2

3

4

5

6

7

1. A. The statute of limitations proceeds from the time when a right becomes objectively available and proceeds from the time when the right can be exercised. The term "non-exercise of the right" refers to a disability under the Act on the Exercise of such right, for example, where the period has expired or any condition has expired, and the exercise of the right is practically difficult. However, the exercise of a defense right on the ground of the statute of limitations is governed by the principles of good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights, which are the major principles of the Civil Act, and thus, under special circumstances where the exercise of the right cannot be expected due to a de facto obstacle that cannot be exercised objectively before the statute of limitations expires, the obligor's assertion for the completion of the statute of limitations is not permissible as an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da27604 delivered on December 9, 1994, etc.).

On the other hand, even in cases where there exists an objective obstacle that makes it impossible to expect the creditor to exercise his/her right as above, if such obstacle is terminated, the debtor's defense of extinctive prescription can be prevented only within a reasonable period from exercising his/her right. Whether it can be viewed as exercising his/her right within a reasonable period of time should be determined by comprehensively taking into account various circumstances, including the relationship between the creditor and the debtor, the cause of the claim for damages, the cause of the obligee's delay in exercising his/her right, and the progress from the time when the obligee filed a lawsuit for damages. However, since the extinctive prescription system is based on the principle of trust and good faith to achieve legal stability and to relieve the difficulty in proving it, it is very exceptional to deny the effect of extinctive prescription based on the principle of trust and good faith even though it falls under the requirements for its application. Therefore, the "reasonable period of time" should be limited to a short period of time pursuant to the Civil Act, barring special circumstances. In particular, even in cases where it is inevitable to extend the period of time in the claim for damages due to illegal acts, it should not exceed three years (3).

202819 en banc Decision).

B. Where a public prosecution was instituted based on evidence, etc. collected by a State agency due to an illegal act in the course of investigation, and a final judgment of conviction was rendered, but the existence of grounds for retrial became final and conclusive after the judgment of innocence became final and conclusive in the retrial procedure, and the State claims damages against the State due to an illegal act of a State agency, etc., it shall be deemed that there was a de facto obstacle that the obligee cannot expect

Therefore, in such a case, the defense of the completion of the extinctive prescription by the debtor cannot be allowed as an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith. However, the creditor should exercise his right within six months from the date of the final judgment of not guilty, which is equivalent to the suspension of prescription under the Civil Act, unless there are special

In such a case, in principle, whether a claim for damages was filed within the pertinent period should be determined on the basis of whether a lawsuit for damages was filed. However, in a case where a judgment of innocence became final and conclusive, a creditor may first file a claim for criminal compensation under the Criminal Compensation and Restoration of Honor Act (hereinafter “Criminal Compensation Act”) which can be said to be more simple procedures prior to a civil claim for damages. Thus, even if a creditor did not file a lawsuit for damages within six months from the final and conclusive date of judgment of innocence, where a creditor filed a claim for criminal compensation under the Criminal Compensation Act within the said period, “reasonable period of time” is deemed to have special circumstances to extend the period, and at that time, a claim for damages may be deemed to have been exercised within a considerable period of time. In such cases, even in a case, the period shall not exceed three years from the final and conclusive date of judgment of innocence for which the actual disability of the exercise of rights became final and conclusive (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da444, Dec. 12, 2013).

C. After citing the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, the court below acknowledged facts as stated in its holding, and rejected the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription on the ground that the defendant's assertion of the completion of extinctive prescription against the plaintiffs cannot be allowed as abuse of rights against the principle of good faith, since it is reasonable to deem that the plaintiffs exercised their rights within

However, according to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance and the records cited by the court below, ① Plaintiffs A, B, and G were arrested and detained by employees of the National Security Planning Department on September 1983 and led to the confession of the crime of suspicion, such as assault and various advisers, etc. Based on these findings, the Plaintiff A was prosecuted for violating the National Security Act (espionage, etc.) on the ground that he/she was found guilty of all facts charged at Seoul High Court on July 6, 1984, and was found guilty on the ground that the Defendant 1 was found guilty on the ground that the Defendant 2 was not guilty on the ground that the Defendant 1 was found guilty on the ground that the Defendant 1 was not guilty on the ground that the Defendant 2 was found guilty on the ground that the Defendant 1 was not guilty on the ground that the Defendant 1 was found guilty on the ground that the Defendant 1 was not guilty on the grounds that the Defendant 2 was found guilty on the ground that the Defendant 1’s appeal was dismissed on September 25, 1984.

Examining the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, the lower court’s determination that the Plaintiffs could not exercise the right to claim compensation of this case against the Defendant until January 13, 201, which became final and conclusive, is justifiable. However, the Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit only after the lapse of more than six months from the date on which the decision on criminal compensation became final and conclusive. In such a case, the lower court should have deliberated on whether there were extenuating circumstances, such as the relationship between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant, and whether there was a very special circumstance to delay the Plaintiffs’ exercise of rights after the date on which the decision on criminal compensation became final and conclusive, and should have determined whether the Plaintiffs exercised the right within a considerable period of time within which the Plaintiffs could prevent the Defendant’s defense against extinctive prescription.

Nevertheless, the court below did not properly deliberate and decide on this, and judged that the plaintiffs exercised their rights within a considerable period of time that could exclude the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription. In so doing, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the abuse of rights by the defense of extinctive prescription or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, which affected the conclusion

However, according to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record, Plaintiff B and G were engaged in harsh conduct on the ground that they were unlawfully committed in the National Security Planning Department. However, the fact that the Plaintiff was indicted with the Plaintiff and was not tried at the trial. The past history committee revealed that Plaintiff B and G was subject to illegal confinement and harsh treatment as above at the time of the truth-finding decision on the instant case on May 2009, and that the instant lawsuit was filed on March 22, 2012, before the lapse of three years from the date of the truth-finding decision.

If there are some circumstances, it is reasonable to view that the plaintiffs exercised their rights within a reasonable period of time to exclude the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription regarding the plaintiffs' claim for consolation money due to the defendant's illegal acts against plaintiffs B and G. Therefore, the court below pointed out that the defendant's claim for consolation money and this part need to be examined separately.

2. Therefore, the part of the lower judgment against the Defendant is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Shin Young-young

Justices Kim Yong-deok

Justices Kim So-young