2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

A. On October 13, 1999, the Plaintiff discontinued his business on July 31, 2001, when operating a mutual log-based contract and lending business, * the comprehensive mid-term (hereinafter referred to as the “instant business establishment”) and was in arrears with the total of 7 items, including the value-added tax for the first time in 2000, total of 45,687,000 won (hereinafter referred to as the “tax amount in arrears”), and the details of the amount in arrears are as shown in attached Table 1.

B. On March 3, 2001, the Defendant attached construction machinery (dump trucks 06Ra50*; hereinafter “dump trucks of this case”) and life insurance on October 7, 2004, Samsung life insurance on November 18, 2005, and Samsung Life Insurance on September 21, 2006 (hereinafter “each insurance money of this case”) (hereinafter “each insurance money of this case”), and notified each of them.

C. On August 22, 2001, Sep. 26, 2001, Oct. 30, 2001, Oct. 30, 2001, Mar. 28, 2002, and Dec. 28, 2004, the Defendant issued a written disposal of each of the instant deficits (hereinafter “each of the instant deficits”).

D. On October 25, 2012, the Defendant additionally seized (hereinafter referred to as the “instant attachment”) the Plaintiff’s new interest rate **** 1,765 square meters (hereinafter referred to as “instant land”).

E. On August 12, 2013, the Plaintiff filed an application for the cancellation of the instant seizure, since the right to collect the amount in arrears has expired by the statute of limitations. However, on August 19, 2013, the Defendant rendered a disposition rejecting the instant seizure (hereinafter “instant disposition”) on the ground that the instant seizure had been suspended by the statute of limitations due to the preceding seizure.

F. The Plaintiff filed an objection with the Director of the Gwangju Regional Tax Office seeking revocation of the instant disposition, which was dismissed on September 16, 2013.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap 1 through 5 evidence (including branch numbers, hereinafter the same shall apply), Eul 1 to 5 evidence, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination on the legitimacy of the instant disposition

A. Summary of the plaintiff's assertion

① Since the actual business entity of “***” is bb, it is illegal that the Defendant seized the instant insurance proceeds to collect the delinquent tax of bB against bB. Since each of the instant insurance proceeds was based on an insurance contract concluded by bB by stealing the Plaintiff’s name, it cannot be said that the extinctive prescription for the instant delinquent tax amount was suspended due to the seizure of each of the instant insurance proceeds. Since the instant land and each of the instant insurance proceeds are not owned by the Plaintiff, the Defendant’s seizure disposition is null and void.

② Even if the instant tax amount in arrears was against the Plaintiff, the extinctive prescription of the instant collection right has expired since 5 years from September 21, 2006, which was last attached by the Defendant on the instant tax amount in arrears.

③ Even if the amount of tax in arrears is against the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff’s tax liability on the amount of tax in arrears in the instant case was extinguished by each of the instant deficits disposition, and even if not, the attachment of this case, which was conducted without cancelling each of the instant deficits disposition, is unlawful. The interruption effect of the extinctive prescription of the right to collect national taxes due to the attachment of this case is lost according to each of the instant deficits disposition. The extinctive prescription from the date of each of the instant deficits disposition, the extinctive prescription from December 28, 2004, which is the date of the last deficits disposition, has expired, is all the Plaintiff’s tax liability on the amount of tax in arrears in the instant case, and the attachment of this case has expired on December 27, 2009.

④ Article 27(1) of the Framework Act on National Taxes provides that “If the State’s right to collect national taxes is not exercised within the period specified in any of the following subparagraphs from the time it is possible to exercise such right, the extinctive prescription shall expire.” However, Article 28(2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes provides the grounds for interruption and suspension of extinctive prescription. Article 27(1) of the Framework Act on National Taxes violates Article 27(1) of the Framework Act on National Taxes, and Article 28(2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes

B. Relevant statutes

Attached Form 2 shall be as listed in attached Table 2.

C. Determination

1) Determination as to the Plaintiff’s assertion

According to the principle of substantial taxation, since the confirmation of a taxpayer must be based on substance, not external appearance, and if the ownership of the income, profit, property, act or transaction subject to taxation is merely nominal, and there is another person to whom it actually belongs, the person to whom it actually belongs shall be deemed the taxpayer (Article 14(1) of the Framework Act on National Taxes). However, the burden of proof is borne by the claimant that the ownership of the transaction subject to taxation is only nominal, and that there is

In light of the above legal principles, the testimony of bB of a witness of the trial party who conforms to the Plaintiff’s assertion is difficult to believe it as it is, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge the Plaintiff’s assertion, in light of the following circumstances.

Rather, Gap evidence 10, Eul evidence 2, 3, 6, 12 through 14, witness bB testimony at the trial court, the result of the order to submit financial transaction information to the Korea Federation of Banks at the trial court and the purport of the whole pleadings, i.e., the plaintiff completed a judicial divorce on October 17, 1984, but again re-exploited around March 26, 1999. The plaintiff's allegation that the above legal provision was not valid under the plaintiff's name of the plaintiff's right to request the release of the insurance money from Oct. 13, 199 to Jul. 31, 201, it is difficult to find that the plaintiff's each of the above legal provision was invalid under the plaintiff's name of the witness at the time of the transfer of the bill without the plaintiff's consent to the transfer of the certificate of this case.

2) Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion

On the other hand, the Framework Act on National Taxes provides that if the right to collect the national tax is not exercised for five years from the time when it can be exercised (Article 27(1)), the extinctive prescription of the right to collect national tax shall be interrupted (Article 28(1)4), and the interrupted extinctive prescription shall begin to run anew from the time when the period until the seizure is cancelled (Article 28(2)4). As seen earlier, the Defendant issued a seizure disposition on the instant dump truck in order to collect the delinquent tax amount on March 7, 2001, and the seizure has not been cancelled until now, it cannot be deemed that the extinctive prescription of the right to collect national tax has expired on the ground that five or more years have passed since the seizure was not cancelled. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s above assertion by the Plaintiff is without merit.

3) Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion

A) Common legal principles

Article 26 subparag. 1 of the former Framework Act on National Taxes prior to the amendment by Act No. 5189 of Dec. 30, 1996 stipulated the time when the disposition on deficits became the cause for extinguishment of liability for tax payment. However, due to the amendment, the disposition on deficits was excluded from the cause for extinguishment of liability for tax payment. In addition, Article 86(2) of the former National Tax Collection Act (amended by Act No. 11125 of Dec. 31, 2011; hereinafter the same shall apply) provides that when another seizable property is discovered after the disposition on deficits, the disposition on deficits must be revoked without delay and the disposition on deficits must be taken. In light of such circumstances, the disposition on deficits is not a disposition on permanently extinguishing a tax obligation, but only the meaning of the cancellation of the disposition on deficits as an administrative procedure again (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2001Du10066, Sept. 24, 2002; 201Du5275, Mar. 257, 2011).

(B) Judgment on the argument of the Supreme Court

In light of the above legal principles, the Plaintiff’s duty to pay the tax amount in arrears cannot be deemed ultimately extinguished on the sole basis of the existence of each disposition on deficits in this case. Thus, the Plaintiff’s assertion that all the Plaintiff’s tax liability in arrears with respect to the tax amount in this case extinguished on the date of each disposition on deficits is without merit.

C) Judgment as to the argument of the Republic of Korea

(3) Even if the above amendment of the Framework Act on National Taxes excludes the Plaintiff from the grounds for extinguishment of liability for disposition on default at any time, there is no change in the rights and obligations of the taxpayer due to the disposition on default. Since the former National Tax Collection Act does not provide for the procedures for notifying the taxpayer of disposition on default, it is difficult to view the taxpayer to have trust in terms of the fact that the disposition on default was made by the taxpayer as an opportunity for notification, and the former National Tax Collection Act does not provide for other provisions regarding the procedure for disposition on default at least 9 (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 200Du9860, supra). It is difficult for the taxpayer to view that the new procedure for disposition on default was revoked without any provision regarding the validity of cancellation and the procedure for notifying the taxpayer of disposition on default at least 9, and thus, it is difficult for the latter to view that there was no disadvantage for the taxpayer to have been a disposition on default at least 9, as stated in the revised National Tax Collection Act.

As seen earlier, in light of the following: (a) the prior attachment of this case remains effective without cancellation; (b) Article 28(2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes does not provide for the grounds for the interruption of the period of prescription for which the disposal of deficit was suspended; and (c) Article 28(2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes amended by Act No. 5189 on December 30, 196, the disposal of deficit does not permanently extinguish the duty to pay taxes; and (d) it has only the meaning of the termination of the procedure for the disposition on default; and (e) the period of extinctive prescription of the collection right of this case against the Plaintiff is suspended due to the prior attachment of this case

4) Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion

On the other hand, the grounds for the existence of the statute of limitations are that respect the permanent state of fact and protect the potential person on the right, and in particular, the latter meaning is strong (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 91Da32053, Mar. 31, 1992). Thus, in light of the reason for the existence of the statute of limitations, it is premised on the premise that a certain act of the right holder or obligor who suspends the state of non-exercise of rights should lose the validity of the statute of limitations already passed when there is a certain act of the right holder or obligor, and Article 28(1) of the Framework Act on National Taxes violates Article 27(1) of the same Act. Thus, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the statute of limitations under Article 28(1) of the same Act goes against Article 27(1) of the same Act is groundless. Furthermore, the statute of limitations under Article 28(1)4 of the former National Tax Collection Act is suspended due to the attachment of this case. As such, the statute of limitations under Article 27(208Da167, etc.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim shall be dismissed as it is without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance shall be just and it shall be dismissed as it is so decided as per Disposition.