2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

A. On March 1, 1990, the Plaintiff was newly appointed as a teacher of B elementary school on March 1, 2012, and was promoted to a vice principal of C elementary school on March 1, 2012. From September 1, 2015 to August 31, 2019, the Plaintiff served as a principal at D elementary school at a public recruitment school. From September 1, 2019, the Plaintiff is serving as an assistant principal of E elementary school.

B. On August 16, 2019, the Defendant issued a reprimand (hereinafter “instant disposition”) against the Plaintiff on the ground that the Plaintiff violated the duty to maintain the dignity of public officials by engaging in verbal sexual harassment against the teaching staff as follows.

○ On March 2016, the Plaintiff: (a) stated that “F is flick according to the G head? G head is omitted; (b) caused F to feel numerical learning as being treated by women working in the drinking house; (c) Hashed Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had Had.

C. The Plaintiff filed a petition review with the Appeal Commission on August 22, 2019, but was dismissed on October 16, 2019.

[Ground of recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap evidence Nos. 1 and 2, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The plaintiff's assertion

A. Absence of disciplinary reasons

1) With respect to the grounds for the first and third disciplinary actions, the Plaintiff did not have made the same statement as those of the grounds for the disciplinary actions, and even if the Plaintiff made such a statement, it does not constitute sexual harassment.

2) Regarding the grounds for disciplinary action Nos. 2-A and 2-A, the Plaintiff’s remarks are merely universal and general contents, and do not constitute sexual harassment on the ground that they were not made with the intent to cause sexual humiliation or shame to a specific person.

(b) deviation from and abuse of discretionary authority;

In light of the fact that the Plaintiff had faithfully engaged in school life for 30 years, and that the instant disposition brought about the result of demotion as assistant principal due to the instant disposition, the instant disposition was deviates from and abused discretion.

3. Relevant statutes;

It is as shown in the attached Form.

4. Determination

A. Judgment on the non-existence of grounds for disciplinary action

1) Relevant regulations and legal principles

A) According to the attached Table 1 of Article 2(1) of the former Rules on Disciplinary Action, etc. on Public Educational Officials (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Education, Mar. 24, 2017; hereinafter “Disciplinary Rule”), “sexual harassment” in violation of the duty to maintain dignity among the types of misconduct refers to sexual harassment under Article 2(3) of the National Human Rights Commission Act. Subparagraph 3 (d) of Article 2 of the former National Human Rights Commission Act (amended by Act No. 16928, Feb. 4, 2020; hereinafter “National Human Rights Commission Act”) refers to “work, employment, and other relation with sexual harassment, and public institutions (referring to State agencies, local governments, and public service-related organizations under Article 2 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Article 2 of the Higher Education Act, and Article 3(2)1 of the Public Service Ethics Act) require or cause any sexual humiliation or disadvantage in relation to the relevant sexual humiliation or sexual harassment, etc.

In this context, “sexual speech and behavior” refers to physical, verbal, and visual acts related to the physical relationship between men and women, or the physical characteristics of male or female, which may objectively cause the general and average person at the same location as the other party to feel sexual humiliation or aversion, in light of sound common sense and practice of the community. Although sexual harassment does not necessarily require sexual motive or intent to constitute a sexual harassment, it is not necessarily required for the perpetrator to have sexual harassment. However, in light of the specific circumstances such as the relationship between the parties, place and situation where the act was committed, the other party’s explicit or presumed response to the act, the content and degree of the act, whether the act was one time or for a short period, or whether the act continued, it is objectively recognized that the ordinary and average person at the same location as the other party may feel sexual humiliation or aversion, and accordingly, the other party to the act ought to be recognized to have caused sexual humiliation or aversion (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 207Du74727, Apr. 12, 2018).

B) Article 63 of the former State Public Officials Act (amended by Act No. 16905, Jan. 29, 2020; hereinafter “State Public Officials Act”) provides that “no public official shall commit any act detrimental to his/her dignity, regardless of whether it is inside or outside the scope of his/her duties.” Considering the status of public officials being widely entrusted with public duties by the people and serving for the entire nation, any act detrimental to the dignity of public officials, as well as any act detrimental to the people’s trust in the public society, shall not be committed against all public officials regardless of whether they are inside or outside the scope of their duties, pursuant to Article 63 of the State Public Officials Act. Here, the term “decency” refers to a physical body that has no color to perform his/her duties as a citizen, regardless of whether it is inside or outside the scope of his/her duties (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2013Du4868, Apr. 16, 2017).

2) Determination as to the grounds for the first disciplinary action

A) Whether the Plaintiff made this part of the statement

In full view of the following circumstances as a whole, the evidence mentioned above, Gap evidence No. 7-1, Eul evidence No. 7-1, Eul evidence No. 10, Eul evidence No. 6, witness F, Eul's testimony, and the overall purport of the arguments and arguments, the plaintiff may recognize the fact that the plaintiff made a statement that "F is stated to the head of G department (the head of G department)" to F of the teachers and staff at the meal place of the new teachers and staff meeting around March 2016 (However, it is insufficient to recognize the fact that the plaintiff made a statement to the head of G department only with the evidence submitted."

① Around March 2016, 2016, the teacher F stated in this Court that “The Plaintiff exchanged the alcohol with the school year G at the exchange of the new teachers and staff members, and then F read “○○, the head of G, the head of the department, and the head of G? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? the head of the school following the Plaintiff’s horses, said ?

② Teachers H, in the same place, is also the subject of “Plaintiff F” ○○.

I have stated, according to one another, that the head of K (the head of the Department) who was next to the other, stated that "I would like to be "I would like to be "I would like to be "I would like to be," and the head of the school department G stated in this court that "I would like to say that some teachers would be disobsent to the plaintiff's speech on March 2016, because I would like to say that I would like to be "I would like to say that I would like to say that I would like to say that I would go against the plaintiff's speech."

③ Teachers F and Teachers H have made a concrete statement in the situation at the time, and the school year G also stated to the effect that there was little perception that the Plaintiff’s horses were displeasible from some teachers and staff members who completed the meeting or the meeting, and that there was no special circumstance to suspect the credibility of each of the above statements.

B) Whether the Plaintiff’s remarks can be assessed as sexual harassment

In light of the aforementioned legal principles, it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiff’s remarks constitute sexual harassment in full view of the following circumstances revealed by comprehensively taking account of the aforementioned evidence and the overall purport of oral argument.

① In making a statement about the situation at the time, the teacher F stated that “I am humbling, humbling, humbling, and humbing sexual humiliation,” and that “I am humbling, humbing, humbing, and humbing, humbing sexual humiliation,” and that “I am humbling, as I would have been a new teacher who was not in one year after receipt of an order, so I am humbling the Plaintiff with an opportunity to be humbling and difficult in school life.” According to the above statement, the teacher F dumbing caused a sense of sexual humiliation by the Plaintiff’s statement, but, due to the Plaintiff’s status and relationship

(2) The Plaintiff’s speech is a speech that makes the drinking house loan with the words “here according to the foregoing” and “oman,” and it is sufficient to regard it as an act that may cause the general and average person in the same position as teachers F to feel sexual humiliation or aversion.

③ Teachers who were in the same occupation as Plaintiff and F Teachers are also young in the course of investigation.

Around 199, I expressed that he saw that he had a strong atmosphere that she blished her lives, and that he she had talked about how she could act with other teachers after a meeting of the society, and expressed her talks about how she could act with the teachers, and that F as a party to the case, she expressed that she had very little figures because she had a speech before many people."

④ The Plaintiff was the principal of the D Elementary School F superior, and the teacher F was the principal of the D Elementary School.

The Plaintiff and teachers F did not appear to have a friendly relationship to the extent that they exchanged the horses as above, but did not seem to have a friendly relationship to the extent that the teachers F did not appear to have a friendly relationship with the head G.

⑤ The Plaintiff’s remarks asserted that the Plaintiff’s remarks did not constitute sexual harassment, in light of the relationship between the Plaintiff and the principal teacherF, the relationship between the teacher F and the principal teacher G, and the situation at the time, etc., it is reasonable to view the Plaintiff’s remarks as sexual harassment, even if the Plaintiff made a statement for the purpose of making a part of the instant case a sexual harassment, it constitutes objectively an act that causes the general and average person in the same place as the teacher F to feel sexual humiliation or aversion, and as long as the teacher F made a sexual humiliation, the Plaintiff’s act is inevitable to constitute sexual harassment, as long as the teacher F was sexual humiliationing.

3) Determination on the remaining grounds for disciplinary action

A) Whether the Plaintiff made this part of the statement

In full view of the following circumstances, the aforementioned evidence, Gap evidence, Eul evidence No. 5, Eul evidence No. 7-2 and Eul evidence No. 10, Eul evidence No. 10, and Eul evidence No. 10, the whole purport of the pleadings, the following circumstances, which can be acknowledged, the plaintiff stated that "the plaintiff was unable to complete the test that the women's children's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women's women in the school room around March 2019" (Article 2-B).

① A teacher I stated in the application for the receipt of a sexual harassment case that “the Plaintiff was unable to incur a female seafarer’s loss at the beginning of March on the old Day” (Disciplinary Reason No. 2-A), and that “I would not have his job performed by the teacher and staff at the school office around March 2019,” “I would not have any force on the job.” (Disciplinary Reason No. 2-B).

② Teachers J stated in the application form for acceptance of sexual harassment cases that “after the Plaintiff expressed his/her intent to avoid entering a school in the principal office around March 2019, the Plaintiff expressed his/her intention to leave the school during business consultation, it shall make a statement to the effect that “after the Plaintiff made a statement to the effect that it is bad in our schools.”

③ Teachers I and J do not seem to have any special circumstance to suspect the credibility of each of the above statements, and it is difficult to deem the above statements to be false solely on the ground that the Plaintiff had conflict with teachers J.

④ In the course of the investigation, the Plaintiff is deemed unsanitary in March in relation to the grounds for disciplinary action No. 2-A.

In order to provide life guidance and to have the ability to conduct activities, I made a statement to the effect that "The last day of March has not been able to do so?" and I made a statement to the effect that "I may speak to the effect that "I may see that I would have been able to do so in a way that I would know about how I would have been able to do so while engaging in business or not" in relation to the 3 disciplinary reasons.

B) Whether the Plaintiff’s remarks constitute grounds for disciplinary action

In light of the above legal principles, comprehensively taking account of the following circumstances, the Plaintiff’s speech may give the other party an displeasure, but it is difficult to see that it constitutes sexual harassment, and it does not constitute a violation of the duty to maintain dignity.

(1) Although the other party may feel an displeasure due to these parts of the speech, in light of the contents, details, and circumstances at the time of the said speech, this part of the speech is difficult to view it as a speech that, in light of the sound common sense and practice of the social community, is an act of physical relationship between men and women, or physical, speech, and visual activity related to the physical characteristics of men or women, or a woman’s physical characteristics, and that, objectively, an ordinary and average person in the same place as the other party may feel sexual humiliation or aversion.

② The above remarks were made by the Plaintiff’s basic personnel in the course of performing the duties of the office building management, and it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff’s speech and behavior constitutes verbal abuse or inappropriate remarks to the extent that the Plaintiff’s character is disregarded or that the Plaintiff’s mental impulse is reduced. It is also difficult to deem that each of the above remarks was an act of impairing the Plaintiff’s dignity to the extent inappropriate for the Plaintiff to perform his duties as the principal of an elementary school.

4) Sub-committee

Therefore, the Plaintiff shall be deemed to have violated the duty to maintain dignity under Article 63 of the State Public Officials Act by doing the act of the grounds for disciplinary action No. 1, but the grounds for disciplinary action No. 2-A, B, and 3 cannot be deemed to constitute grounds for disciplinary action against the violation of the duty to maintain dignity under the

C. Determination on the assertion of deviation and abuse of discretionary power

1) Even if some of the grounds for disciplinary action are not recognized, if the pertinent disciplinary action is deemed justifiable only based on certain grounds for disciplinary action, the pertinent disciplinary action cannot be deemed unlawful (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 96Nu1184, May 9, 1997). Of the grounds for disciplinary action in the instant case, the grounds for disciplinary action can be recognized, but the remainder may not be recognized as the grounds for disciplinary action. Therefore, we examine whether the pertinent grounds for disciplinary action can be deemed appropriate based on the recognition of the grounds for disciplinary action in the instant case.

2) In principle, when a disciplinary measure is taken against a teacher for a reason for disciplinary action, the disciplinary measure is held at the discretion of the person having the authority to take the disciplinary measure. Thus, the disciplinary measure is illegal only when the person having the authority to take the disciplinary measure exercises the authority to take the disciplinary measure so that it is deemed that the person having the authority to take the disciplinary measure abused the discretion that has been placed at the discretion of the person having the authority to take the disciplinary measure. In order for the disciplinary measure to be considered as a disposition that has considerably lost validity under the social norms, the disciplinary measure must be deemed as a case where it is objectively and objectively deemed unfair in light of the characteristics of the duty, the content and nature of the offense, and the purpose of the disciplinary measure based on the disciplinary measure and all other circumstances incidental thereto (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Du

3) In light of the above legal principles, comprehensively taking account of the following circumstances revealed through the aforementioned evidence, the facts acknowledged earlier, and the purport of the entire pleadings, the instant disposition cannot be deemed as a deviation from or abuse of discretion, which has been entrusted to the person having authority over disciplinary action, as it considerably lacks validity under the social norms. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s assertion on this part is without merit.

A) Teachers requires more morality than ordinary occupation and injury to dignity of teachers is likely to undermine the people’s trust in the entire society of teachers as well as themselves.

B) Although the Plaintiff, who is in the principal’s position, bears a more strict duty to maintain dignity than other teachers, the Plaintiff made a statement of sexual harassment in a superior position against the ordinary teacher working for the same school.

C) According to the criteria for disciplinary action under the attached Table of Article 2(1) of the Disciplinary Rule, the case where “the degree of non-defensive and transitional room” among “violation of dignity maintenance” is prescribed as “a reduction of salary or reprimand.” There is no special circumstance to deem the above criteria for disciplinary action unreasonable, and the instant disposition constitutes the lower limit of the criteria for disciplinary action as “a reprimand, which is the lowest level of disciplinary action, among the types of disciplinary action.” Furthermore, according to Article 4(2)4(d) of the Disciplinary Rule, if a disciplinary action becomes the object of disciplinary action due to sexual harassment under Article 2 subparag. 3(d) of the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, disciplinary action may not be mitigated. Thus, even if there are grounds for mitigation of disciplinary action under Article 4(1) and (3) of the said Rule against the Plaintiff, the disciplinary action against the Plaintiff may not be mitigated from “a reprimand” disposition.

D) Cheating committed by public officials such as teachers to achieve through the instant disposition

It cannot be said that the public interest such as eradication and establishment of public service discipline is smaller than the disadvantage that the plaintiff would suffer.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Kim Jong-min

Judges Lee Jin-jin

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.