[2] Where the loan certificate contains the name, resident registration number, and address of the joint and several sureties, the case holding that even if the seal is not affixed, it is sufficient for the general public to enter it into the real private document under the above joint and several sureties

[3] Criteria to determine whether a person who is not a certified judicial scrivener has "work" of a certified judicial scrivener

1. As to Defendant 1’s appeal

A. The crime of forging a private document is established when the form and appearance to the extent that the nominal owner can see in writing the document so that it can be seen as a document is sufficient to mislead the general public into the real private document of the nominal owner. It does not necessarily require the signature or seal of the person who prepared the document (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 88Do2209, Aug. 8, 1989; 95Do2221, Dec. 26, 197).

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, the loan certificate 3 of this case contains the name of Non-Indicted 1 as joint and several sureties, and the resident registration number and address of Non-Indicted 1 also are also stated. Although Non-Indicted 1 did not affix the seal, it is sufficient for the general public to enter the same purport in the real private document in the name of Non-Indicted 1 with the form and appearance to the extent that it can be seen as a document that Non-Indicted 1 had jointly and severally guaranteed, so the judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the forgery of a private document and the criminal intent as otherwise

B. Whether a person, who is not a certified judicial scrivener, has "work" or not, shall be determined according to social norms by comprehensively taking into account various circumstances such as the repetition of affairs, continuity of affairs, business nature, etc., and the purpose, size, recovery, period, attitude, etc. of such act. It is not only to repeatedly receive remuneration but also to continuously handle such affairs with a intention to continue such affairs, and it constitutes a single act (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Do935, Jun. 13, 2003).

In full view of the relationship between Defendant 1 and his mandators, the amount, size, and collection of money and valuables received, Defendant 1 shall be deemed to have been engaged in the preparation and submission of consumer bankruptcy application documents submitted to the court which is a certified judicial scrivener, even though he is not a certified judicial scrivener. Therefore, the judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the "business" under Article 3 of the Certified Judicial Scriveners Act as otherwise

In addition, the grounds of appeal in relation to the violation of the Certified Judicial Scriveners Act shall not be legitimate grounds of appeal on the grounds that Defendant 1 did not claim as the grounds of appeal in the appellate court or the appellate court did not consider as the subject of judgment ex officio.

C. According to Article 35 of the Criminal Act, a person who was sentenced to imprisonment without prison labor or heavier punishment and committed a crime falling under imprisonment without prison labor or heavier punishment within three years after the execution of the sentence is completed or exempted shall be punished as a repeated crime.

According to the records, Defendant 1 was sentenced to eight months of imprisonment due to the crime of attempted fraud, etc. and completed the execution of the sentence on December 9, 2001, and all of the criminal facts of this case except the crime of violation of the Certified Judicial Scriveners Act among the criminal facts of this case were committed within three years after the execution of the sentence was completed, and thus, it constitutes a repeated crime.

It is reasonable that the court below imposed on the charge of altering each private document, the crime of uttering of altered private document due to the use of a loan certificate on December 13, 2001, and the crime of uttering of falsified document due to the use of a loan certificate on December 29, 199, and the crime of uttering of falsified investigation document. Therefore, there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to aggravation of repeated crime, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

D. In this case where a sentence of imprisonment with labor for less than 10 years is rendered, the reason that the sentence of the court below is too unreasonable is not a legitimate ground for appeal.

All of the grounds of appeal cannot be accepted.

2. As to Defendant 2’s appeal

In relation to co-offenders who are jointly engaged in a crime, the conspiracy does not require any legal punishment, but is a combination of two or more persons to jointly process a crime and realize the crime. Thus, even if there was no process of the whole conspiracy, if the combination of the intentions is made in order or implicitly through several persons, the conspiracy relationship is established, and even if there was no direct participation in the execution, even if there was a person who did not participate in the act of the conspiracy, he/she is subject to criminal liability as a co-principal for the other co-principal (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 200Do3483, Nov. 10, 200; 2005Do8507, Jan. 26, 2006).

In full view of the evidence, including Defendant 1’s statement, the lower court found Defendant 2 guilty of all the facts constituting an offense in collusion with Defendant 1 by submitting a forged loan certificate to the original branch of the Chuncheon District Court for the original branch of the original branch, but attempted to render a favorable judgment. In so doing, the lower court did not err by violating the rules of evidence or misapprehending the legal principles as to co-principal, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and as to Defendant 1, part of the number of detention days after the appeal shall be included in the original sentence. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Yang Sung-tae (Presiding Justice)