not have any influence on the plaintiff's employment obstruction as alleged in the above evidence and evidence.

D. The plaintiff asserts that the collective agreement of the defendant company takes precedence over the rules of employment, and that the dismissal of the defendant company is null and void since the grounds for omission of work experience under Article 52 of the collective agreement of the defendant company are not prescribed as grounds for dismissal.

In light of the following facts: (a) the part of the rules of employment that violates the labor conditions and other criteria for the treatment of workers prescribed in the collective agreement is null and void (Article 33(1) of the Labor Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act); (b) the rules of employment cannot be contrary to the collective agreement applicable to the workplace (Article 99(1) of the Labor Standards Act); (c) an employer may determine new grounds for disciplinary action under the rules of employment unless it is contrary to the collective agreement (Article 99(1) of the Labor Standards Act); and (d) an employer may take disciplinary action based on the grounds for disciplinary action (see Supreme Court Decisions 92Nu13035 delivered on January 15, 193; 94Nu5069 delivered on February 14, 195; 94Nu5069 delivered on February 18, 195; and (d) the collective agreement of the defendant company cannot be dismissed by the rules of employment, as it does not provide for grounds for dismissal under the rules of employment as stated in the collective agreement.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the dismissal of this case against the plaintiff of the defendant company is justified, so the plaintiff's claim of this case, which is premised on the invalidity of the dismissal of this case due to the lack of justifiable grounds, shall be dismissed. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of first instance is just and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Kim Su-chul(Presiding Judge)