2. The costs of the lawsuit are assessed against the defendant.

A. The Plaintiff is a teacher who was newly appointed as a teacher of Gwangju Metropolitan City B elementary school on September 1, 2003 and was transferred to C elementary school on March 1, 2006 and served at D elementary school from March 1, 2017.

B. On October 2019, the Defendant demanded a resolution of heavy disciplinary action against the Plaintiff on the ground that the Plaintiff violated the duty to maintain dignity under Article 63 of the former State Public Officials Act (amended by Act No. 16905, Jan. 29, 2020; hereinafter referred to as the “State Public Officials Act”) by providing “the Plaintiff” or “the instant misconduct” as indicated in attached Table 1 (hereinafter referred to as “instant disciplinary cause” and “the instant misconduct” according to each sequence.

C. On October 28, 2019, the said commission decided to dismiss the Plaintiff on the ground of the instant disciplinary cause. On November 11, 2019, the Defendant issued the instant disciplinary action against the Plaintiff on the ground of the instant disciplinary cause (hereinafter “instant disciplinary action”).

D. On December 2, 2019, the Plaintiff dissatisfied with the instant disposition, filed a petition review with the Teachers’ Appeal Committee, but was dismissed on February 19, 2020.

[Reasons for Recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 5, Eul evidence Nos. 1, 4 and 5, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The plaintiff's assertion

A. Non-existence of grounds for disposition

In light of the circumstances and context where the Plaintiff committed the instant misconduct, the Plaintiff’s act does not constitute an inappropriate speech, such as sexual harassment or verbal abuse that violates the duty to maintain dignity.

(b) deviation from and abuse of discretionary authority;

Even if certain grounds for disciplinary action are recognized among the grounds for disciplinary action of this case, the instant disposition is unlawful by deviating from and abusing discretion.

3. Relevant statutes;

Attached Form 2 shall be as shown in attached Table 2.

4. Determination

A. Determination as to the non-existence of grounds for disposition

1) Whether the Plaintiff committed the instant misconduct

A) Facts of recognition

Gap evidence of heading 9 to 43, Eul evidence of heading 6 to 14 (including paper numbers), witness

In full view of the purport of the testimony and arguments of E and F, the fact that the Plaintiff and D elementary school teachers have made a statement or written statement concerning the grounds for the instant disciplinary action in the course of the complete examination or in this court can be acknowledged as follows.

(1) Regarding grounds for disciplinary action No. 1

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

(2) Regarding grounds for disciplinary action No. 2

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

B) Specific determination

(1) The remaining grounds for disciplinary action except for grounds for 1-5 grounds for disciplinary action

In light of the following circumstances: (a) Persons subject to the grounds of the disciplinary action and witnesses, who are deemed to have committed the same act as the grounds of the disciplinary action in this part; and (b) there are no special circumstances to deem that the above statements were false; and (c) some grounds of the disciplinary action are subject to the grounds of the disciplinary action.

In full view of the fact that the plaintiff also recognized such an act, the plaintiff can be recognized as a substitute for the fact that the plaintiff committed a wrongful act in this part.

However, in the case of the disciplinary reasons for 2-2, the part that the Plaintiff stated that “the Plaintiff only stated that the Plaintiff stated “the farb” as “the farb” at the time of 2-2, stating that the Plaintiff stated “the farb”, but the farb stated that the Plaintiff “farb” was “the Plaintiff,” but it cannot be ruled out the possibility that the farb caused the farb’s mistake in a sudden situation where the farb had been disturbed due to the farbat, unlike other disciplinary reasons, and that the student’s statement, etc. was not submitted as evidence, it is difficult to recognize only the evidence submitted by the Defendant that “the Plaintiff expressed to the students

And in the case of disciplinary reasons 2-3, the Plaintiff destroyed string-type electric winds by string them.

Although there is a room, it is difficult to recognize the part of the grounds for disciplinary action that "the plaintiff's statement was just because it stated in the statement that "the plaintiff did not speak at any time," that "the plaintiff did not speak to the plaintiff's office," and that "the plaintiff did not speak to the plaintiff's office at any time," and that "the plaintiff did not speak to the plaintiff's office," and that "the plaintiff was legitimate that "the plaintiff would not speak the student's office at any time," and that the plaintiff's statement was not directly viewed by the plaintiff's statement," based on the evidence submitted by the defendant, it is difficult to recognize that "the plaintiff was correct that "the plaintiff did not speak to the student at any time" in this part of the grounds for disciplinary action that "the plaintiff did not speak to the student at any time."

(2) Grounds for 1-5

In contrast, the aforementioned disposition process and the purport of the evidence and the whole pleadings as mentioned above.

The following circumstances that can be acknowledged by the Plaintiff: (i) the Plaintiff stated that the Plaintiff did not have made the same statement as the grounds for the disciplinary action in this part in the course of the investigation; (ii) the Teachers F made a statement to the effect that “the Plaintiff did not make the Plaintiff’s statement as the grounds for the disciplinary action in this part; and (iii) it is an abstract statement to the effect that the Plaintiff made the statement to the effect that “if the Plaintiff did not have made the statement as the grounds for the disciplinary action in this part; and (iv) if the Plaintiff’s face is bad, it would be memoryed to the Plaintiff as it would have made such a statement to the extent that he did not have made such a statement, it is difficult to acknowledge the fact that the Plaintiff committed a misconduct in this part only with the evidence submitted by the Defendant.

2) Whether the Plaintiff’s act constitutes a violation of the duty to maintain dignity, such as sexual harassment or verbal abuse

A) Relevant legal principles

(1) According to the attached Table 3 of Article 2 of the former Rules on Disciplinary Measures, etc. of Public Educational Officials (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Education, Mar. 24, 2017) (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Education), “sexual harassment” means sexual harassment under Article 2 subparagraph 3 (d) of the National Human Rights Commission Act in the form of misconduct. Article 2 subparagraph 3 (d) of the former Commission on Human Rights (amended by Act No. 16928, Feb. 4, 2020; hereinafter “National Human Rights Commission Act”) refers to “work, employment, and other relation with sexual harassment, a public institution (referring to State agencies, local governments, various levels of schools established under Article 2 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Article 2 of the Higher Education Act, and Article 3-2 (1) of the Public Service Ethics Act, and public service organizations under Article 3-2 (1) of the Public Service Ethics Act shall not require employees, employers, or workers to feel sexual humiliation or aversion due to sexual words or actions, etc.

In this context, “sexual speech and behavior” refers to physical, verbal, and visual acts related to the physical relationship between men and women, or the physical characteristics of male or female, which may objectively cause a general and average person at the same location as the other party to feel sexual humiliation or aversion, in light of the sound common sense and practice of the community. In order to establish sexual harassment, it does not necessarily require a sexual motive or intent to the actor. However, in light of the specific circumstances such as the relationship between the parties, place and situation where the act was committed, the other party’s explicit or presumed response to the act, the content and degree of the act, whether the act was one time or for a short period, or whether the act continued, it ought to be objectively recognized that the general and average person at the same location as the other party may feel sexual humiliation or aversion, and accordingly, the other party to the act ought to be recognized to have suffered sexual humiliation or aversion (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Du7747, Apr. 12, 2018).

(2) Article 63 of the former State Public Officials Act (amended by Act No. 16905, Jan. 29, 2020; hereinafter "the State Public Officials Act") provides that "no public official shall commit any act detrimental to his/her dignity regardless of whether it is inside or outside the scope of his/her duties." Considering the status of public officials widely entrusted by the people and serving for the entire nation, any act detrimental to the dignity of public officials, as well as any act detrimental to the people's trust in the public society, shall not be committed against any public official regardless of his/her duties, regardless of whether it is inside or outside the scope of his/her duties, pursuant to Article 63 of the State Public Officials Act." Here, the term "goods" refers to physical body without any color in performing his/her duties as a whole as a servant of all citizens, who are the sovereign citizens, regardless of whether it is inside or outside the scope of his/her duties (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2013Du484, Apr. 28, 2017).

B) Specific determination

(i) 1-1 to 1-3, 1-6 to 1-1, 1-13, 2-1 to 2-3, 2-9 to 2-12;

(4) The grounds for disciplinary action shall be 2-13 (4), 2-13 (5), 2-13 (7), 2-13 (8), 2-13 (0), 2-13 (1), and 2-13 (2), and (3)

In light of the above legal principles, in full view of the following circumstances, it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiff’s act of misconduct constitutes a violation of the duty to maintain dignity, taking into account the following circumstances, which can be acknowledged by the background and facts of the above disposition, the evidence and the entire purport

(A) Of the grounds for the disciplinary action in this part, the direct and indirect mentioning of the expressions related to physical relation, such as physical characteristics of women, such as wrapping bucks (1-1) or sucks (1-2) between the conversationss of female teachers (1-1), the act of reporting female teachers at close distance (1-10), the act of reporting female teachers at a wall with their arms (1-7, 1-7, 1-8, 1-7, 1-8, 1-9, 1-11, 1-13) constitutes sexual harassment, which objectively causes a general and average person in the same position as the other party, to feel sexual humiliation or aversion.

(나) 원고의 발언이 성적 언동에 이르지 않아 성희롱에 해당하지 않는 경우에도 동료교사에게 ‘비율이 좋지 않다’(1-3), ‘B급이야’(1-7 ①), ‘몸매가 애같다’(2-13 ⑫), 여학생들을 두고 ‘발육이 좋다. 다 컸다’(1-6), 학부모를 두고 ‘쭉쭉빵빵하고 반반하다’(2-13 ⑬)고 발언하는 등 여성의 외모를 평가하거나 여성을 대상화하는 발언은 품위유지 의무 위반에 해당한다고 봄이 타당하다.

(C) In addition, among the grounds for the disciplinary action in this part, the acts of violence (2-3, 2-12), the acts of using abusive language, 2-2, 2-13 (7), the speaking (2-1, 2-6, 2-13 (4), 2-13 (8), 2-13 (0) or the speaking (2-9, 2-10, 2-11, 2-11, 2-135) intended for school teachers or students constituted a violation of the duty to maintain dignity.

(2) 1-4, 1-12, 2-4, 2-5 through 2-8, 2-13 (1), 2-13 (2), 2-13 (3), 2-13, and 2-136;

2-13 (9) Disciplinary Grounds

In light of the above legal principles, comprehensively taking account of the following circumstances that can be acknowledged by the aforementioned details and facts of the disposition, the evidence as seen earlier, and the purport of the entire pleadings, the grounds for the disciplinary action in this part can be deemed to constitute sexual harassment, but it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff’s speech constitutes a violation of the duty to maintain dignity, even if it does not constitute sexual harassment.

(A) During the meeting, a statement that “the head goes beyond is unresh and dominated,” or a statement that “the head goes beyond her head” (1-4), “the head is 1-12, 2-13 (2)” and “the head of a ship is a good,” and “the head of a ship is not that of a ship. I want not only to hear and see that he/she is a baby. I want to do so.” (2-13(1). (2-13 ②) may give the other party an unresh or inconvenience, but in light of the sound common sense and practice of the community, this part of the statement cannot be seen as an act of causing the general and average person at the same place as the other party to feel sexual humiliation or aversion, and it cannot be seen as an act of causing harm to his/her dignity, and it cannot be seen as an act of causing harm to his/her position to the point of performing his/her sexual humiliation or aversion.

(B) In the case of disciplinary reasons Nos. 2-4, 2-5 through 2-8, the Plaintiff pointed out the other teacher’s ability to work, or deemed that the other teacher was frightencing in the conflict between the Plaintiff and the other teacher, or in the process of the conflict between the Plaintiff and the other teacher, the other teacher frightencing. However, considering the situation at the time, the situation at the time, the situation before and after, the relationship with the Plaintiff, the details of the statement, the response of the other teacher, etc., it is difficult to deem that the Plaintiff’s speech and behavior constitutes verbal abuse or improper speech to the extent that

(C) The Plaintiff’s remarks (2-13) that there was no doubt that the Plaintiff did not have personnel management of the same teacher (2-13) and that the Plaintiff’s act of gambling and gambling (2-139) on the franchising of the franchis between the franchis and the franchis, cannot be deemed to constitute violent or verbal abuse to the extent that the said act

3) Sub-decisions

Therefore, among the disciplinary reasons of this case, the Plaintiff is subject to Articles 1-1 through 1-3, 1-6 through 1-11, 1-13, 2-1 through 2-3, 2-9 through 2-12, 2-13, 2-13, 2-13, 2-13, 2-13, 2-13, 2-13, 2-13, 2-130, and 2-13.

(11) The State Public Officials Act shall be deemed to have violated the duty to maintain dignity as provided for in Article 63 of the State Public Officials Act by engaging in the conduct of the grounds for disciplinary action 2-13 (in cases of subparagraph 2-2 or 2-3, the same shall apply as mentioned earlier), 1-4, 1-5, 1-12, 2-4, 2-5 through 2-8, 2-13, 2-13 (1), 2-13 (2), 2-13 (3), 2-13 (6), 2-13 (9) shall not be deemed to have been subject to the grounds for disciplinary action.

B. Determination on the assertion of deviation and abuse of discretionary power

1) Even if a disciplinary action constitutes a disciplinary action, whether the person having an authority to take an action is subject to disciplinary action against him/her, and what kind of disciplinary action is subject to the discretion of the person having authority to take the action. However, in cases where the exercise of discretion is contrary to the purpose of granting the authority to take the disciplinary action, or where the person violates the principle of equality by choosing an excessive disciplinary action, which is contrary to the standards and standards generally applied to the same degree of flight without reasonable grounds, or by choosing a disciplinary action which violates the principle of equality, the disciplinary action is unlawful as it goes beyond the bounds of discretionary power. Whether the exercise of discretionary power has violated the principle of proportionality in a disciplinary action is unlawful. Whether the exercise of discretionary power has been recognized as grounds for disciplinary action, shall be determined by comprehensively taking into account such various circumstances as the content, degree, background, and motive of the act, degree of influence of the offender’s position and duty, details of the offender’s performance, reputation and job performance, degree of disadvantage caused by the disciplinary action (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2014Du53474, etc.

2) In light of the above legal principles, comprehensively taking account of the following circumstances that can be acknowledged by the details and the evidence as seen earlier and the purport of the entire pleadings, the instant disposition is deemed to be an excessive disciplinary measure compared to the degree of the Plaintiff’s misconduct, and thus, it is against the principle of proportionality.

A) The Plaintiff’s misconduct is a public educational official who committed sexual harassment against his/her teachers and damaged his/her dignity, and it is true that the possibility of criticism is not considerable.

B) However, the part of the grounds for disciplinary action of the Plaintiff does not constitute a violation of the duty to maintain sexual harassment or dignity, and most of the misconduct recognized as the grounds for disciplinary action arose from the dialogue with the same teachers. It is not an act of misconduct by taking advantage of his superior status, but an improper speech or behavior in the process of dialogue with the same fees. This circumstance is difficult to view that the degree of the misconduct committed by the Plaintiff is severe or that it constitutes an intentional act, considering the Plaintiff’s circumstances, details, language used, and conditions before and after the

C) The instant disciplinary action was urged by the Plaintiff to file a civil petition against another teacher’s act in the citizen newspaper, and the Plaintiff and some teachers seem to have been in a serious conflict for a considerable period of time. Due to such circumstance, the possibility that some teachers were in an exaggerated response to certain misconduct in the process of investigating the instant disciplinary action cannot be ruled out.

D) According to the attached Table of Article 2 of the former Rules on Disciplinary Measures, etc. on Public Educational Officials (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Education, Mar. 24, 2017) (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, Mar. 24, 2017), the Plaintiff’s misconduct constitutes a violation of the duty to maintain the dignity (sexual harassment and other violation of the duty to maintain the dignity). The above rules stipulate that the violation of the duty to maintain the dignity (sexual harassment) shall be “duty-off” as “where the degree of non-performance is weak and gross negligence,” and that the violation of the duty to maintain the dignity (other violation of the duty to maintain the dignity) shall be “where the degree of non-performance is weak and gross negligence,” and the above disposition is difficult to be deemed as a violation of the duty to maintain the dignity (Article 178 of the former Rules on Disciplinary Measures on Public Educational Officials, etc. (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Education, Sept. 17, 2019).

E) Since the appointment in 2003, the Plaintiff did not receive any particular disciplinary action for at least 15 years prior to the instant disposition, and appears to have faithfully performed the duties of teachers. Considering all the circumstances revealed in the records, such as the motive and background leading up to the Plaintiff’s misconduct, the content and nature of the misconduct, the Plaintiff’s usual behavior, and the Plaintiff’s attitude of working, it is difficult to deem that the dismissal of the Plaintiff, who caused serious influence or disadvantage to the Plaintiff, is difficult to be considered as a degree of deprivation of the Plaintiff’s status and position of the teachers. The dismissal of the Plaintiff, which is a serious disciplinary action, is in violation of the principle of proportionality, even if the determination is too excessive, taking into account all the circumstances such as the Plaintiff’s duty of teacher, the necessity of

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is reasonable, and it is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Kim Jong-min

Judges Lee Jin-jin

2) Although the instant disciplinary cause is indicated as teacherV, in light of the contents of the evidence No. 41 and the purport of the entire pleadings, it seems that the teacherO’s clerical error is deemed to be a clerical error.

3) The attached Table of Article 2(1) of the former Rules on Disciplinary Measures, etc. of Public Educational Officials (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Education, Mar. 18, 2019), and the attached Table of Article 2(1) of the former Rules on Disciplinary Measures, etc. of Public Educational Officials (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Education, Sept. 17, 2019), also stipulate the same.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.