The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 10 million won with 5% interest per annum from April 15, 2009 to January 27, 2012, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the day of full payment.

2. The plaintiff's remaining appeal is dismissed.

3. The total costs of the lawsuit shall be ten minutes, which shall be borne by the plaintiff, and the remainder shall be borne by the defendant.

4. The portion paid with the amount under paragraph (1) may be provisionally executed.

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the amount of 5% per annum from April 15, 2009 to the date of complete payment, and 20% per annum from the next day to the date of complete payment. ② The correction of the attached Table 1 in the upper part of the part A35 of the daily “○○ Daily Report” which was first issued after the decision became final and conclusive, and the part of the attached Table 1 shall be inserted into the class 50 of the ancient body, the main part in the main part, the main part in the main part, and the part in the corrected report into class 30 of the ancient body. ③ If the above paragraph is not implemented, the amount of money shall be paid at the rate of 30 million won per day from the expiration date of the above period to the completion date of implementation.

2. Purport of appeal

A. The portion of the judgment of the court of first instance against the plaintiff falling under one of the following amounts shall be revoked. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 50 million won with 5% interest per annum from April 15, 2009 to the date of this judgment, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the date of full payment.

(b) revoke the corrective report of the judgment of the first instance, and seek such judgment as is indicated B and 3 of the purport of the claim.

The following facts are not disputed between the parties, or may be acknowledged by adding up the whole purport of the pleadings to each entry in Gap evidence 1 and 2:

A. The Plaintiff is a member of the 18th National Assembly, who is in office as a member of the National Assembly △△△△△△ Committee from around 2008, and the Defendant is a newspaper that issues the daily newspaper.

B. On April 14, 2009, the Ministry of Gender Equality reported the case related to sexual traffic as a major pending issue at the second meeting of the National Assembly of 282th National Assembly (Extraordinary Session) held on April 14, 2009 with reference to the cases where the bereaved family members of Nonparty 1 (non-party to the judgment of the Supreme Court) committed suicide on the grounds of drinking and sexual intercourse, etc. (hereinafter “non-party 1 case”), who filed a complaint against the persons involved in sexual traffic to violate the Special Act on sexual traffic (hereinafter “non-party 1 case”), and the cases where the former Cheongdae-dae et al. and the administrative officers, etc. received an oral contact from the persons involved in the sexual traffic and

C. Accordingly, the Minister of Gender Equality asked the Minister of Gender Equality whether a journalist is included in a person who has been controlled by sexual traffic, and whether it is not related to the defendant's intention in the case of non-party 1, and the press has made a statement in attached Form 2 (hereinafter "the statement in this case") to the effect that since the media is a considerable power organ, it should also extend education on the prevention of sexual traffic conducted for public officials to the press organization, etc.

D. On April 15, 2009, the following day, the Defendant published a private statement in attached Form 3 (hereinafter “the private statement in this case”) that criticizes the Plaintiff’s remarks under the title “sexual assaulting verbal abuse” toward the press of the Plaintiff’s member of △ Party.

2. The assertion and judgment

A. The plaintiff's assertion

1) In the instant speech, the Plaintiff did not have made a statement as “marist and female residents,” and even though there was no fact that “sexually verbal abuse” was made to the press, the Defendant, in the instant private opinion, expressed the Plaintiff as “Nonindicted 2, who left the political stage with the birth of the Nonindicted Party 2 regime.” In the said person’s entry, the Plaintiff expressed as “marbing verbal abuse,” and read as “marbing verbal abuse,” and the Plaintiff’s remarks as “marbing verbal abuse,” and “marbing at the face of journalists,” thereby impairing the Plaintiff’s reputation by pointing out false facts. As such, the Defendant is obligated to publish a correction report as indicated in attached Table 1, with payment of damages for mental damage caused by defamation to the Plaintiff.

2) Even if the Defendant’s report of this case does not constitute defamation against the Plaintiff, the Defendant’s statement of this case in the private opinion of this case is on the premise that the Plaintiff’s speech of this case is “sexually verbal abuse,” “the act of throwing garbage on the face of journalists,” “the act of spiting a specific person and a specific occupational group by taking advantage of the color-friendly black will rain,” “the act of spiting a specific person and a specific occupational group,” and the Plaintiff’s “the act of spiting a normal person, as a normal member, exceeded the normal human being,” insulting the Plaintiff. In addition, among the private opinion of this case, another person is obligated to ask the Plaintiff that “I would not have been married,” and on the premise that “I would not know that I would have been married.” The part of the Plaintiff’s career and expressed the Plaintiff’s “the person who was listed in the name of Nonparty 2,” and thus, the Defendant is also obligated to pay damages due to insult against the Plaintiff.

B. Determination

1) Determination as to damages and claims for corrective reports resulting from a statement of false facts

A) Where a person defames another person by publishing a fact through the press and the publication, when the Plaintiff claims damages by claiming that the alleged fact is false or false as the cause of the claim (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Da58823, Jan. 24, 2008). In order to establish defamation by media reports, there must be a statement of specific facts that may undermine the victim’s social evaluation. Here, even in cases where a statement of fact is used in indirect and round-up manner, there are cases where the existence of a fact is expressed in light of the overall purport of the expression, and thus, there is a possibility that the social value or evaluation of a specific person may be infringed (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Da29379, Dec. 27, 2007). In addition, in order to determine whether an expression of fact is a statement of opinion, it should be determined based on the objective purport of the entire expression, including the relevant article’s language and text, 200, and the purport of the entire expression should be examined as 14.20.

B) First of all, according to the health statement and evidence No. 2 as to whether the Plaintiff made a statement in the private opinion of this case as to whether the part of the Plaintiff’s statement is false or false, it is acknowledged that the Plaintiff did not make the above statement accurately. Meanwhile, according to the above facts, in the process of questioning the Minister of Gender Equality at the meeting of the National Assembly Women’s Committee prior to the publication date of this case, the Plaintiff asked several journalists from among the persons under sexual traffic in the process of questioning the Minister of Gender Equality at the meeting of the National Assembly Women’s Committee meeting of the National Assembly held before the publication date of this case, and made a statement to the effect that “the Plaintiff included a journal in the sexual traffic.” The Defendant made a statement to the effect that the Plaintiff made a statement to the effect that “the journals are made in the form of sexual traffic” was consistent with the objective part, and thus, it can be deemed that it is nothing more than the truth or somewhat exaggerated expressions in detail. Thus, it cannot be said that the Defendant made a false statement.

Next, among the private opinions of this case, the part stating that "the plaintiff is a "non-party 2" who leaves the political stage along with the birth of the non-party 2 regime. The journalist's "satise is made out of the verbal abuse of female workers" in his entrance (the part that "pressist is a "satise and female workers" is as seen earlier, and the remaining part is the same as seen earlier, and therefore, it is difficult to regard the remaining part as a statement of fact merely because the plaintiff's political position was connected with the non-party 2's former president, and that the defendant's evaluation opinion about the plaintiff's political inclination was revealed. Further, the part that expressed the plaintiff's statement of this case as "sexual verbal abuse" and "satise at the face of journalistss" is merely a subjective expression of opinion of the defendant as to the plaintiff's speech of this case, and it is difficult to regard as a statement of fact.

C) Therefore, the Plaintiff’s claim for damages based on the premise that the private theory of this case had damaged the Plaintiff’s reputation by pointing out false facts is without merit. The Plaintiff’s claim for a corrective statement is accepted pursuant to Article 764 of the Civil Act, and the claim for a corrective statement is made in lieu of, or together with, compensation for damages. As such, insofar as the Plaintiff’s claim for damages

2) Determination as to the claim for damages caused by insult

A) Occurrence of liability for damages

(1) Although it cannot be deemed unlawful solely on the ground that the expressive person expressed a critical opinion against another person, if the form and content of the expressive act constitutes an insulting and definite personal attack, thereby infringing on the personality right, it may constitute defamation and separate types of tort (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2005Da65494, Apr. 9, 2009; 2001Da84480, Mar. 25, 2003).

(2) Regarding the instant case, the Defendant expressed that the Plaintiff had made sexually violent language against the press in the title of the instant private statement against the Plaintiff’s speech, and the contents of the main text also indicate that “the Plaintiff’s act of insulting sexually violent language,” “the act of dumping garbage on the face of journalists,” “the act of spiting a specific person and a specific professional group by abusing the colorly black will rain,” and “the act of spiting the spiting the Plaintiff into a specific person and a specific professional group, as an ordinary member.” Even if considering that the Plaintiff’s statement of this case was prepared from a critical point of view that the Defendant could have held as a media organization, it constitutes an act of insulting the Plaintiff’s social evaluation, and thus, constitutes a tort of infringing the Plaintiff’s personal right, the Defendant is obligated to compensate the Plaintiff for mental damage caused by the insult.

However, the defendant stated in the private theory of this case that the plaintiff "I would not know that he would have been married," and then asked several persons who had the same occupation as the plaintiff's husband who were in control of sexual traffic and speaks in the manner of preventing sexual traffic in his occupation, and the part, etc. that the defendant listed the plaintiff's career and expressed as "foreign President President President President President President 2" as "the part, etc. expressed as "the plaintiff's career," cannot be deemed to constitute insult in light of the form and content of the expression, etc. Therefore, the plaintiff's argument about each of the above parts is without merit.

B) Judgment on the defendant's argument

(1) The defendant asserts to the purport that the private theory of this case is a public figure as a member of the plaintiff, and the private theory of this case is a matter of the plaintiff's public speech at the National Assembly, and that the criticism, rumor, and exaggerated expression techniques are often used differently from the article that informs facts, and that the private theory of this case was made at the level of rebuttals as to the plaintiff's unlawful attack against journalists through the statement at the National Assembly. In light of the fact that the plaintiff made an unjust attack against journalists, the private theory of this case is not made with the intention of gathering the plaintiff in bad faith or insulting the plaintiff, and thus, its illegality is denied.

(2) In setting the limitation between the freedom of press and the protection of reputation, if the expression concerns a matter of public and social meaning, it shall be evaluated differently from the case concerning a matter belonging to the private sector. In particular, the restriction on the freedom of press should be mitigated. In light of the fact that public officials’ morality, integrity, or work process is legitimate, it shall always be subject to citizen monitoring and criticism. Such monitoring and criticism function shall not be easily restricted unless it is a malicious or considerably unreasonable attack. However, in such a case, when determining the contents and method of media reports, the contents and degree of suspicions, the degree of public interest, the degree of undermining the social evaluation of public officials or public service society, and other various circumstances, it shall be deemed that the media report is in bad or extremely rush attack beyond the legitimate scope of media activities such as monitoring, criticism, and check against public officials or public service society, even if it is deemed that the media report has considerably lost reasonableness, it shall not be deemed that it comes from defamation 207, 2007.

(3) We examine the plaintiff's statement of this case. The plaintiff's statement of this case contains a question about journalist's sexual traffic and question about journalist's sexual traffic prevention education. The plaintiff's statement of this case is not so-called "non-party 1's private opinion." The defendant's statement of this case is a critical opinion about the plaintiff's statement of this case, which is a public official, and its public interest should be acknowledged. Unlike the article's article which focuses on the report of fact, the opinion of the newspaper's opinion can be used in various ways of expression such as rumor and exaggeration in the newspaper's opinion, so if the defendant's expression used in the newspaper of this case is easily unlawful, the defendant's statement of this case's sexual assault is "non-party 1's sexual assault" used in the opinion of this case's private opinion, and if the plaintiff's expression of this case's opinion of this case's private opinion is an expression of "non-party 1's private opinion" or "the plaintiff's expression of opinion of this case's private opinion of this case's own opinion of reason."

C) Amount of consolation money

Furthermore, with respect to the amount of consolation money that the Defendant is liable to pay to the Plaintiff, taking account of the health class, Plaintiff’s age, gender, occupation, progress of the instant case, degree of infringement of the Plaintiff’s legal interests as a public official or individual, the level and method of expression of the Defendant’s expressive act, and other various circumstances shown in the argument in the instant case, it is reasonable to determine consolation money as KRW 10,000,000 for the Plaintiff

D) Sub-committee

Therefore, the defendant is obligated to pay to the plaintiff the consolation money of KRW 10,00,000 as well as damages for delay at the rate of 5% per annum under the Civil Act from April 15, 2009, which is the date of the above tort, to January 27, 2012, which is the date of the decision of the court of first instance, and 20% per annum under the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings, from the next day to the date of full payment.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is justified within the above scope of recognition, and the remaining claims are dismissed without merit. Since the judgment of the court of first instance is unfair with a different conclusion, the part against the plaintiff corresponding to the above amount ordered to be paid in the judgment of the court of first instance shall be revoked and the payment order shall be ordered to the defendant, and the remaining appeal of the plaintiff shall be dismissed as it is so decided as per Disposition.

[Attachment]

Judges Cho Jae-young (Presiding Judge)