[2] The extinctive prescription of the principal's right to claim reimbursement of benefit or the right to secure performance

[3] Whether the statute of limitations is interrupted where part of the obligation was discharged before the statute of limitations expired

[2] Since the principal's right to claim reimbursement of benefits or the right to claim performance guarantee against the commission agent due to the provision of consigned goods does not have any relationship with the principal's goods supplied to the commission agent, it does not fall under the "price of goods sold by the merchant" under Article 163 subparagraph 6 of the Civil Code and is not subject to the short-term extinctive prescription for three years. On the other hand, the commission agent is a typical commercial activity under the Commercial Code and the commission agent is a natural merchant and the principal is also a normal merchant. Thus, barring any special circumstance, the above claim arising from the commission agent's sale and purchase of consigned goods is a claim arising from ordinary commercial activity and thus, the five-year extinctive prescription for commercial activity under

[3] If part of the obligation is discharged before the completion of the statute of limitations, the effect of interrupting prescription takes effect on the recognition of the obligation unless dispute arises with regard to the amount of the obligation.

In light of the records, the fact-finding by the court below on the defendants' liability to pay the installment payment to the plaintiff caused by the installment sale of this case is just, and there is no error of law by incomplete deliberation or misconception of facts due to violation of the rules of evidence as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

2. We examine the plaintiff's incidental reasons.

A. The court below is just in light of the records, and there is no error of law in misconception of facts due to violation of the rules of evidence, and there is no reason to criticize the appeal.

B. Article 163 subparagraph 6 of the Civil Code, to which the three-year short-term extinctive prescription applies, "price for the goods sold by the merchant" means only the price for the goods sold by the merchant and its own claim due to the sale and purchase of the goods, and it shall be interpreted that it is limited to the claim that is distinct from

The supply of goods to a commission agent for sale on consignment differs from the supply of goods to a buyer in order to fulfill the seller's obligation to make a sales contract under Article 568 of the Civil Act. Thus, the commission agent's contractual obligation is merely responding to the principal's obligation to pay remuneration to the commission agent and does not respond to the principal's obligation to supply goods. Thus, the principal's right to claim reimbursement of benefits or right to demand performance of warranty liability against the commission agent due to the provision of the commission goods does not have a relation to the principal's supply of goods to the commission agent, and thus, the goods are not a "price of goods sold by the principal" under subparagraph 6 of Article 163 of the Civil Act, and it is a typical commercial activity under the Commercial Act and the commission agent is a merchant and the principal's ordinary commercial activity. Thus, the above claims arising from the commission agent's sale and purchase of goods to the commission agent are subject to the expiration date of a three-year period under Article 64 of the Commercial Act, unless there are any special circumstances.

The lower court determined that the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants for the remaining payment of KRW 9,870,410 of the above mineral name point transaction amount was subject to the three-year short-term extinctive prescription under Article 163 subparag. 6 of the Civil Act. However, according to the original judgment, the Plaintiff’s claim for the remaining payment of the above mineral name point transaction amount against the Defendants cannot be subject to the short-term extinctive prescription under Article 163 subparag. 6 of the Civil Act. However, according to the original judgment, the Plaintiff’s claim for the remaining payment of the above mineral name point transaction amount against the Defendants cannot be subject to the short-term extinctive prescription under Article 163 subparag. 6 of the Civil Act due to the Plaintiff’s consignment contract between the Plaintiff and the commission agent, pursuant to the instant consignment contract between February 1986 and April 1987, the Plaintiff supplied the Defendants for sale consignment and the Defendants’ claim for the remaining payment amount to be paid by the Defendants pursuant to the above contract.

Therefore, the court below is justified in pointing this out, since the court below erred in misunderstanding the legal principles as to the extinctive prescription of the principal's claim against the commission agent.

C. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the plaintiff's second defense on October 30, 1990 on the following grounds: (a) the defendants paid KRW 1,00,000 to the claims for the remainder of the transaction in the above mining name address; and (b) the plaintiff notified the defendants of the payment of the above goods on October 26, 1993; (c) since the defendants did not raise any objection thereto, the defendants' defense for the completion of the statute of limitations is not reasonable; (d) the defendants cannot be deemed to have renounced the interests for the completion of the statute of limitations after the expiration of the statute of limitations; and even if the above payment was deemed to have been approved, it is apparent that the above payment was approved again after the lapse of the statute of limitations; and therefore, (e) the plaintiff's second defense was rejected on the ground that the second defense of

However, as seen above, the Plaintiff’s claim for the remainder of the transaction in the above mining name point against the Defendants is not subject to the short-term extinctive prescription of three years under Article 163 subparag. 6 of the Civil Act, but subject to the five-year commercial extinctive prescription, and it is apparent that the prescription has not yet been completed on October 30, 1990, asserting that the Plaintiff received a partial repayment, if calculated from April 1987 at the end of the transaction.

In addition, if a part of the debt is discharged before the completion of the prescription, it takes effect as an approval of the debt, unless there is any dispute as to the amount of the debt (see Supreme Court Decision 78Da1790, May 13, 1980). As alleged by the plaintiff, if the plaintiff was paid part of the claim for balance in the name address transaction from the defendants on the above date, and if there is no dispute as to the amount of the deposit, the prescription period is suspended on the above date and the period from this date to the time of the lawsuit in this case does not expire, and the defendants' defense of the prescription period is no longer reasonable. Thus, the court below should have deliberated whether there was any dispute as to whether the part of the payment date in this case is the repayment of the remaining amount in the name address address and the amount are the repayment of the deposit amount in the name address (the opening date of No. 1-1 (No. 1-5, No. 3390, Nov. 5, 191).

Nevertheless, the court below's rejection of the plaintiff's re-defense without any deliberation is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the approval of debt, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. Therefore, the ground for appeal pointing this out has merit.

3. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the plaintiff is reversed and remanded to the court below. All appeals by the defendants are dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Jae-soo (Presiding Justice)